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This Focus moves forward a long-stalled reconsideration to argue that the  
relationship between language, ethnicity, and identity in Burma is not necessarily  
set in stone. Rather, language may be one element informing an ongoing  
process that various groups engage in to define themselves in relation to others.
2 | The Newsletter | No.75 | Autumn 2016 
  
Contents
 3 From the Director
  THE STUDY
 4-5  New urban proletariat: Why town development  
needs pastoralists
  Emilia Roza Sulek
 6-7  The Green March brings forth the desert  
treasures: Japanese cooperation and Morocco’s  
south-Atlantic fishing
   Mayuka Tanabe
 8-9  The Leshan Giant Buddha Scenic Area:  
Contestation among the stakeholders
  Xiaomei ZHAO
 10-11 Social protection and regional migration 
   governance: Some insights from ASEAN
  Elisa Fornalé
 12 Heritage and political change in Indonesia
  Tod Jones
 13 Special feature: The Exhibition
  Moving Cambodia
  Jaskiran Dhillon, Radhika Subramaniam & Miriam Ticktin
 14-15 Special feature: The Interlocuter
  Being human in the world: Towards alternative 
  pedagogies
  Aarti Kawlra & Françoise Vergès
  THE REGION
 16-17 News from Southeast Asia
 18-20 News from Northeast Asia
 21-23 China Connections
  THE REVIEW
 24 Pakistan clarified 
  Kristoffel Lieten
 24 Electoral dynamics in Indonesia
  Kevin Evans
 26 From the other side of the fence:  
  Two new books about Bali
  Graeme MacRae
 26 Images of the Canton factories
  Hope Marie Childers
 28 The ICAS 10 Asian Studies Book Fair
  THE FOCUS
 29-43 Does language equal ethnicity in Burma?
   Guest Editor: Patrick McCormick
  THE REVIEW Continued 
 44-45 New reviews and titles on newbooks.asia
  THE NETWORK
 46 AUP Publications
 47 IIAS Announcements
 48-49 Urban Knowledge Network Asia – An update
 50-51 The Adspace
  
 52 IIAS Announcements
 53 IIAS Research and Projects 
 54-55 IIAS Fellowship Programme 
  THE PORTRAIT
 56 Chaekgeori: the power of books
  Jinyoung Jin
The Focus 
Does language 
equal ethnicity 
in Burma?
32-33
The Tai or Shan people of Burma stand in  
a complex linguistic and cultural relationship 
with the peoples around them. Mathias Jenny 
explores how they have adopted ideas and  
linguistic practices from their larger, more power-
ful neighbours, while simultaneously fulfilling 
that same role for nearby upland peoples.
34-35
The Kachin have long featured in anthropology, 
but how long has this super-ethnic category 
indexed a local reality? André Müller presents  
a linguistic analysis suggesting that at least 
some of the speakers in this category have  
been in close contact for a long time. 
36-37
Keita Kuraba and Masao Imamura trace the 
rise of Jinghpaw as the language franca and 
preeminent medium of cultural and literary 
expression among the Kachins in Burma  
since the nineteenth century. 
38
What happens when people are made into 
an ethnic group, yet one without a common 
language or script? Takahiro Kojima explores 
how various Palaung groups have struggled  
to agree upon and promote a common  
Palaung language and script. 
39
Rachel Weymuth focuses specifically on  
the technical aspects of creating a common 
Palaung language out of disparate lects,  
a process involving considerations of power  
and prestige.  
40-41
‘Reducing’ speech to script means actually 
reducing its variety and variation. Through  
the lens of creating a Palaung dictionary, 
Nathan Badenoch traces this process to  
remind us that the ways Palaung groups  
have related to each other and their larger 
neighbours is hardly unchanging. 
42-43
People tend to equate language with ethnicity 
in Burma. Yet as Patrick McCormick explores, 
in whatever way speakers of Burmese dialects 
consider themselves – as an ethnicity separate 
from the majority Burmans or not – they  
tend to occupy the same hierarchical position  
as the Burman majority. 
29-31 Introduction
After decades, the possibilities for doing research  
in and about Burma have slowly begun to increase.  
Guest editor Patrick McCormick pairs the trajectory of  
the country, which cut itself off from the international 
academic community, with the stagnation of Burma  
Studies. Yet the hurdles academics and intellectuals  
face are still steep. 
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The 2016-2017 academic year started well for IIAS, as we received a major  
grant from the New York-based Andrew W. Mellon Foundation to continue   
our innovative work to develop new research and teaching paradigms that  
seek to move beyond traditional area studies, towards what can best be  
defined as globally connected humanities. 
Philippe Peycam 
THE FOUR-YEAR GRANT, through a collaborative platform  
of over twenty Asian, African, European and North American 
universities and their local social and cultural partners, 
will support work toward the co-creation of an alternative 
humanistic pedagogy curriculum. This follows the successful 
completion of a previous three-year project (Rethinking  
Asian Studies in a Global Context; www.rethinking.asia),  
also supported by The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation,  
to rethink the scholarly practice of area (Asia) studies in 
today’s global context. 
The new programme is entitled Humanities across  
Borders: Asia and Africa in the World. The initiative calls for  
expanding the scope of the humanities by mobilising the 
knowledge in ‘everyday life practices’ that have remained 
largely unrepresented in contemporary academia. It will  
connect and mobilise a global network of individuals and 
institutions capable of generating such knowledge in Asia 
and Africa in order to develop new pedagogies for teach-
ing, research, and dissemination of this knowledge across 
disciplinary, national, and sectorial borders. The aim is to 
contribute to the realignment of the social role and mission  
of institutions of higher learning with regard to the human-
istic principles and values that inspired their establishment 
in the first place (see also the article on pages 14-15 by Aarti 
Kawlra and Françoise Vergès). 
This overall goal encompasses the following objectives:  
the establishment of a trans-regional consortium of  
engaged scholars, educators, and  institutions committed 
to innovations in research and education; the development 
of experimental methodological interventions through 
the collection, production, and analysis of humanistic 
‘meaning-making’ knowledge in four regions – Southeast 
Asia, South Asia, East Asia, and West Africa – along key ‘sites 
of knowledge’ and common themes of comparison; the 
encouragement of university-society participatory activities 
and, when possible, their institutionalisation in the form of 
trans-disciplinary centres for testing curricula and pedagogies 
in partner institutions; the joint finalisation of a curricular 
matrix capable of integrating other forms of humanistic 
learning out of different local contexts.
My message here would not be complete without saying 
a few words about ICAS 10. Work is currently underway to 
prepare for the convention that will take place in Chiang Mai,  
Thailand, from 20-23 July 2017, in partnership with Chiang  
Mai University (CMU). The tenth edition of the biennial ICAS 
event will be innovative in many ways. In close collaboration 
with CMU, IIAS is seeking to diversify the range of activities 
and experiences at the convention, with an effort toward 
closer connections between intellectual and cultural activities 
within the local society (ICAS 10 will take pace directly after  
the annual International Thai Studies Conference, to be 
held at the same venue). In addition to thematic panels, 
roundtables and keynotes, the convention will host art and 
craft exhibitions, film viewings, and academic-civil society 
exchanges. 
Another major innovation concerns the ICAS Book Prize 
(IBP), now in its seventh edition. For the first time, the IBP  
will feature publications in languages other than English: 
Chinese, Korean, French and German. We believe this  
will contribute to the extension of ‘spaces of knowledge’ 
about Asia, and facilitate exchanges between them.  
The IBP is made possible thanks to the collaboration with  
a number of key partners including Leiden University’s 
Asia Library, the GIS-Réseau Asie, the Hong Kong Institute 
of Education, the Seoul National University Asia Centre 
(SNUAC), the German Institute of Global and Area Studies 
(GIGA), and the Schweizerische Akademie der Geistes- und 
Sozialwissenschaften.  
As these two major IIAS undertakings demonstrate,  
2017 – hailed as the ‘Asia Year’ in Leiden (see page 47) – will 
see IIAS continue its pioneering work to expand knowledge 
on and with Asia, in the world.
Philippe Peycam, Director IIAS 
The 10th International 
Convention of Asia Scholars
20-23 July 2017
Chiang Mai, Thailand
Experts in the field of Asian Studies will meet in the delightful Northern Thai city of
Chiang Mai. Events will include: panels and roundtable discussions, keynote speeches,
and the first Asian Studies Book Fair. Enjoy the multitude of networking opportunities,
possibilities to share your research and to meet with academic publishers.
Booth registration will open soon 
Sign up to receive all ICAS 10 related updates 
http://icas.asia/icas-10
See page 28 for 
details about the 
ICAS 10 Asian 
Studies Book Fair
New urban proletariat
Above: 
New in town. 
Pastoralists from 
Martod County in 
Dawu. (photo by 
author; 2007)
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Resettlement is a tool applied by many governments as a cure to social or environmental ailments, a step in infra-
structure projects or an instrument of social engineering. People are resettled when the land has to be cleared for 
construction works, when natural disasters strike or environmental conditions deteriorate, but also when states want 
to assert their sovereignty and enact a process of far-reaching political, economic, and demographic transformation.  
Emilia Roza Sulek
IN CHINA, resettlement is part of a large number of state 
programs affecting both rural and urban populations.  
Perhaps the best-known case took place as a result of the 
Three Gorges Dam construction project on the Yangtze River. 
Another case that gained international attention concerned 
pastoral populations inhabiting regions as distant as the 
Tibetan plateau, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. In 2015, the 
Chinese government pledged that by the end of the year it 
would move ‘the remaining 1.2 million herders’, which begs 
the question of  how many pastoralists were already ‘moved’ 
previously.1 The main reason for resettlement was stated to 
be the need to conserve the environment, which was said to 
be suffering from desertification brought on by overgrazing;  
it was said that removing people and their herds from the land 
would remedy the problem. The second reason given was the 
government’s desire to improve the living standards of the 
pastoral populations, to give them better access to educa-
tion and healthcare facilities, as well as markets and other 
achievements of ‘developed’ society. This ‘developmental’ 
component is inseparable from resettlement; by implement-
ing resettlement the Chinese state is helping the pastoralists 
to become ‘developed’ and to make economic ‘progress’,  
but it also ‘develops’ the country or at least its image. 
Resettlement is implemented top-down rather than  
in deliberation with the communities affected by it. The  
conditions for requiring resettlement also appear to be  
quite arbitrary. The narrative about desertification has been 
proven wrong for the last thirty years; a recent book edited  
by Behnke and Mortimore shows once again that desertifica-
tion was a non-event that grew or was ‘cultivated’ by different 
economic and political actors in order to achieve their own 
goals.2 The same applies to a belief that there is a causal link 
between mobility and poverty and that ‘underdevelopment’ 
of pastoral regions is a result of pastoral mobility. As is  
typical of many discourses on pastoral populations, this  
one too feeds on imagery originating from ‘agricultural’  
and ‘settled’ societies, which hinders the understanding  
of pastoral systems and rationalizes interventions. Finally, 
when applied to mobile populations, the term ‘resettlement’ 
is misleading, as it implies that people being ‘re-settled’ are 
sedentary people, moved from one settlement to another. 
The Tibetan pastoralists involved often lived in houses during 
winter and spring, but moved to tents in higher elevated 
pastures during summer and autumn. They maintained herds 
of yaks and sheep which provided them with subsistence 
and cash income. Even though their mobility had already 
decreased compared to a century ago, due to the fragment-
ation of pastoral lands or growing importance of markets  
and services that anchored pastoralists to settlements, 
they did not have an all-year-round dwelling and were not 
permanently settled. Therefore, it would be more accurate  
in their case to talk of ‘settlement’ or ‘sedentarization’ rather 
than re-settlement. Extending to pastoral contexts the use  
of the term resettlement obscures the magnitude of change 
and the often over-imposed nature of this intervention.
Sedentarization of pastoralists on the Tibetan plateau is 
a component of a variety of programs that have similar but 
not always identical goals, target and scope.3 These programs 
impress with their technical and financial investments, but they 
also raise important questions about the rules of participation 
and its consequences. Scholars have debated the degree of 
force or persuasion with which the programs were imple-
mented; although some pastoralists volunteered to take part, 
others were selected by lottery or by local political leaders in 
order to meet the desired quota. The results of these programs, 
both already observed as well as expected to ensue, range from 
economic impoverishment through loss of nomadic lifestyle 
and knowledge, to the trauma of displacement, negative 
impact on community cohesion, religious cults and more.4 
This essay discusses yet another aspect of these programs: 
their role in the urbanization process in pastoral Tibet. It 
gathers my observations from the region called Golok, north-
eastern Tibetan plateau, from 2007, when these programs were 
gradually introduced, and 2014, when they were completed.
2007
In 2007, when I started my research,5 the state programs  
of moving pastoralists into towns were just gaining momen-
tum. Dawu, prefectural capital of Golok and my home at that 
time, grew larger as more and more accommodation was 
built for incoming pastoralists; each new neighbourhood was 
bedecked with billboards informing people about the goals 
of the program and the funds invested. It was a hot topic of 
discussion; pastoralists expressed their doubts and concerns: 
“Why does the government do it?” And, “Do you think we will 
really return to our land in ten years?” At the same time, town 
residents expressed other worries; prophesizing with regard  
to the newcomers, and fearing an increase in crime and loss  
of security, they declared: “They will end as beggars, thieves 
and prostitutes”.6
I considered conducting research about the program  
as I was struck by the novelty of this phenomenon and  
the grim narrative about the governments’ hidden agenda  
of eradicating pastoralism. However, the atmosphere  
surrounding the topic was so tense that many people 
cautioned me not to visit the ‘resettlement villages’ too  
often. They perceived it to be a politically sensitive topic,  
and in their opinion it would be wiser to stay away from it. 
Still, I managed to speak with many pastoralists and visited 
their homes, both those in the town and in the highlands. 
Several themes recurred in their narratives.
First of all, the diversity of the pastoralists’ experiences 
was striking. Some people recalled real environmental 
problems with the desert encroaching on their land, but  
others said that they had lush pastureland that could feed 
even bigger herds than they owned. This could indicate 
that the correlation between the implementation of these 
programs and their ecological reasons was often rather  
weak. In addition, the pastoralists had varying expectations 
of life in town. Their local officials promised them a ‘better 
life’, but this notion was interpreted in numerous ways. Some 
pastoralists sought education for their children, others closer 
contact with relatives working in town, or better access to 
healthcare. Many sought an easier life in terms of workload, 
with less of the physical work that consumed their days on the 
grasslands. Finally, there were also those who sought nothing 
from life in town; they did not want to move, but were forced 
to. The pastoralists’ experiences differed with regard to  
their material situation, depending on their earlier economic 
status and on what their community leaders had negotiated 
for them. Most families sold their livestock before moving  
to town, providing them with some savings. All families were 
given a simple house and a state subsidy, but on top of that 
there were also some ‘extras’. People from some townships 
received coal, others grain or clothes, and yet others no help 
in-kind at all. This diversity of expectations and experiences 
shows how easily broad generalizations can be inaccurate, 
even on the scale of just one ‘resettlement village’, which 
comprises people from different townships. 
Secondly, a certain narrative about poverty was evident  
in conversations with people regardless of their financial status. 
This manifested itself when they spoke to me, a European 
foreigner. However, a Tibetan scholar who studied this topic 
had similar observations.7 This was a sign of how a scholar or 
an outsider can be taken (or mistaken) for a ‘carrier of hope’, 
who might pass on their message to an NGO or another official 
body that could intervene, making the settler’s life easier. 
In hindsight, knowing that many of my informants did not 
struggle to make ends meet, I concluded that this narrative 
was an expression of shock caused by the costs of life in town, 
rather than a representation of people’s actual poverty.   
Why town development needs pastoralists
Above: 
Construction work 
in progress. This 
is just one of the 
settlements for 
the pastoralists in 
Dawu. (photo by 
author; 2008)
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Thirdly, even though many people complained about  
their current economic situation, some admitted that they 
had wanted to move and had done so of their own free will. 
They explained that life in town had already been desirable, 
but a step they would not have dared or afforded to take had 
it not been for the state’s assistance. Stories about monetary 
gains, through renting out the houses they were given, 
showed that some enterprising individuals were making 
a profit from the program and were using the situation 
to achieve their own goals. Some families even split into 
separate households, with the younger generations staying  
in the highlands and the elder moving to town, in order to 
enjoy both the old and the new – or to obtain a free house 
that could be rented out at some later point. These people 
saw the program not as a permanent move to town, but  
as an opportunity to increase their economic activities. 
Fourthly, the settled pastoralists were often embarrassed 
for their living conditions, which they saw as not good enough 
to receive guests. Compared to their houses in the highlands, 
those in town felt cold and uninviting, with concrete walls and 
floors, little furniture and not much in terms of decoration. 
However, leaving material scarcity aside, I later wondered 
if some houses stood half-empty simply because they were 
at the time considered to be merely temporary shelter. The 
psychology of the settlers, not self-made migrants but people 
who were forcibly moved across the land by the state, could 
possibly shed light on the austerity of the homes. Back in 
2007, many pastoralists believed that they would not stay  
in the town forever. “In ten years we’ll be back on our land”, 
they said. Some had even left some livestock in the care  
of highland relatives to secure their future return.
  
2014
During my stay in Dawu in 2014, it was clear to see that the 
town had expanded and that the settlement quarters had 
been ‘swallowed-up’ by it. Once built at the edge of the town, 
they were now surrounded by apartment blocks and new 
residential districts. It was tempting to ask whether the same 
had happened to their inhabitants: had they also been woven 
into the urban fabric? 
An expanding town needs people, including those with 
limited urban experience or skills inadequate to engage in 
secondary or tertiary sectors. The lack of school education, 
insufficient competence in the Chinese language or ‘lack  
of skills’ had been identified as obstacles to the pastoralists’ 
integration into the urban setting,8 but the growth of  
the town created employment also for such workers.  
The carwash saloons, eateries and construction sites  
needed a labour force, as did the traffic and cleaning  
sectors. Street vendors selling plastic jewellery and other 
cheap goods were recruited from among the settlers.  
But they also found jobs in shops where pastoralists were  
the main clients and where common language and  
cultural affinity mattered; even though growing in size,  
Dawu remained the capital of a pastoral prefecture and  
it was the pastoralists who were the driving force of the  
local economy and the service sector. Finally, the mani  
stone industry offered employment, too. The street  
adjoining the monastery is now filled with carvers’ tents, 
where before only a handful of people had done this work. 
Workers armed with drilling machines carve Buddhist  
prayers on evenly cut stone slabs, which are sold to  
pilgrims and tourists. Writing skills are not essential, as 
prayers and other images are often cut through stencils. 
The Chinese state settlement programs have to be  
understood beyond environmentalist policies to ‘restore’ 
Tibetan grasslands to their ‘original’ shape, or as an  
intervention to improve the standard of life of populations 
who live far away from towns, schools and hospitals.  
If settlement was only about environment, one would have  
to conclude that it did not always match its goals; many 
sources report that grazing bans were not even implemented 
and that grasslands in fact suffered under-grazing rather  
than returned to some idyllic state.9 If settlement was  
meant to improve the material standards of people’s lives, 
one would need to ask according to which criteria such 
change should be measured. The pastoralists’ stories  
concerning their financial precariousness, even if some- 
times exaggerated, do not create a picture of affluence  
and satisfaction. At least in the first years after the move,  
the ‘quality jump’ either did not take place or was difficult  
to see. 
The settlement programs should instead be considered 
within the context of China’s urbanization drive. In moving 
pastoralists to towns these programs produced urban citizens. 
This dimension of the settlement, as fuelling the town develop-
ment, was not included in the official portfolio of reasons when 
these programs were introduced. However, it is in this context 
that they have appeared particularly effective. Even if the  
settlers retained their rural resident registration (which in  
China is still difficult to change) they became de facto urban 
dwellers. Their lives, even with difficulties, became town lives. 
And where the development of towns creates jobs for people, 
people are needed for the development of towns.10
New urban proletariat
There is no doubt that people can adapt to the most adverse 
conditions and find ways to survive. Tibetan pastoralists can 
do it, as well. Existing literature reports on the initial shock 
and confusion, and discusses the identity crisis and social and 
psychological problems that haunt people who are thrown  
into new and, for many, unfamiliar settings; the next few 
years will perhaps bring new studies showing how things have 
evolved. For many people the scenario of going back to the 
highlands now seems impossible. “They will never go back to 
their land”, as someone told me in 2014. “Here, they can at 
least earn some money, but who will give them a job when they 
are back on their land?” It appears that, after the initial years, 
people came to perceive urbanization as a one-way street or 
a process from which there is no way back. Likewise, a similar 
perception was that as soon as one becomes a paid labourer, 
there is no return. Once you lose your economic autonomy,  
you will not be able to regain it. 
The settled pastoralists indeed made a transition from life 
defined by self-employment and a high degree of autonomy,  
to a life working for others. As if this was not enough, it was 
often work in sectors that are not particularly well-respected. 
The art of survival for this new urban proletariat depended on 
their ability to find economic satisfaction whilst being an under-
class in the local society. If they wanted to survive, they had to 
redefine their thinking about jobs that they had previously never 
wished to do. “People’s attitudes to work are changing”, as some 
pastoralists said in 2014. “Even work on a construction site was 
something we despised. Let alone garbage collecting!” 
Towns are the habitat of people who are not economically 
self-sufficient and who have to rely on others. In effect, they 
bring forth new needs and job opportunities, binding their 
citizens with new ties and absorbing newcomers who both  
fill existing niches and create new ones. Dawu is a special case; 
it is a growing town that is undergoing substantial investments 
with the hope to attract tourists, and it provides new settlers 
with an existing social and economic environment. But how 
are settlers surviving in other locations? One can only hope 
that as long as they are relocated into, or near to, existing 
towns, rather than brand new settlements in isolated areas, 
they will be able to depend on the existing social and economic 
structures, into which they can hopefully assimilate, with 
better or worse results.
Emilia Roza Sulek is a social anthropologist, Mongolist 
and Tibetologist, and currently a visiting fellow at the 
International Institute for Asian Studies. The author thanks 
Lilian Iselin, Saverio Krätli and Jarmila Ptackova for their 
critical reading of this essay (emisulek@yahoo.com).
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Japan-Morocco economic and technical cooperation in the fishing sector has inadvertently resulted in Moroccan  
domestic politics integrating Western Sahara into the national territory. Japanese cooperation does not officially extend 
to Western Sahara due to the region’s disputed political status, yet it was nevertheless effectively used by the Moroccan 
government to develop the fishing industry in the region. This was motivated by the rich fishing grounds off the south-
Atlantic coastline, from Tarfaya to the Mauritanian border, which are good for more than 60 percent of the Moroccan 
national fishery production in quantity and value. Furthermore, after thirty years of Japanese cooperation, the Moroccan 
fishing industry in Laâyoune and Dakhla (Western Sahara) now plays a leading role in the south-south cooperation  
between Morocco and sub-Saharan countries, by initiating workshops and educational programmes designed  
for the transferral of technical knowledge.
Mayuka Tanabe
FISH MAKES UP HALF of all animal protein consumption  
in Japan, the highest rate in the world; the fishing industry  
has long been a vital part of economic and social life of the 
nation. Since the 1960s, however, Japan has had to start 
importing fisheries products (seafood) as a way to counter-
balance the loss of domestic and distant-water production.1 
As reliance upon imported fisheries products intensified in the 
mid 1980s, cooperation with African and Oceanic countries 
was a necessary measure for the Japanese government in 
securing fisheries import while maintaining relationships 
through technical and economic cooperation. 
The start of the Japanese-Moroccan cooperation was  
the fisheries agreement signed between the two countries  
in 1985, in which the Moroccan government allowed thirty 
Japanese high-sea vessels to fish tuna and bonito in their  
200 miles offshores. Since then Morocco has also supported 
Japan’s position at ICCAT Madrid (concerning tuna fishing), 
with regards to the Washington Treaty (International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1956), and the  
IWC (International Whaling Commission). In short, Japanese 
fisheries diplomacy in Morocco has had three main objectives: 
1) securing food import for the Japanese nation; 2) acquiring 
rights for their vessels to fish off the Moroccan Atlantic  
shores; 3) acquiring political allies to defend their position  
on whaling and tuna fishing in the global context. So far  
the two countries have built a mutually beneficial relation,  
in terms of strengthening their political and economic 
influences in the African continent and beyond. 
Western Sahara: the core of the Moroccan  
fishing industry
In November 1975 hundreds of thousands of Moroccans 
crossed their southern border into Spanish Sahara in the 
strategic mass demonstration known as ‘the Green March’. 
Accompanied by 20,000 troops, the event forced Spain to 
relinquish its power over the disputed territory. Although 
Morocco at first received very little resistance, it eventually 
became embroiled in a sixteen-year war with the Saharawi 
Polisario Front, representing some of the indigenous 
population, until a 1991 UN ceasefire. Morocco has secured  
de facto control of much of the region (including the coast) 
since then. The development of the fishing industry in this 
region was one of the important Moroccan policies to  
create income opportunities for both Moroccan immigrants 
coming from the north of Tarfaya and also for the local 
Saharawi groups, in view of total annexation of Western 
Sahara to Morocco by means of economic integration. 
In light of this political context, Japan’s financial and 
technical support has played an indirect but significant role. 
2015 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the start of the 
cooperation between Japan and Morocco, which began with  
a bilateral agreement on marine fishing in 1985. Japan-
Morocco relations are characterised by the two countries’ 
heavy economic reliance on import and export of fishery 
products. Morocco is the top exporter of fishery products in 
Africa. As a leading foreign exchange earner, accounting for 
56 percent of agricultural and 16 percent of total exports,  
the fishing industry is an important economic sector of 
Morocco with an inextricable connection to Asia, Africa  
and the European Union.2 Due to the growing demand for 
fisheries products, not only from Spain, Portugal and Japan, 
but also from Russia and China, the marine species off the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic shores of Morocco proper have 
become endangered. Therefore, south-Atlantic fishing off the 
shores of Western Sahara (Laâyoune, Boujdour and Dakhla)  
is of utmost importance to the Moroccan fishing industry;  
the Western Saharan coastal area accounts for approximately  
50 percent (in quantity) of Morocco’s annual production  
of more than 1,000,000 ton. Furthermore, the types of fish 
caught in this region mainly consist of cephalopods (such as 
octopus and squids) and other deep-sea fish, which sell at a 
three or four times higher price than the sardines and small 
pelagic fish caught in Morocco proper. In 2013, the fish 
captured along the Western Saharan coast accounted for  
64 percent of the Moroccan national production in value.3 
Although the JICA (Japan International Cooperation 
Agency) is not directly active in the development of Western 
Sahara, its models have nevertheless been locally adopted 
and implemented, exemplified by the highly computerised 
fish market, ‘the Hall of Fish’ (la halle au poisson) in the port of 
Laâyoune. Currently the ports of Laâyoune and Dakhla boast 
the most advanced levels of hygiene, traceability, inspection, 
and price control in the entire African continent, and strictly 
comply with the European Union’s import standards. 
Since the 1980s, the Moroccan fishing sector has been 
profoundly transformed by Japanese cooperation. The 
development of infrastructure, fishing techniques and human 
resources has made Morocco less dependent on Europe and 
has increased its negotiating power with regard to fisheries 
agreements. Furthermore, the development of the artisanal 
fishing sector has contributed to a new pattern of internal 
migration of fishermen (see below), and has also helped them 
acquire new techniques and hygiene standards, making their 
products competitive in the international market. 
However, Japanese cooperation has also had a profound 
effect on the integration process of Western Sahara into 
Moroccan territory. It started with the building of the port  
in Agadir in the mid-1980s, which initially served as a supply 
base for the Moroccan tanks rolling into Western Sahara for 
the war against the Polisario. Eventually the Moroccan 
government utilised the Japanese ODA (Official Development 
Assistance) to build a dock for high-sea vessels, which became 
a national disembarkation point for the ships fishing off the 
shores of Laâyoune and Dakhla. The Japanese cooperation 
served as the foundation for the Moroccan government’s 
construction of the most advanced ports and fishery facilities 
in Western Sahara, which has became the undeniable centre 
of Morocco’s fishing industry. 
The Moroccanisation of the fishing sector
The cooperation between Japan and Morocco officially  
started in 1985, at the request of the Moroccan government 
for help to ‘Moroccanise’ the professional workforce in the 
fishing sector, which had long been dominated by foreigners. 
Prior to this time, the Moroccan domestic fishing sector had 
no training institutions or fishing ports with docks; it lacked 
the necessary infrastructure for disembarkation and had no 
freezing facilities. Morocco was merely making its fishing 
grounds available to the European Union and was missing  
out on a significant amount of foreign currency. 
In order to Moroccanise its high-sea captains and trawlers, 
and to provide practical education for its mariners, the first 
EPM (École des Pêches Maritimes) was established in Agadir 
with JICA’s non-refundable financial and technical support. 
The EPM’s educational programme was supported by the  
UN’s FAO, and the curriculum was based on the French 
system. JICA sent several experts to teach navigational 
techniques. By 2000, thanks to these educational efforts,  
all the high-sea and inshore captains and mariners were 
Moroccan nationals. The EPM Agadir was upgraded to ISPM 
(Institut Supérieur des Pêches Maritimes) in 2006. Currently 
there are five ITPM (Institut de la Technologie des Pêches 
Japanese cooperation and Morocco’s south-Atlantic fishing 
Below: 
Imessouane: the 
first fishing village 
(VDP) created by 
Japanese cooperation
(photo by author).
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Maritimes), eight CQPMs (Centre de la Qualification des Pêches 
Maritimes), and one ISPM in the coastal cities of Morocco. 
The second initiative by the Japanese-Moroccan coop-
eration, was to build the INRH (Institut de la Recherche 
Halieutique) headquarters in Casablanca, a fisheries research 
centre that promotes diversification of production and 
aquaculture, which controls the number of vessels in port and 
their fishing allowances. For example, every year (since 1989) 
they set a ‘biological rest’ period for octopus fishing, so as to 
protect the animals during their breeding season. 
The third important pillar of the cooperation, also vital  
to Moroccan politics with regard to Western Sahara, was  
to provide infrastructure for artisanal fishermen and their 
small-scale fishing activities. Historically, Moroccan artisanal 
fishermen sold their catch to intermediaries (mareyeurs),  
who bought at very low prices and who in return delivered  
the necessary provisions such as gasoline or ice, since the 
fishermen mostly had quite solitary working and living 
conditions. This project aimed to break this system of 
isolation. It set about building a fishing industry in Agadir, 
with docks and other substantial infrastructure. In order to 
sedentarise the artisanal fishermen, the first fishing village 
(village de pêcheurs, VDP) was built in Imessouane in 1996,  
on the Atlantic coast 99km north of Agadir, with the Japanese 
aid of 63 million Moroccan dirhams. The project was designed 
to improve the living and working conditions of 200 artisanal 
fishermen on the site; to advance the safety of accessing and 
navigating the sea for 60 small scale boats; and to enhance 
the conservation and marketing of fish. The community  
based approach included the creation of a cooperative, which 
manages fishing activities and the general needs of everyday 
life, such as the distribution of gasoline, the mosque and 
meeting rooms for education. Freezing facilities, and the 
knowledge of how to fabricate ice, are crucial elements  
in raising the quality and value of merchandise. Following  
suit, three more VDPs were created on the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean coasts: Cala Iris (1996), Souiria Q’dima 
(1998-1999) and Sidi Hsaine (2002-2003). Later, a number  
of unloading points, PDA (Point de Débarquement Aménagé), 
similar to VDPs but without ports, were created. The Moroccan 
government built a total of 30 PDAs up and down the coast, 
mostly in the Western Sahara. 
The ‘sedentarisation’ of villagers in Imessouane was 
partially successful; their revenue went up significantly and 
many benefited from insurance (CNSS, Casse Nationale de la 
Sécurité Sociale). The fishermen come to the VDP as early as 
4am in the morning to prepare their materials, and return to 
their home villages after work. Their wives engage in other 
economic activities, such as collecting mussels, herding and 
cultivating Argan trees. They also participate in literacy 
programmes at the mosque. Some of the fishermen have 
indicated some technical problems at the port, preventing 
them from fishing during the winter months. The port of 
Imessouane is indeed only usable for five to six months, 
during the summer and autumn. 
As a result, about 30 percent of the young villagers  
in the Agadir region migrate south to Dakhla, Tan Tan,  
Boujdour and other areas during winter months (December  
to February), which is also the season of octopus fishing. 
Octopus is abundant in the Western Saharan waters, and 
fetch higher prices than other products. Migrants from 
Imessouane generally build temporary barracks near the 
disembarkation sites, and find work with local boat owners. 
Before 2000, Laâyoune and Dakhla lay in an anarchical 
territory where Moroccans and foreigners would randomly 
catch octopus and other marine species and then disembark 
at the Spanish port of Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. After 
the building of the modern ports and PDAs, the central state 
encouraged the local Saharawi people to work in fishing.  
The project ‘Sakia El Hamra’ was implemented in 2011,  
which aimed to absorb the young indigenous population  
into the fishing sector, by giving them education and offering 
250 boats (one for six persons) for free, equipped with  
fishing tools. However, the project to provide work for the 
indigenous population simply resulted in more work 
performed by migrants from Morocco proper, since many  
of the locals rented out or sold their boats and did not actually 
work themselves. Some of the migrants from the north of 
Tarfaya (Agadir, Essaouira, Safi, El Jadida, Marrakech, etc.)  
are now settled in the region, with sufficient income to buy  
a house and educate their children, whereas others leave their 
families in the home villages and engage in seasonal labour.
South-south cooperation 
The current advanced state of the Moroccan fishing industry  
is the most successful example of the Japanese fisheries  
policies in Africa. After 30 years of Japanese cooperation in the 
Moroccan fishing sector, involving the non-refundable annual 
aid of 500 million yen (4.42 million euros), Morocco has grown 
to possess a solid infrastructure and expertise in the fishing 
sector. What characterises the Japanese cooperation most  
is the ‘win-win relation’, guided by the principle to help build  
up the national economy of the African country, as opposed  
to mere exploitation of resources. As a result, Morocco now 
functions as mediator of technical knowledge transferral,  
from Japan to countries in sub-Saharan Africa, referred to  
as ‘south-south cooperation’. 
In March 2016, the 27th edition of the Crans Montana  
Forum took place in Dakhla, with the theme ‘Africa and the 
South-South Cooperation - Toward a better Governance for  
a sustainable Economic & Social Development’, reinforcing 
Dakhla’s leading position not only in the national fishing 
industry, but also in the south-south cooperation. More than 
1000 participants from 130 countries were present, including 
African and European entrepreneurs looking for business 
opportunities in Western Sahara. By choosing the city of Dakhla 
as a venue for the forum, the Moroccan government intended 
to showcase the advanced level of its fishing industry and 
economic activities, and the impact on the sub-Saharan African 
countries’ development through regional cooperation. 
The strong relationship between Morocco and 
Francophone Africa dates back to the time of late king Hassan 
II, who sent several political advisors and made significant 
investments in various sectors such as banking, telecom-
munication and insurance in Gabon, Guinea, Benin, Senegal, 
Comoro and Madagascar. The south-south cooperation in  
the fisheries sector is aimed at further solidifying Morocco’s 
economic and political influence in West Africa. 
Conclusion
Japanese financial and technical support to Morocco’s  
fishing industry has not only led to unbelievable develop-
ment and growth – turning it from a lawless, artisanal  
and unproductive sector, into a high-tech and profitable 
industry – but the cooperation has also had an indirect  
effect on internal politics concerning the incorporation  
of Western Sahara. In a win-win situation, Japan benefits  
from Morocco’s fisheries products: the octopus collected  
in Dakhla alone constitute 40-60 percent of the Japanese 
market demand. 
On 6 November 2015, the Moroccan nation celebrated 
their 40th anniversary of the Green March; like a swarm  
of bees they eventually extracted treasures from the desolate 
desert landscape. With the abundance of fishing resources, 
Western Sahara has become an integral part of the Moroccan 
economy, attracting migrants and foreign investors who,  
in so doing, recognise the region as Moroccan territory. 
Evidently, for the Moroccan government and its people,  
the Green March has no end. 
Mayuka Tanabe, is a Fellow at the International  
Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden; and a Postdoctoral 
researcher (anthropologist) at the Institut des Mondes 
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The Leshan Giant Buddha Scenic Area 
Fig. 1 (above): 
Giant Buddha  
with a view from  
the river (photo by 
Yue JIA in 2013).
Fig. 2 (below left): 
The gate of Linyun 
Temple (photo by 
Yue JIA in 2013).
Fig. 3 (below right): 
Buddhist service at 
Linyun Temple (photo 
by Yue JIA in 2013).
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The Leshan Giant Buddha Scenic Area (LGBSA) in China’s  
Sichuan Province is a sacred site for the Maitreya faith, the 
main belief of the local people. It is a world heritage site 
(WHS) that was inscribed in 1996, together with the adjacent 
Mount Emei Scenic Area (MESA). At 71 metres high, the Giant 
Buddha is the largest Buddha statue in the world. The LGBSA 
is located across the river from the ancient city of Leshan,  
and includes a number of important protected cultural  
monuments in a setting of great natural beauty. 
The Giant Buddha was carved out of a hillside in the  
8th century, and overlooks the junction of three rivers (fig. 1). 
Lingyun Temple (fig. 2) stands on the cliff above the Buddha;  
it was first built in the 7th century, but destroyed twice 
between the 13th and 17th centuries. Its present structure  
is from the early Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). The monks  
offer Buddhist services to, mainly, pilgrims who visit on 
special occasions each year (fig. 3). Other significant cultural 
structures in the area include Mahao Crag (fig. 4), a collection 
of over 500 tombs originating from the 1st to 4th centuries, 
and Wuyou Temple, an important place of worship for  
local Buddhists.
Incredibly, there is also a theme park called Oriental  
Buddha Park (OBP), situated right in the middle of this WHS, 
between the Giant Buddha and Mahao Crag. It is run by  
a private travel company, which has reproduced hundreds  
of famous Buddha statues found all over the world.  
The theme park is the second biggest attraction in the  
area, after the Giant Buddha itself, and many tourists pay  
to enter the park rather than visit other zones for free  
(or less). They are likely misled by all the advertising and  
the theme park’s obvious presence.
Conflict between local communities and the MC
Like other sacred Buddhist sites in China, Linyun Temple and 
its Giant Buddha statue were once local facilities. They stood 
in beautiful surroundings, amongst a number of small settle-
ments (see map), whose inhabitants would visit the temple for 
their daily prayers and other religious ceremonies. The local 
residents were fishermen and peasants; fishing the river and/
or farming the land in the mountains. However, in the early 
1990s, large numbers of locals were relocated, thereby losing 
their land. This decision to relocate was made and carried out 
by the Management Committee (MC) of LGBSA, established  
to take charge of the WHS application in 1996 and currently 
the executive of the LGBSA.1 The committee’s main concerns 
are the preservation of the inscribed cultural heritage and  
the investment in tourist services to bring money to the  
area, rather than the personal needs of the local people.
Bizijie is a community of 1244 households, located right 
at the main entrance of the LGBSA. Its name literally means 
‘comb street’, indicating its original layout that is typical for 
a traditional Chinese village: a main street with branching 
alleys. The village used to be bigger, but many residents were 
relocated. The compensation was very low, and certainly  
insufficient. Those who remained lost their farmland and had  
to turn to other ways to make money, such as tourist services  
like snack bars, restaurants and souvenir shops. The revenue  
was at first not bad because of the village’s prime location 
at the entrance of the WHS area, but in 2004 a travel agency 
was established, under the supervision of the MC, which 
monopolised the local tourist business and isolated Bizijie from 
the tourist route by building blocks in the middle of the road 
between the community and the Scenic Area. Even though 
the blocks were dismantled a few days later, the conflict had 
taken hold and the locals lost their trust in the MC.2 Most of the 
remaining residents gave up and moved out of the area, leaving 
all tourist business to be run by outsiders with little to no  
knowledge of local history, and who are not even Buddhists. 
Another example of conflict between the MC and locals 
has taken place at the village Yucun. Yucun literally means 
‘fishing village’; its 40 households used to make a living by 
fishing the rivers. Before the 1990s, all visitors to the Giant 
Buddha arrived by boat and walked through the village to the 
statue. However, in the 1990s the MC decided to reconstruct 
the village, and temporarily moved the inhabitants to 
Diaoyutai. They were promised they could soon return, yet 
this has still not been made possible. Currently Yucun is no 
longer a settlement, but just a street with restaurants, tea 
houses and souvenir shops. To be fair, the owners of these 
establishments are amongst the original inhabitants, but 
business is disappointing. The route to the Scenic Area has 
been diverted and tourists no longer pass through Yucan on 
their way to the Giant Buddha. The revenue is no more than 
basic living expenses, as one of the owners told us.
These are not the only examples in the area of people 
who have been forced to move. Many more have lost their 
land due to land expropriation by the MC. The compensation 
is minimal and they have not been given priority to employ-
ment by MC’s travel agency, even though most positions are 
non-technical and low-paid, such as cleaners and guards. 
Most of the young people have had to find work in other 
towns and cities. Ironically, the private travel agency running 
the Oriental Buddha Park is regarded in a more positive light 
by most locals. The OBP agency has also expropriated some 
farmland and has relocated residents, but it pays a higher 
compensation, many of the relocated people are hired by the 
travel agency afterwards, and all the residents get pension 
insurance – the three main concerns of relocation are much 
better dealt with by the OBP agency than by the Heritage MC. 
The various stakeholders of  
a heritage site will commonly  
appreciate it for different reasons; 
sometimes to such an extent 
that conflict and contestation 
occurs. This is the case at the 
World Heritage site Leshan Giant 
Buddha Scenic Area, which is not 
only a holy place for the Maitreya 
faith in China, but also a very 
popular tourist destination.  
Xiaomei ZHAO 
Contestation among the stakeholders
Map (below):  
Local communities,  
worshipping areas  
and touristic attract- 
ions at the WHS of  
LGBSA (drawn by the  
CHCC team working  
on the Management  
Plan of LGBSA in 2013). 
Fig. 4 (below right): 
Mahao Crag (photo 
by Yue JIA in 2013).
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Buddhist sanctuary or touristic destination? 
The Outstanding Universal Value (OUV) of the LGBSA,3 stated 
by UNESCO, lies in the unique landscape at the confluence of 
three rivers, the technique of constructing the Giant Buddha, 
and the testimony of the historical development of the 
Maitreya faith in China. The inscription of World Heritage Site 
attracts an immense amount of attention. In the question-
naire,4  93% of the interviewees know of the site, though 
only 11% have been there. The number of visitors has been 
increasing steadily, reaching 3 million in 2012. However, the 
tourism boom seems to be overwhelming the sacredness of 
this Buddhist site.5
There are two temples at LGBSA, Lingyun and Wuyou, 
where religious services are offered by the same group of 
monks. Both temples used to be thriving and bustling on the 
1st and 15th day of each month when hundreds of locals came 
to light incense and to pray. The temples have different users 
now, mainly because of their respective locations. Locals only 
go to Wuyou Temple, as an entry fee is charged at Linyun. 
Linyun is always full of tourists whose main destination is the 
Giant Buddha. Most visitors offer incense, even though they 
are not necessarily devout followers, and many pilgrims are 
attracted by the reputation of the temple. The monks thus 
benefit from the fame of the World Heritage Site, and would 
now like to enlarge their temples and improve their living  
and work conditions. However, their plan has been refused  
by the MC, as the temples are important features of the WHS, 
situated right in the middle of the Scenic Area, where new 
construction is forbidden. In this case it seems that heritage 
protection is being given priority over religious demands, 
even though the religion is essential for the heritage value. 
However, the MC’s consideration may in fact lie with wanting 
to follow the WHS ‘rules’, as the inscription brings with  
it tourism and income for the local economy. 
Based on the outcome of the questionnaire,6 the visitors’ 
appreciation of this heritage site is quite ambiguous. They 
agree with the OUV of the area, yet most visitors fail to see or 
understand the many cultural and historic aspects of the site. 
Their schedules are often tight, and they are commonly given 
just half a day by the travel agency to explore the Scenic Area. 
The main attraction is the ‘hugeness’ of the Giant Buddha, and 
the impressive landscape, yet little to no attention is given to 
understanding the history of the Maitreya faith or experienc-
ing the local culture. The fact that the average tourist is 
denied the full experience of local religious performances and 
daily activities, potentially impairs their better understanding 
of the heritage values of the World Heritage Site. 
Whose heritage? 
There are different stakeholders of the Leshan Giant  
Buddha Scenic Area, dividable into several groups according 
to relation to, and main concern with, the heritage site  
(table 1 below). Their demands often conflict with one 
another.
Besides functioning as an authority, with economic growth 
as its primary task, the MC is also guided and limited in its 
actions and policies by the official OUV. The Outstanding 
Universal Values need to be met before being inscribed on 
the World Heritage List; the 6 criteria for ‘cultural heritage’ 
have been determined by UNESCO and its advisory institutes. 
Although it’s an open framework, the OUV are still defined 
by the authorities, who have clearly given priority to the on 
site ‘monuments’, with less concern for stakeholders, their 
understanding of the heritage site, and their demands. It is 
indeed common at WHS, especially at living heritage sites of 
significant religious value such as the LGBSA, that the tangible 
heritage (mainly monuments and buildings) is the only object 
of conservation and periodic monitoring by international 
authorities, while the associated intangible traditions and 
beliefs, which have close links with their stakeholders, are 
often neglected. 
The LGBSA has been valued as a masterpiece of great  
originality and ingenuity (criterion iv) and as directly  
associated with the living tradition of Buddhism (criterion vi). 
In direct accordance with WHS rules, the MC only takes  
great care of the various inscribed heritage elements on 
the site, rather than the integral development of the whole 
heritage site. 
The Giant Buddha and its associated religious facilities  
are the main monuments, and are considered to be the main 
touristic resources. The problem is that the MC fails to find 
other ways than heritage tourism to develop the area; other 
local resources (such as the local culture and surrounding 
natural landscape) are out-performed by the main monu-
ments, and have little significance for the MC development 
plans. The local belief, which is an indispensable part of this 
Buddhist site, is given little attention simply because it isn’t 
able to bring in money. 
The MC has worked hard to ensure no changes are  
made to the monuments, thus safeguarding the tourism 
business, even though the changes could in fact revitalize  
the religion. The local people are given even less concern.  
The Scenic Area used to be their living space, and they are  
the most able to interpret the heritage values of their 
Maitreya faith. Yet the conservation approach in use is 
certainly not human-based, and serves neither as a way  
to continue the local beliefs, nor to enrich people’s lives,  
even though the heritage site used to be all theirs, before 
becoming universal ‘heritage’.
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Economic growth based
on heritage management
Profit, under MC  
supervision
Investment and profit based
on the heritage resource
Benefit from private business
based on the heritage resource
Survival, employment and 
better living conditions
Bigger and improved ceremony
area and religious services
Appreciation of the heritage site
Table 1: Stakeholders of the Leshan Giant Buddha Scenic Area
Group Relation to heritage site Stakeholders Main concerns
Executive Administration
Tourism Tourist services 
Local On site; used to/currently  
communities living off local resources
 Worshipping and/or 
Buddhists providing religious
 services at the site
Visitors Visiting the scenic area 
LGBSA Management 
Committee
Leshan Giant Buddha 
Industrial Co., Ltd
Oriental Buddha Park 
Travel Company
Private tourist 
business owner
The communities living 
in and around the site
Local  
believers
Monks of Linyun 
and Wuyou Temples
Pilgrims
Tourists
Core area
Buffer zone
Visiting spots
Original living areas
Relocated communities
Other communities
Pilgrim’s worshipping area
Local believer’s worshipping area
Tourist visiting areas
Metres
Above: 
Migrant worker in 
textile mill, Thailand. 
Image reproduced 
under a creative 
commons license, 
courtesy of ILO/
Areeluck Phankh-
ian on flickr.
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Access to social security rights and their portability for migrant workers is emerging as a legal dilemma. The urgency  
of this topic was emphasized in the broader framework of discussions that took place during the ASIA-EU People’s 
Forum (AEPF) held in Ulaan Baatar from 4 to 6 July 2016. 750 participants from civil society, academia and parliaments 
from 42 countries had a fruitful meeting, under the main theme ‘Building New Solidarities: Working for Inclusive,  
Just and Equal Alternatives in Asia and Europe’, which led to the  adoption of the ‘AEPF11 Final Declaration’ submitted  
to the 11th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit. As emphasized by Tina Ebro, who represented the International  
Organizing Committee, “we met at a time of growing inequalities, injustices and turmoil world-wide. There was a strong  
consensus at AEPF11 that the dominant development approach over the last decades – based around deregulation  
of markets, trade liberalisation, the privatisation of essential services and resources – has failed to meet peoples’ needs  
and rights, and contributed to climate change with its catastrophic consequences”.
Elisa Fornalé
Social protection and regional migration governance
THE DIFFICULTIES for migrant workers in accessing social 
protection can lead to greater vulnerability and discriminatory 
treatment in the exercise of their rights. In response to this situa-
tion, the ‘Final Declaration’ adopted by the AEPF recommended, 
in particular, that the ASEM member states “implement universal 
and comprehensive social protection, guaranteeing decent 
work, food, essential services and adequate income to vulner-
able groups” and that they “respect the rights of migrants and 
refugees, and adopt legal and political frameworks which allow 
them safe movement.”
Starting from this normative exhortation, the focus of this 
contribution will be to unpick the contemporary multilayered 
social protection regime to identify which ‘layer’ is in charge 
of migrants’ social rights and in particular to explore the 
role currently played by regions and regional agreements. 
This contribution discusses two interrelated issues: the legal 
implications of emerging regional migration regimes for the 
social protection of migrant workers and how this level of 
analysis interacts with the global migration governance.
Social protection, regionalism and migration
To make sense of this analysis, it is necessary to clarify the 
interaction between social protection, regionalism and migra-
tion. Social protection1 is part of a progressive shift from the 
domestic domain to a composite multilevel legal environment 
that draws upon migration law, labour law and human rights 
law.2 This shift is partly due to greater cross-border mobility 
and the emergence of new legal–political arenas, such as 
regional regimes, which have made the need to recognize  
the rights of non-citizens a supranational issue. Equally 
important is that the states no longer have sole responsibility 
for providing social justice and “the idea of social solidarity  
can no longer be treated as a national or local monopoly”.3  
At the international level, the human right to social security 
was first recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (art. 22), a non-binding instrument, which inspired  
the establishment of a universal international system of  
social security.4
Social protection of migrant workers has been a central 
theme since the inception of the International Labour Organ-
ization (ILO): 31 Conventions and 24 Recommendations have 
been adopted to “make social protection a reality for all” 
(ILO, 2016). In the case of migrant workers, the Social Security 
(Minimum Standards) Convention n. 102 (art. 68); the Equality  
of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention n. 19; and  
the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention 1962  
n. 118, are relevant. Additionally, in 2012, the ‘ILO Recommen-
dation concerning National Floors of Social Protection (no. 202)’ 
was adopted to guarantee social protection to “all residents”.
The portability of social security can be defined as a coro- 
llary of this basic human right. In particular, the Maintenance 
of Social Security Rights Convention 1982 n. 157, and 
Recommendation n. 167, established an international system 
for the maintenance of acquired rights emphasizing the key 
role of bilateral and multilateral social security agreements. 
As stated by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in its comment no. 19 with respect to the 
specific issue of portability, “where non-nationals, including  
migrant workers, have contributed to a social security 
scheme, they should be able to benefit from that contribution 
or receive their contribution if they leave their country”.  
With a view to facilitating the effective implementation  
and exercise of social protection at a domestic level, the 
member states have taken various measures at the bilateral 
and multilateral levels through which migrant workers can 
maintain and export the social security rights acquired  
in their country of employment.
From a historical perspective, the first instrument 
developed by member states to guarantee equal access to 
social protection for migrant workers was the bilateral social 
security agreement. These agreements originated in the 
nineteenth century as a response to several emerging issues 
related to the movement of foreign workers. At that time, the 
development of social security standards was very limited and 
these kinds of instruments facilitated only a minimum level 
of protection. After World War II, the issue of social security 
became increasingly relevant and the number of bilateral 
agreements concluded rose considerably.5 Bilateral agree-
Below: A Thai vendor 
sells produce to 
Cambodian migrant 
workers. Image 
reproduced under  
a creative commons 
license, courtesy  
of ILO/Areeluck 
Phankhian on flickr.
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Some insights from ASEAN
ments are the preferred option for extending social security 
coverage, because the countries involved can easily reach an 
agreement on their content and the drafting process generally 
requires less diplomatic effort. At the same time, the diffusion 
of these agreements can put at risk the promotion of universal 
coverage; in fact Olivier raised the concern that this multitude 
of agreements can create “different entitlements for different 
categories of migrant workers”.6
In parallel with the bilateral agreements, regionalism 
started to emerge as an efficient level of cooperation to ensure 
cross-border coordination and to influence bilateral and 
domestic measures. Regional social security agreements soon 
started to develop.7 A significant example is the European–
Mediterranean Agreements adopted between the European 
Union (EU) and Maghreb countries in the 1990s (Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia) that address the protection of social rights 
for migrant workers working in the EU. In addition, in Africa, 
the Economic Community of West African States adopted the 
General Convention on Social Security in 1993, to guarantee 
the equality of treatment between national and non-national 
workers and the preservation of acquired rights. It is becoming 
clear that regions should play a paramount role in ensuring 
that migrants’ social rights are respected. This can best be 
explained by examining the strong relationship between 
migration and regionalism. 
Regional projects are developing in various geographical 8 
contexts and “migration in the form of free circulation of people” 
is a key element in achieving real regional integration.9 The 
implementation of these regimes is shifting the normative 
debate from a global scenario to a regional domain where the 
needs of people involved in the free movement dynamics can 
be better looked after, ensuring that their human rights and 
social needs are met and overcoming the nationalist perspective 
by generating comprehensive regulations.
The European experience revealed the challenges and 
the complexities of this issue. It has been identified as a best 
practice example of how to overcome the fragmented scenario 
that results from the simultaneous existence of several bilateral 
agreements and to establish a more consistent regulatory 
framework. This framework includes the protection of social 
security rights of third-country nationals.10 It is increasingly 
clear that “constitutional commitment to respect for human 
dignity and ‘market freedoms’ (e.g. free movement of workers 
and their families) may require legal protection of ‘positive 
liberties’ by means of social rights (e.g. to education, health 
protection) in order to empower individuals to develop their 
‘human capacities’ autonomously”.11
To test this idea of the advantages of linking regionalism, 
migration and social protection, I would like to introduce some 
insights from the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). These insights will be used in an attempt to deter-
mine whether the regional layer has a major role in increasing 
access to social rights by facilitating, for instance, the adoption 
of social security agreements or whether states will opt for new 
forms of unilateralism to deal with contemporary legal gaps.
Intra-ASEAN mobility and access to social protection
When ASEAN was established in 1967 by means of the  
Bangkok Declaration (the so-called ASEAN Declaration), its 
focus was primarily on promoting stability and economic 
development in the region. There was no clear framework to 
deal with intra-regional mobility. The two founding principles 
were “non-intervention at a national level” and “a consensus  
to clearly avoid any delegation of sovereignty”.
The ASEAN regional project was developed around three 
pillars, namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the 
ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community. The ASEAN Economic Community has contributed 
to the ‘mobility agenda’ by implementing policies allowing 
the movement of highly skilled migrant workers. Meanwhile, 
ASEAN’s socio-cultural and political communities have  
addressed the mobility of low-skilled or irregular migrants,  
in particular, with respect to issues such as the protection  
of migrant workers.
Access to social protection for migrant workers is a complex 
issue in the region and it is destined to become a priority in the 
establishment of the ASEAN community. First, several legislative 
barriers are present at national levels that affect the ability of 
individuals to gain full access to social benefits and de facto limit 
their equal treatment. For instance, they have to fulfil specific 
requirements, such as minimum length of residency or minimum 
contributions, to be entitled to social security benefits. Second, 
they are increasingly facing difficulties linked with absence of 
effective portability of acquired rights, which can affect their 
decision to return to their countries of origin. In fact, contrary 
to the practice of the majority of states worldwide, no bilateral 
social security agreements exist between ASEAN member 
states. Finally, the level of ratification of international standards 
is not uniform and this results in a persistent lack of adequate 
instruments or appropriate enforcement mechanisms that puts 
the “greater integration of the ASEAN region” at risk.12
Regionalising social protection for migrant workers  
in ASEAN?
The ongoing research project on Regional Migration Governance 
(R_emigra) explores whether ASEAN regional project can poten-
tially improve the current underdeveloped scenario advancing  
in the idea of a “socially integrated region”.13
Driven by the intention to safeguard the fundamental 
human rights of migrant workers, the ASEAN Declaration  
on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant 
Workers adopted in 2007 establishes that a comprehensive 
social security system needs to be implemented progressively 
as an indispensable precondition for ensuring their integration. 
This Declaration is inspired by international human rights 
instruments and it is conceived not as a binding treaty but as 
a common standard to be achieved by the ASEAN member 
states to underpin the social rights of migrant workers. This 
understanding of social protection is supported by the overall 
importance of fostering the social protection system at a do-
mestic level, in particular the adoption of regional standards.14
The normative process in this context evolved with the 
adoption of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, 
adopted in 2009,15 and with the recent adoption of the  
ASEAN Declaration on Strengthening Social Protection in 2013. 
This non-binding instrument recognizes that “everyone at  
risk, migrant workers and other vulnerable groups, are entitled 
to have equitable access to social protection that is a basic 
human right” and this requires the development of appropriate 
tools, such as the establishment of “universal health coverage”. 
 These steps paved the way for ASEAN member states to  
commit to developing specific measures and to increasing  
the capacity to expand the coverage of social protection  
to strengthen ASEAN’s economic integration. Indeed, due 
to the non-ratification and implementation of international 
standards or social security agreements, a major emphasis  
on the crucial role of regionalism is imperative.
This situation can be illustrated with reference to progressive 
implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on Strengthening 
Social Protection. This requires the drafting at domestic level by 
each ASEAN member state of new plans of action on “common 
social protection gaps and concrete actions”.16 This will lead to 
the definition of national SPFs (social protection floors; a set 
of basic guarantees) and more comprehensive social security 
systems. In this regional effort, the member states will attempt 
to foster the implementation of the new ILO Recommendation  
n. 202 in the four sectors identified: access to essential health 
care, to basic income security for children, to basic income 
security for persons of working age, and to basic security income 
for older persons. In particular, one SPF entitles all elderly people 
to social protection and countries will be fully responsible for 
developing national schemes for providing universal pension 
coverage. It is noteworthy that many citizens in Asia currently 
receive no, or very low, pensions.
The project of deploying regional migration governance  
as a meaningful tool to implement international human rights 
standards at the domestic level could reveal this to be an  
effective framework, even though criticism can be raised about 
the potential delays and challenges in the implementation  
of regional norms at the national level. This cannot invalidate 
its relevance. Thus, given the slow progress of unilateral frame-
works, it has the potential to capture and to strengthen the 
global-domestic dialogue by achieving greater social integration. 
In fact, this normative process will facilitate the adoption at 
the domestic level of new regulations in line with the content 
of the ILO standards through fostering the implementation 
of a regional tool. And it can facilitate the future adoption of 
new bilateral or multilateral agreements to improve coopera-
tion between countries and facilitate the portability of social 
security benefits, an emerging legal imperative.
As remarked by Betts: “at the moment, social contracts 
remain state-centric and ill-adapted to a transnational world. 
Education, health care, pensions and taxation systems remain 
rigidly fixed to particular states and territories. Over time,  
there will be a need to conceive of ways in which the provision 
of social services can be adapted to be mobile across inter-
national borders in a transnational world”.17
Conclusion
Acknowledgement of the relationship between migrant 
workers’ access to social protection and regionalism invites an 
exploration of the potential and limits of regional frameworks 
for identifying mechanisms to increase the protection of the 
human Rights of migrant workers. Domestic law, in particular 
in the ASEAN context, has thus far proven limited as a tool for 
framing adequate responses, not only because of the scarcity 
of resources, but also because of the difficulty in utilizing 
international law.
The case for supporting regional migration governance  
as a meaningful layer on which to meet the human rights  
needs of cross-border migrant workers is strengthened by  
the reality of the current situation in ASEAN. The relationships 
and processes of ASEAN’s members offer a unique platform 
to translate into practice the content of international instru-
ments and to adopt new measures. Taking regionalism as the 
‘operational basis’ for overcoming persistent limits of social 
protection may be a better way to address the need to develop 
a coherent and solid social protection floor and to enable 
people to move freely across borders.
Elisa Fornalé is Marie Curie Researcher at the Center  
for Migration Law, Radboud University (e.fornale@jur.ru.nl). 
This contribution is based on research conducted for  
the R_emigra Project, funded by the European Union’s 
Seventh Programme (FP7/2007-2013; GA n. 629347).
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Adrian Perkasa, my friend and colleague from Airlangga University, drove a  
circuitous route, avoiding trucks, chickens and rice drying on the road, on our way 
to the shrine known locally as Watu Ombo. As occurred at all of the small shrines 
near villages, the Caretaker (Juru Pelihara) appeared a few minutes after we arrived 
to see what we were doing and chat about the place his family had looked after  
for three generations. It was the day after the monthly special day on the Javanese 
calendar (Malam Jumat Legi) when many Javanese people visit shrines, and the  
offerings from the night before were evident. The Caretaker had also gathered  
a set of fourteenth century foundation stones from the Majapahit kingdom,  
excavated by traditional brick makers, that he was keeping on site. There were  
large trees within the shrine’s compound and other residents were sitting around 
chatting or keeping an eye on their rice drying in the parking lot. 
Tod Jones
Fig. 1 (left):  
Bajang Ratu, 
Trowulan, East Java 
(photo by Tod Jones). 
Fig. 2 (right):  
Masjid Agung, 
Banten Lama (photo 
by Tine Suartina).
THE MANAGEMENT and spatial organisation of Watu Ombo  
differs considerably from the larger sites that were reconstructed 
in the 1980s and 1990s. These iconic sites are the product of 
large state investments fuelled by the success of Borobudur, 
the nationalist importance of the Majapahit as the precursor 
of the Indonesian nation, and the growth of oil prices. Take, 
for instance, Bajang Ratu (fig.1). The structure, an entrance 
gate to a compound, is located in the middle of a European 
style garden with little shade. While indeed monumental and 
impressive, the lack of shade, seating and other activities in the 
surrounding park lessens the utility of the site for residents, 
and visitors tend to stay for short periods where they enter 
the park, take pictures of the gate, walk briefly around the 
garden before returning to their car or bus, and heading to the 
similarly organised Candi Tikus. Paid staff maintain the site during 
opening hours, and it is locked at night. Until the mid-1990s, 
this site was like Watu Ombo before graves and homes were 
relocated to make way for the park. 
While my comparison highlights the richness of Indonesians’ 
relationships with heritage and how they exist in tension  
with official management practices, there is no simple binary 
between expert and community sites and practices. Local 
people worked for years on the reconstruction of ‘official’ sites, 
becoming experts in such conservation work, not to mention  
the strong feelings that remain for these sites amongst 
residents. The state pays locals to maintain the ‘community’ 
sites and has done so since colonial times; local people work  
as gardeners and officials at the larger sites to service the bus- 
loads of visitors who stop for half an hour on their day trips to 
Trowulan. Furthermore, democratic Indonesia has an uneven 
heritage politics, where the shifts at higher levels (such as  
decisions at the national level or international funding) can 
have different implications and effects at the level of site man-
agement for different groups and in different locations. Below, 
I turn my attention to the drivers and complications of heritage 
politics in Indonesia, using examples drawn from contributors 
to a special issue on Indonesian heritage in Inside Indonesia,  
which I co-edited with Riwanto Tirtosudarmo earlier this year.1 
Decentralising culture
The Suharto era command culture model of cultural manage-
ment, while challenged by the rise of mass popular culture  
in the 1990s, began to break down in the aftermath of the 
Asian Financial Crisis and the resignation of Suharto in 1998.2 
Two shifts in particular were important. First, cultural policy 
was realigned from an affiliation with education to an affiliation 
with tourism.3 Second and more importantly, cultural policy 
was one of a number of policy areas decentralised in 2002, 
devolving control of the cultural bureaucracy from the national 
to the provincial and district levels. While thousands of staff 
shifted from the national bureaucracy to the provincial and 
district bureaucracies, this did not include archaeological 
offices (Balai Pelestarian Cagar Budaya and the Balai Konservasi 
Borobudur) that remain centrally controlled from the 
Directorate of Culture and continue to manage archaeological 
sites. From an educational function, culture was aligned with 
the economic goals of tourism and regional development. 
District and provincial governments became more important 
to heritage planning and management, but have differing  
levels of commitment and capabilities. Furthermore, heritage 
legislation reform, which passed parliament in 2010, has 
stalled due to the absence of implementing legislation, leaving 
heritage management frameworks weak and uncertain. 
Banten Lama in particular has struggled to find a balance be-
tween different interests in the contemporary period.4 Banten 
Lama was home to an Islamic sultanate in the sixteenth century 
that became an important religious centre for the spread of 
Islam across Java, and its Grand Mosque (Masjid Agung) is now 
the centrepiece of a diverse heritage precinct that attracts 
thousands of visitors annually (fig. 2). However, divisions within 
the leadership of Masjid Agung has led to uncertain decision 
making, from conservation work on the mosque to the location 
of the mosque entry gates and the stalls of petty traders. This 
division makes site planning and management difficult for 
Banten City. The last local regulations, passed in 1990, are not 
adequate for the number of visitors and complexity of the site. 
The uncertain heritage regulatory framework contributes to 
paralysis and bureaucratic unwillingness to work within a  
difficult situation, even when these issues are undermining 
both the experiences of visitors and the returns for locals. 
Heritage in broader processes of spatial change
Considerations of heritage should take into account the 
effects of broader processes of spatial change. Trowulan, the 
previously mentioned location of the capital of the Majapahit 
kingdom, is located within an hour’s drive from Surabaya  
on a major road. Although the population of Trowulan is just  
under 70,000, it is part of Gerbangkertosusila – the mega-region  
of ‘Gresik Bangkalan Mojokerto Surabaya Sidoarjo Lamongan’ 
that had a population of 9 million people in 2010. While 
Trowulan’s red bricks have clearly been manufactured for 
hundreds of years, the urbanisation of this region has created 
an unprecedented demand for building materials. The remains 
of the Majapahit capital inhabit an area of approximately 90 
square kilometres under contemporary structures and sugar 
cane fields. Traditional red brick construction removes the top 
one to two metres of top soil from a field that is rented from 
a farmer, making the traditional red brick manufacturers the 
most active excavators of Majapahit era artefacts. While this is 
near-impossible to prevent (even as part of a national heritage 
listing in 2013), my research with Adrian Perkasa indicates that 
the red brick manufacturers have relationships with Majapahit 
heritage and value the artefacts they find. The potential is  
there for engagement and interaction around their excavations 
to build new relationships between residents, researchers  
and Trowulan’s underground capital. 
Changing heritage management practices
The political climate in democratic Indonesia also has offered 
opportunities for civil society groups to push new heritage 
agendas. The Indonesian National Trust (Badan Pelestarian 
Pusaka Indonesia – BPPI) formed in 2004 from a network of 
city-based groups and individuals across Indonesia. Protests 
and actions by these groups, the World Monuments Fund, and 
the Save Trowulan resident group, prevented a steel factory 
that had been approved in 2013 by the archaeological bureau 
from being built in an area close to residential areas.5 Changes 
within archaeology towards site management led in the early 
2010s to a greater willingness to accommodate access to 
previously closed archaeological areas, in particular the smaller, 
less-visited sites.6 This new access has driven both local activi-
ties, such as guiding tourists and local events, as well as new 
online groups, like Bol Brutu who use Facebook and WhatsApp 
to share photographs and news, to organise short and long 
trips for visiting heritage places, as well as other activities 
like exhibitions and recording local histories. However, these 
lower level activities still run into the issue of official heritage 
management. At the larger, more regulated heritage sites, local 
guides who are not officially registered cannot seek customers, 
and Bol Brutu cannot undertake their creative activities. 
The entry of democratic politics has been beneficial  
to the cultural ecology of Indonesia and has enabled new 
coproductions of heritage through a more open approach to  
site management and more incentives for collaborations across 
different groups and levels of government. However, state 
heritage management could do more to support the cultural 
ecology, in particular through finalising the heritage legislation, 
encouraging further engagement with public archaeology in 
state archaeological institutions, and allowing even greater ac-
cess to residents who want to seek inspiration and opportunities 
from access to state-managed heritage sites and objects. Denis 
Byrne has pointed out to us that most of the population of Asia 
seeks special connections and favours from their relationships 
to heritage objects and sites.7 There are openings in Indonesia 
for heritage management to be relevant to the vast numbers  
of people who hold this understanding. 
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In November 2015, the multi-media exhibition Futurographies: Cambodia-USA-France, curated by our students, 
opened at the Sheila C. Johnson Design Center at The New School, New York (www.newschool.edu/sjdc).  
In 2016, it travelled to Sa Sa Bassac Gallery in Phnom Penh (February) and to the Parsons Paris Gallery (April). 
The exhibition reflected almost five years of our research and teaching focused on migration, the poetics of 
urban transformation, the mobility of culture and commodities, and artistic practices in states of emergency.
Jaskiran Dhillon, Radhika Subramaniam and Miriam Ticktin
CAMBODIA HAS RECENTLY become a locus of inquiry, and its 
history and politics drew our diverse disciplinary approaches 
together. With the curatorial-ethnographic workshop that 
generated this exhibition, we hoped to ignite new insights for 
ourselves and for an interdisciplinary group of design and social 
science students through the collision of methodologies. In the 
conversation below, we reflect on our collaboration and the 
issues the project raised in the context of our ongoing work. 
RS: How do you think our varied backgrounds influenced  
what we did?
JD: As a scholar and advocate committed to social transfor-
mation, I foreground the interconnections among flows of 
knowledge, capital, labor, power, and people and examine their 
implications for social movements. Since 2010, I have worked in 
Cambodia, which is an exemplary site for exploring such trans-
national exchanges – its political history is deeply intertwined 
with other Southeast Asian countries, with Europe because of 
French colonization, and with North America through the US 
bombing during the Vietnam war, and in general, because of 
international aid. Since I teach at a US institution, the relation-
ship between Cambodia and the US is a launching point for my 
students to interrogate the politics around development and 
humanitarianism. I was really excited when the opportunity  
to translate some of this into a curatorial platform emerged  
in 2012-2013 through my collaboration with Radhika.
MT: My role was to bring to bear the relationship of Cambodia 
with France in shaping both historical and contemporary lives. 
This transformed our place of inquiry into a tri-local (Cambodia-
US-France) space, bringing in imperial histories and diasporic 
presents, and how people, ideas and experiences move in 
relation to these. I had worked with undocumented immigrants 
in France, researching their relationship with French colonialism 
and racism, but I knew nothing about Cambodia.
RS: Our earlier project, which also culminated in an exhibition, 
was more bi-lateral. The exhibition coincided with ‘Season of 
Cambodia’, a festival of art and performance that took place 
across New York in April 2013. We were eager that it was not 
about a place far away, and that it was not only historical but 
also traceable in the present, such that we were all implicated. 
So we highlighted US involvement in Cambodia. Interestingly, 
The New School has a direct link to this history – it functioned 
as a regional hub for the 1970 student strike against Nixon’s 
Cambodian incursion. Art and design students, at the time, 
shelved their thesis show to mount an anti-war exhibition called 
My God! We’re Losing a Great Country. Jaskiran has also been 
immersing students in the Cambodian context for some time.
JD: Yes, I’ve been teaching ‘Lang in Cambodia’, an immersive 
summer program in Siem Reap. This interdisciplinary program 
aims to expand student learning of ‘development’ by collapsing 
the distance between its emergence as a discourse and the 
way it plays out as a social and political practice. It compels 
students, in a very visceral way, to think deeply about the kinds 
of transnational flows I referred to earlier. 
Our three-way collaboration presented another attempt 
to engage with these questions, adding a new place and new 
methods. It was really generative to have Miriam’s expertise 
on French colonialism, since it broadened everyone’s thinking 
about how Cambodia has been produced as a ‘developing’ 
country in need of Western aid. But combining different meth-
odologies was particularly challenging: leading students in 
intense ethnographic research in three different countries, and 
then asking them to translate this knowledge into an exhibit. 
RS: I had two inroads; my work focuses on what I call ‘cultures 
of catastrophe’ informed by training in anthropology and per-
formance studies. As the curator/director of The New School’s 
galleries, I have over a decade’s experience in art in the public 
domain. Despite this, the exhibition format was challenging for 
everyone, not just the social science students – how to make an 
argument visually and spatially that isn’t reductive or merely 
illustrative and also open to the inevitable ambiguity of art? That 
was the real risk as an educator – instilling in the students critical, 
reflexive thinking about context and representation, while also 
encouraging an exuberant leap of faith into the realm of art 
where material and meaning might exceed one’s framework. 
The students chose to split and juxtapose these strands in the 
exhibition with two intertwined timelines, one artistic, one 
historical. As a visual solution for an intractable disciplinary 
conjuncture, it was quite striking, and elicited vigorous discus-
sion in the gallery. But the split also perpetuated the separations 
we were trying to work against. For an art gallery like Sa Sa 
Bassac, the historical timeline seemed extraneous or over-con-
textualizing the art; there, it was relegated to a handout rather 
than an interference on the wall. I understood the reasons, even 
the awkwardly academic quality of the timeline, but this was 
one of those stilted movements across disciplines that interested 
me – the inelegance of translations and mistranslations.
MT: On that, one of the key questions we faced was how to 
detect histories in the present. Where and how do we trace 
Cambodia in France and France in Cambodia? Our students 
wanted to use categories they are familiar with, i.e., identity. 
So, they asked, where are the Cambodian-French? How big are 
their communities, do they organize as a diaspora? In fact, our 
challenge was to trace these histories while being attentive to 
the mobility of conceptual categories themselves – not simply 
the mobility of people. Translation never results in sameness.  
In France, identity categories are not politically recognized in the 
same way as in the U.S, either by the state or the public. French 
theories of republican universalism suggest that, in the name  
of equality, one should keep identity (race, religion, ethnicity) in 
the private sphere, enabling one to claim equality in the public 
sphere. One exists as a citizen, not as a particular kind of citizen. 
Of course, there are many critiques of republicanism (to focus 
on race, this theory insists, would be to reproduce racisms; yet 
how does one tackle all-too-real racisms if there is no acknow-
ledgement of race?), and while things are changing, this way  
of looking at the world underlies much of French society. 
JD: One of the most interesting and challenging aspects of 
this project was stepping out of linear and causal perceptions 
of the linkages among people, place, and history in order to 
pay close attention to the notion of circulation. On the one 
hand, we found some clear continuities: for instance, the 
Cambodian diaspora living in the United States, mainly Khmer 
refugees fleeing from the genocide, have actively organized 
around US deportation through the ‘1Love Movement’. People 
once welcomed to the US as refugees help a later generation 
that is no longer welcome, being deported, and blamed for 
the effects on them of the trauma of war. The U.S.’s own 
participation in that horror is ignored with the violence 
externalized onto Cambodian bodies. So we saw continuities 
and explicit attempts to create discontinuities. At other times, 
the connections were not so clear.
MT: For instance, in Paris, we found that there were very few 
Cambodian-French organizations or recognizable Cambodian-
French communities. Rather, people were dispersed, even if they 
were often located in places of greater disenfranchisement such 
as the banlieues. Ties with Cambodia barely figured in the French 
imagination despite a powerful and violent historical relation-
ship. We know that Pol Pot was trained in France, that many 
of the ideas that later informed the Khmer Rouge took shape 
in France, before they traveled to Cambodia. We began to look 
at how equality and difference were configured in contemporary 
French society. How could theories of equality ultimately justify 
a genocide – did contemporary theories still embed that horrific 
possibility? To this end, we met with associations and activist 
groups who were interested in the history of French imperialisms; 
and in inequality more broadly understood. 
RS: Nevertheless, for students, there was almost a sense of 
relief when we caught up with a fantastic hip-hop group called 
Komlang Khmer (Khmer Power) in Paris whose raps were later 
included in the show. Although of diverse backgrounds, they 
were the first to speak in terms of a hyphenated identity – as 
‘franco-cambodgiens’. This says a lot about the ways in which 
the cultures of music travel. What meaning does hip-hop, forged 
from the U.S. experience of racism, have for those dealing 
with French republican racism – and how does such expression 
manifest within a different political framework? 
Questions of identity dogged our heels – for instance, in how 
context affected the reception of the exhibition. We had been 
insistent with the students on keeping dynamic these triang-
ulations: history-memory-mobility, ethnography-art-dialogue, 
Cambodia-USA-France. Yet, it was often the ‘Cambodia show’ 
in New York and Paris, or an exhibition by ‘diasporic artists’; 
Remember the Khmer Times headline?: ‘Diaspora Unite to 
Exhibit Alternative Futures’. Still, if I had one take-away, it 
would be that this ‘three-ing’ kept us generatively off-balance 
so that certainties were always out of reach.
MT: For my part, I was struck by the fact that the exhibition  
form opened up a way to grasp both the ‘imaginary’  
(i.e., unrealized futures), and the ‘real’ that nevertheless eludes 
understanding (i.e., how equality could justify genocide).
JD: As an experiment, this was ambitious and hugely productive, 
but not replicable any time soon! The unique investment of 
time, fundraising, enthusiasm and goodwill that transcended 
graduations and semesters makes it (sadly) hard to reproduce  
in a university context!
Jaskiran Dhillon is Assistant Professor of Global Studies  
and Anthropology (dhillonj@newschool.edu). 
Radhika Subramaniam is Director/Chief Curator of the  
Sheila C. Johnson Design Center and Assistant Professor  
in the School of Art and Design History and Theory  
(rsubramaniam@newschool.edu).
Miriam Ticktin is Associate Professor of Anthropology,  
and co-director of the Zolberg Institute on Migration  
and Mobility (ticktinm@newschool.edu).
All three teach at The New School, New York.
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“Reading the world always precedes reading the word,  
and reading the word implies continually reading the world.”1
We are witnessing the emergence of neo-liberal universities  
and a rationalisation of programs and departments of humanities  
and humanistic social sciences. Disciplines fostering humanistic knowl-
edge are increasingly being disavowed under charges of elitism or ar-
chaism even as economic expediency is driving universities to push for 
their consolidation and/or dissolution. In Japan, for instance, more than 
fifty universities attempted to downsize their humanities programs 
following an official dictum in 2013 to focus on disciplines that “better 
meet society’s needs”. In a statement made to the NY Times in 2013, 
Homi K. Bhabha, director of the Mahindra Humanities Center at  
Harvard University, announced that “The humanities are facing serious 
challenges in both developed and developing countries. In India for 
example the humanities are more or less dead, and professional schools 
and the study of business and technology are in the ascendant”.2
Aarti Kawlra and Françoise Vergès
AMONG ACADEMIA, however, the concern is not merely  
about shrinking job opportunities or redundancy, but about  
the rescue of the humanities from itself, namely from tradi-
tional disciplinary emphases on canonical texts and territorially 
defined area studies. A growing body of scholars, interested in 
rethinking Asian studies from a de-bordered or de-nationalised 
perspective, has called for expanding the vocabularies and 
epistemic breadth of the humanities to take cognisance of the 
commonalities and connections that unite rather than divide 
humans. This would mean investigating human vulnerabilities 
and versatilities as part of wider mechanisms of comparison 
within a global context. Such an expanded humanities has the 
potential to contribute to contemporary social life by building, 
supporting and validating humanistic acts (and communities) 
of interpretation, performance and sustenance regardless  
of the weight of their antiquity or provenance. 
In this reflective essay, we attempt to go past bounded 
disciplinary, institutional and national prescriptions in the 
exploration of humanistic learning methodologies that are 
otherwise overlooked, or sometimes deliberately silenced, 
within conventional curricula and pedagogic practices. Even 
though we come from vastly different backgrounds, we share  
a deep awareness for embodied practices as sites of knowledge 
and cultural transmission. We are both interested in the politics 
of circulation – in the mobilities of people around objects, 
techniques and recipes – and in tracing routes that surpass the 
frame of national and international relations. Indeed, a search 
for alternative spaces and methodologies of teaching and learn-
ing has been the substratum of our individual perspectives. 
Aarti Kawlra, an anthropologist based in Chennai, is interested 
in material culture studies, and Françoise Vergès is a feminist 
post-colonial theorist from Reunion Island. 
Working together in the platforms promoting South-South 
exchanges offered by the IIAS-Mellon program ‘Rethinking 
Asian Studies in a Global Context’ (2013-2015)3 has yielded  
a mutual attentiveness to the pedagogical value of alternative 
sites of knowledge. At the IIAS Summer School titled ‘Reading 
Craft: Itineraries of Culture, Knowledge and Power in the Global 
Ecumene’,4 held in August 2014 in Chiang-Mai, for instance, 
we articulated the need for an alternate cartography that 
re-centred craft-worlds in the exploration of subaltern micro-
histories and ethnographies. The IIAS international conference 
‘Asia/Africa: A New Axis of Knowledge’,5 held in September 
2015 at the University of Accra, further validated our shared 
interest in exhuming erased links and contributions of anony-
mous slaves, artisans and refugees in finding new connections 
and comparisons between Asia and Africa and other parts of 
the world. Pursuing trajectories of cloth, our shared passion, 
has been especially rewarding as an immediate point of identity 
and difference. Indigo dyed and printed textiles, for example, 
have animated many of our meetings and united scholars and 
practitioners from vastly divergent disciplines and geographies. 
Our aim is to interrogate the widening gap between everyday 
/common sense knowledge practices and disciplinary/textual 
knowledge about being human in the world and to share some 
thoughts on what we are calling ‘humanistic pedagogies’. 
 
Second wave of decolonisation?
Movements for restitutive justice across the Global South have 
highlighted the importance of recovering varied cosmologies 
and cultures of humanity that reunite people, lands, pasts,  
that had been torn asunder or ruptured by colonial rule.  
We know that for interlocutors of imperialism, such as Gandhi, 
Tagore, Césaire, Cabral, and DuBois, the anti-colonial struggle 
had already ceased to be defined by the nationalist project  
and was recast as a humanist struggle for political justice, 
cultural (non-racialised) dignity and world peace. And even  
though many of their projects either failed or remain unfinished,  
it is their search for a liberative education – one that is free from 
“walled segregation in the particular or … [from] a dilution in 
the ‘universal’”, as Césaire wrote in 1956 – which interests us.  
We suggest that a second wave of decolonisation is afoot  
and must be predicated upon the ‘decolonial’ as method. 
Instead of limiting ourselves to ‘Asia as method’ and viewing 
civilisationalism and the discourse of Asian (or African) unity 
as a “shared resentment vis-à-vis the West”,6 we propose 
“decolonial ways of thinking and doing”7 through the  
exploration of humanistic pedagogies. 
The recovery of humanistic pedagogies is grounded 
in a long history of dissent and critical thinking. It can be 
found in Asian and African thought and among indigenous 
peoples who conceive the world as interconnected as well 
as in European craft practices and the work of philosophers 
and writers (Tolstoy for instance). In the world of the ‘Black 
Atlantic’, created by the transatlantic slave trade, it emerged 
as the political-philosophical issue in the anti-slavery struggle 
of the 18th and 19th century: What does it mean to be human 
when a cultural, social and economic system has declared 
that humanity was divided between naturally free and unfree 
human beings, between lives that mattered and lives that 
did not matter? It is ironic that slave trade reached its apex 
during the 18th century when thinkers of the Enlightenment 
promoted the idea that “all men are created equal”.  
It is worth recalling that this was also the century featuring 
revolts of slaves, among them the 1791 insurrection in the 
French colony of Saint-Domingue that led to the creation 
of the Republic of Haiti. It also inspired the rallying cry of 
the European anti-slavery struggle, “Am I not a man and 
your brother?” Later, in the period of European post-slavery 
colonisation and imperialism, struggles of resistance stirred 
poetry, songs, oral literature, manifestos, and educational 
projects in the South. The idea re-emerged in the 1920’s with 
the anti-colonial movements for civil rights worldwide. In the 
1940s, the belief that colonised peoples or ‘coloured peoples’ 
should unite and create strong transnational institutions 
led to the organisation of congresses and the publication of 
manifestos and journals. All underlined the necessity of being 
emancipated from the ‘pedagogy of servitude’, the eman-
cipation from Eurocentric representations of non-Europeans, 
whether inspired by Orientalism8 or by other discourses that 
instituted a global hierarchy of peoples along the lines of race. 
Pedagogical projects became strongly associated not only 
with emancipation from elitist European domination but also 
with the rehabilitation of vernacular knowledge, practices and 
voices of the forgotten and the marginalised, together with a 
rediscovery of art and culture, and their creolised and hybrid 
forms. This ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’, to borrow Paulo 
Freire’s expression, was particularly strong in Asia and inspired 
the first wave of decolonisation.9 The newly founded nation-
states devised pedagogical programmes to promote a national 
consciousness and sense of cultural identity as a means of 
self-representation and assertion. The idea culminated in the 
first African-Asian conference held in Bandung in 1955. Though, 
according to historians, the final resolution remained timid, 
reflecting the difficulty of reaching a transnational common 
goal, most recent analyses have sought to recover the historical 
dimension of the event. In revisiting Bandung and its ‘spirit’ 
here, we are not embracing its intended and unintended 
outcomes but re-appropriating a history and a genealogy of 
critical, conscious and collective thinking of the West and the 
rest of the world for its value in reinvigorating the teaching  
and learning of the humanities and humanistic social sciences.
More than sixty years ago, anthropologist Lévi-Strauss 
advised UNESCO to push for greater interaction and method-
ological unity of the exact sciences with the humanities: 
“technological civilization is not a separate civilization, 
which requires the invention of special techniques for its 
improvement: the humanization of social life is not the task 
of one profession”.10 We believe, as he did, that any thinking 
(or judgement) about humans within a prevailing order “… 
humanizes it, as the emergence of a criticism is already a 
change”.11 We are therefore proposing an educational agenda 
that is neither theory-centred nor centred on a particular con-
stellation – the West, industrialisation, capital, a geo-political 
region, or even the global. Rather, we would like to see theory 
emerge from inquiries into forms of knowledge-practice that 
inhabit the interstices and are deemed illegitimate, irrational, 
vernacular, tacit, embodied and sensorial. In other words,  
we are seeking decolonial readings of being in-the-world. 
These conditions include the uses of history, culture,  
economics, politics, education, art, architecture, craft, design, 
magic, science and religion; in the past and in the present; 
in Asia and Africa in-the-world; de-spatialised, quotidian and 
dividual; those of selves capable of embracing the highest 
goals and truths; ways of being in-the-world by “not alienating 
ourselves from it and dominating it, but comprehending  
and uniting it with ourselves…”12
Above: A group of 
students at the IIAS 
Summer School in 
Chiangmai (2014).
Below: Aarti Kalwira 
and Françoise Vergès 
with a weaver from 
Ban Sam (left) and 
Nussara Tiengkate, 
weaver and designer. 
IIAS Summer School, 
Chiang Mai, 2014.
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We wish to explore the different arenas where knowledge 
about being human is creatively and collectively released, 
whilst being attentive to cognitive structures that have dele-
gitimised these spaces of cultural expression and transmission. 
Masking the conditions of production, distancing producers 
from consumers and accumulation by appropriation of human 
and extra-human nature has been a requirement of capitalist 
economy in the era of the Capitalocene or ‘age of capital’,13 
crystallising the deification of the individual over the collective. 
An industrial-minded civilisation has widened the epistemic 
divide between the human, social and natural sciences by 
stressing objective and uniform solutions that alienate and 
rupture alternative values and beliefs of human existence  
in the world. According to Amitav Ghosh, a collective ‘crisis  
of culture’ underlies climate change on earth, invading even  
the arts and humanities with the false belief and expectation  
of bourgeois stability.14 Our aim is to make visible these 
contradictions and call for the inculcation of a spirit of  
‘solidarity without borders’15 within curricula through the  
integration of humanistic imaginaries, vocabularies, perfor-
mances and practices in contemporary pedagogic practice.
Spaces of humanistic pedagogies 
The proximity of humanistic knowledge production in our 
midst is an opportunity to bring into dialogue and scholarly  
interrogation the real knowledge of being human. The cultural 
interlocutions of artists, writers, poets, artisans, migrants and 
refugees, for example, jostle for space alongside sanctioned 
knowledge in the humanities, but remain in simple juxta-
position as ‘disjunctures’ or absorbed as commodities in the 
global economy. Humanistic knowledge inhabits the tensions 
around grand narratives of advancement and decline.  
It resides in the interstices of spatialised polarities constructed 
by the global, the national, the regional and the urban. It is  
an opportunity to mobilise the many and varied sites of 
knowledge that creatively and critically interpret historical 
and contemporary contingencies across borders. Re-instating 
the humanistic pedagogical project is to bring back the 
methods of the artist, the writer, the linguist, the field 
anthropologist, historian and the scientist, to work together 
in defence of their engagements with the world. 
A further turn towards humanistic forms of knowledge  
can produce original work if it rests on a new pedagogy, on  
new ways of reproducing knowledge, of teaching and learning,  
that support rather than de-authorise or expropriate alter-
native ways of being and doing. They are alternative because 
they defend an ecological method and pedagogy, or an  
eco-pedagogy of imagining (and cooperating) the self in  
relationship, both to human and non-human nature. At the IIAS 
Summer School on alternative readings of craft practices, for 
instance, our exposure to back strap loom weaving in a village 
north of Chiang Mai was especially instructive in using craft as  
a pedagogic tool and lens for humanistic knowledge. It drew 
our attention to weaving as an embodied knowledge practice; 
the significance of the senses in grasping tacit knowledge 
outside the classroom; and the artisanal household as a site  
for the inscription of micro-histories of sustenance and know- 
ledge transmission where gender asymmetries in productive  
arrangements occur within a milieu of ‘cooperative conflicts’.16  
Humanistic pedagogy nourishes the art of attention  
and challenges the ‘culture of speed’17 in the academy  
to promote ‘sentipensante (sensing/thinking) pedagogy’  
in educational practice. It is a methodological tool that  
recognises the value of an extended grounding in critical 
thinking and doing in order that learning “encompasses  
wholeness … helps students transcend limiting views  
about themselves...”.18 Humanistic pedagogy encourages  
active reflection, of stepping back and thinking about one’s 
own thinking, to halt the pursuit of a solution, and ponder 
instead upon the multiple paths to comprehension, and 
estimating whether the framing of the problem itself is  
limited or skewed. Most importantly, humanistic pedagogies 
do not distinguish between the classical and the folk, the 
performative and the textual, the abstract and the physical, 
the political/economic and the commonsensical for critical 
insights. We propose a pedagogic practice working with 
‘tools of conviviality’ – the methodologies that relate  
individuals and groups to one another in ‘creative intercourse’ 
with each other and the world of nature around them.19 
Anchoring ideas of human cooperation, generosity, and trust  
as shared pedagogic themes across diverse learners builds 
values of interdependence and permits broader definitions  
of identity, freedom and self-reliance. 
Humanistic pedagogy embraces the highest goals and 
truths about being human in the world and is rooted in ideas 
and practices that surpass conventional physical and mental 
borders. It is a collective process of bringing together people 
drawn from vastly different circumstances, imaginaries and 
practices in mutual exchange and expression. For instance,  
the recent workshop “Cartographies of the (post)colonial 
space” conducted by Françoise Vergès, brought artists,  
curators, art historians, poets, philosophers, and historians  
to work together for two days at an exhibition gallery in Paris. 
The aim was to display and self-reflexively discuss complex 
issues using personal effects, texts, images and the body.  
The first day saw the group’s energy buoyed by shared activities 
around themes such as borders, migrant, hybridity, State,  
colonial, and of cooking, cleaning and planning the exhibition 
space and in helping each other rehearse a performance or 
a reading. On the second day participants ‘performed’ their 
individual perspectives not only for the benefit of the public 
but also as an exercise in decolonial thinking and doing in situ. 
There was a reading of an excerpt from Frantz Fanon’s Wretched 
of the Earth; a dance performance, dramatization of a poem; 
display of coffee as a product of imperialism, but also of one’s 
own history; viewing of biographical photos and a film on con-
temporary urban isolation; browsing through a participant’s 
personal anticolonial, feminist library. The pedagogic exercise 
or ‘show’ where the tangible and the tacit were interwoven  
was undone on the same evening.
Any epistemic rethinking in a global context is therefore 
not only about discovering forgotten chapters of history 
or adding marginalised narratives to the master narrative, 
but also about recovering hidden histories and practices of 
cooperation. Our references to cooperative alliances are to 
be found in alternative workshops, in practices of sustenance, 
and spaces of collaborative work, all the while seeking to 
eschew the view that individual interest and accumulation, 
together with its intractable configuration of conflict, is inher-
ently human. Arguably, notions of cooperation and learning 
are developed in the human-space work configuration of both 
the artisanal workshop and the rational factory. But it is the 
mutuality of relations between the master and the apprentice 
in the context of the craft workshop, where knowledge is 
“caught” or “stolen with the eyes”,20 that continues to be the 
basis for the survival of craft in the South and deployed as 
a panacea for development and post-conflict/post-disaster 
rehabilitation across the globe. 
We are interested in challenging the division between 
pedagogy for higher education and pedagogy for the people, 
between ‘high’ and ‘low’ education, and between technical 
and humanistic education. Ecological humanistic pedagogy 
challenges all forms of dehumanised work in favour of shared 
life-affirmative practices of work; it refuses the marginalisation 
of the humanities; it is attentive to the ways power circulates; 
it recognises experience and talent; it acknowledges the 
relation between master and apprentice though it rejects  
its reification; it resists the economy of speed for efficiency 
and rehabilitates the fact that time is needed to nourish 
knowledge. It advocates a pedagogical/research process  
that is built on the virtues of comparison and the recovery  
of creative knowledge to be found, not only through  
a dialogue across disciplines, but also from outside the 
academy, in conversation and collaboration with civil society 
practitioners, activists and other social agents and actors.  
We consider work and livelihood, visual and performative  
practice, language and translation, food and health, and 
memory practices as sites of humanistic knowledge. These sites 
gesture to the convivial alliances forged in non-prescriptive 
workshops, museums, galleries and theatres; neighbourhoods; 
sidewalks; community centres, camps and other anonymous 
public spaces of convivial activity, including those provided 
by the Internet. They are alternate arenas of knowledge 
transmission, exchange and human reproducibility. They 
represent ecologies bound not by the endless pursuit of profit, 
but by the promise of being human in the array of cooperative 
conflicts that dynamically shape the everyday in all its diverse 
entanglements. 
Attending to tacit and embodied forms of knowledge  
in the development of humanistic pedagogies offers the 
opportunity to integrate craft-based practices with digital  
technology. Why and when do people come together for music 
for instance? How does music persuade one to rethink class-
room pedagogic practices? What are the forms of knowledge 
(cognitive, sensorial, emotional and social) that are produced  
in the spaces of conviviality generated through music? How 
is this knowledge inculcated and transmitted? Multi-media 
interfaces have the potential to mobilise trans-border networks 
and narratives to illuminate alternate geographies and  
modes of being and belonging and are important spaces  
for knowledge production and transmission. 
Such an approach will give back to the body and the  
senses its central place in knowledge transmission along with  
written texts. Combining perspectives from the natural, social  
sciences and the humanities through the heuristic of a site of  
knowledge, brings to the fore the question of how knowledge  
is produced, by whom, for whom and significantly with whom.  
The methodology opens up for description and analysis our  
relational, negotiated, and partial perspectives. It recognises  
that only a long, complex practice of critical thinking, doing  
and feeling, together with a dialogue between different ethical,  
aesthetic and moral traditions can respond to the continuing  
human crises of dislocation, dispossession, fragmentation  
and polarisation in the world today. 
The recently awarded IIAS-Mellon program, titled 
“Humanities across Borders: Asia and Africa in the World”,  
is an opportunity for creative experiments in humanistic 
pedagogies across multiple collaborating institutions of higher 
education and their civil society partners in Asia and Africa.  
Over the next four years we hope to deepen our engagement 
with embodied teaching and learning practices in the spaces  
of exchange offered by the program, together with its expand-
ing network of individuals committed to the development  
of a curriculum for humanities across borders. 
Aarti Kawlra, Academic Director, IIAS Mellon program 
Humanities across Borders, Leiden; and Fellow,  
Madras Institute of Development Studies Chennai, India 
(aartikawlra1@gmail.com).
Françoise Vergès, Chair Global South(s), Collège d’études 
mondiales, FMSH Paris (francoise.verges@msh-paris.fr  
and fvmcur@gmail.com)
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The ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute is a Singapore-based research  
centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security,  
and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and  
its wider geostrategic and economic environment. ISEAS seeks  
to stimulate research and debate within scholarly circles, enhance 
public awareness of the region, and facilitate the search for  
viable solutions to the varied problems confronting the region.
New Titles from ISEAS Publishing
ISEAS Publishing is a dynamic press with more than forty years’ experience.  
It is the largest publisher of academic books that focuses on Southeast Asian  
politics, economics and social issues. As a Unit of the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute  
in Singapore, its role is enshrined in Parliamentary Act 9 of 1968, to assist ISEAS  
in the promotion of research on Southeast Asia worldwide.
Esoteric Buddhism  
in Mediaeval Maritime 
Asia: Networks of 
Masters, Texts, Icons
Edited by  
Andrea Acri
2016, 468 pages 
ISBN 9789814695084 
soft cover, US$79.90
The SIJORI Cross-Border 
Region: Transnational 
Politics, Economics, 
and Culture
Edited by Francis  
E Hutchinson  
& Terence Chong
2016, 481 pages 
ISBN 9789814695589 
soft cover, US$59.90
The South China Sea 
Dispute: Navigating 
Diplomatic and 
Strategic Tensions
Edited by  
Ian Storey  
& Cheng-Yi Lin
2016, 307 pages 
ISBN 9789814695558 
soft cover, US$29.90
Please visit the ISEAS Publishing website at https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg  
for the full range of titles and for ordering. Books are also available as PDF 
downloads, either as full books or as individual chapters.
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
Research.
Scholarship.
Policy.
Pentecostal megachurches in Southeast Asia
Terence Chong
News from Southeast Asia
THE ARTICLES PRESENTED HERE are ethnographic studies  
commissioned by the Regional Social and Cultural Studies  
Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute on Pentecost-
alism in Southeast Asia. Part of an edited volume to be  
published by ISEAS, these articles are excerpts from chapters 
which examine the growth of Pentecostal megachurches 
in urban centres in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Singapore as well as their congregations and the politics  
and history from which they have emerged and flourished. 
Indeed the independent Pentecostal movement has been 
growing rapidly in Southeast Asia in recent decades, benefit-
ting from the broader expansion of charismatic Christianity 
from the 1980s onwards in Singapore, Indonesia and  
Malaysia, as well as further afield in Taiwan and South Korea. 
The conventional definition of ‘Pentecostalism’ is the 
emphasis on the deeply personal spiritual experience of  
God, baptism of the Holy Spirit, expressive worship, belief  
in signs and miracles, and glossolalia. According to estimates, 
there are 7.3 million Pentecostals in Indonesia; 2.2 million 
Pentecostals in Philippines; 206 thousand Pentecostals  
in Malaysia; and 150 thousand Charismatic Pentecostals  
in Singapore. 
A 2011 Pew Research Centre study estimated that  
there are 279 million Pentecostals worldwide, comprising  
12.8 per cent of all Christians. There are no accurate estimates 
for the number of Pentecostals in Southeast Asia but the 
percentage of Christians (including Catholics) in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore are 13.2 per cent,  
8.8 per cent, 85 per cent, and 18 per cent, respectively.  
The exact number of Pentecostals are difficult to pin  
down because most country censuses do not differentiate 
Pentecostals from the larger Christian community.  
In addition, Pentecostalism does not have strict doctrines  
or hierarchy, and may manifest as standalone churches  
or as fringe congregations in mainline denominations. 
There are several reasons why Pentecostal growth  
in this region is important. Firstly, to a large extent the 
Pentecostal movement has an ethnic face. The majority of 
Pentecostals in urban centres like Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, 
Surabaya, Jakarta and Manila are, with some notable 
exceptions, upwardly mobile, middle-class ethnic Chinese. 
In countries where the ethnic Chinese are in the minority, 
Pentecostal churches and cell groups are crucial spaces for 
social networking, business contacts and identity-making. 
Secondly, it has a wide economic appeal suggesting an ability to tap into  
different concerns and aspirations. For while the Pentecostal megachurch is  
often associated with the middle classes, it has great attraction for the poor  
and the working class in urban centres like Manila. Thirdly, the central figure 
of the charismatic leader in Pentecostal churches means that senior pastors  
enjoy great deference and sway over large congregations. In actual terms,  
this has meant the ability to mobilise financial capital; and the conflation  
of politics, business and religion to varying degrees raises the spectre  
of religious nationalism.  
Perhaps most crucially, these studies will demonstrate that Asian Pentecost-
alism has both transnationalising and indigenising characteristics. Drawing from 
the west and other parts of the world, Asian Pentecostalism is also driven by local 
prophetic preachers who are able to craft contextual theologies. As such, Asian 
Pentecostalism is simultaneously recognisable as a part of a global phenomenon 
and available for examination only as a politically and historically specific move-
ment. These articles, together with the other chapters in the edited volume will 
offer an updated ethnographic survey of Pentecostalism in Southeast Asia. 
Terence Chong, Senior Fellow,  
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute; and regional editor  
for the News from Southeast Asia section  
in the Newsletter.
INDONESIA HAS a Pentecostal community of an estimated  
6 million, among which the Mawar Sharon church is one  
of the most dynamic and popular. Also known as ‘The Rose 
of Sharon‘ or GMS, the youth-centered church is particularly 
attractive to students in Indonesian college towns. While 
GMS has a strong ethnic Chinese representation, particularly 
among the leadership strata, in reality its congregations are 
made up of multiethnic, middle-class individuals oriented 
towards a global Christian revival. Such individuals are  
drawn to GMS’s market-driven approach to evangelising 
where number-glorifying and mega-worship services echo 
strongly the ethos of mass consumption, a point clearly 
illustrated in the metropolitan city of Surabaya where  
GMS was founded.
Surabaya, Indonesia’s second-largest city, has a population  
of 3.12 million (5.6 million in the metropolitan area). Known 
for shipbuilding, food processing, electronics and furniture 
manufacturing, the city’s residents comprise the Javanese 
majority, Madurese, and Chinese, as well as other ethnic  
groups such as the Sundanese, Minangkabau, and Bugis.  
In terms of its religious profile, Surabaya hosts the Grand 
Mosque of Surabaya and is a strong base for the country’s 
largest Muslim organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama. 
Alongside GMS as one of the fastest growing churches  
in Surabaya is Bethany Indonesian Church. Bethany is the  
largest Pentecostal church in Indonesia with over 1,000 
branch churches around the country and claims to have  
more than 250,000 members. Like GMS, Bethany was  
Counting souls: numbers and mega-worship in the 
global Christian network of Indonesia
En-Chieh Chao
founded and led by ethnic Chinese Indonesians, although the latter’s congrega-
tion is predominately middle-aged while the former is especially popular among 
university students. Both these Pentecostal churches are more of a middle-class 
religious phenomenon that arose as a result of economic growth under the New 
Order (1966-1998) regime, than an ethno-religious movement.
One of the key characteristics of contemporary Pentecostalism is its extension 
to areas of life beyond the religious. Pentecostals in Surabaya, for example, conduct 
self-help workshops for career building, family bonding, women’s issues, children 
and parenthood. Such programmes are not confined to Pentecostals. They are also 
common among their middle-class Muslim counterparts who combine theology  
and entrepreneurship and hold seminars in prestigious hotels. 
However, unlike Islamic pengajian akbar (great sermons) and other self-help  
workshops, most of which are somber affairs, the praise and worship of Bethany 
and GMS, and Pentecostalism in general, are far more boisterous, resembling pop 
concerts. These praise and worship events are locally known as ‘KKR’ (Kebaktian 
Kebangunan Rohani, literally ‘Service of Spiritual Growth’), and demonstrate that 
Pentecostalism is not only “a portable faith” for the individual, but also a show-
business faith designed for the collective.1
The ingredients to such boisterous ‘mega-worship’ are upbeat music, dramatic ser-
mons and dynamic dance. Replacing traditional instruments like the pipe organ or choir 
hymns are R&B bands, mesmeric gurus, and FM radio pop songs. In the megachurch 
sensationalism unites believers with the divine while the flashy multimedia employed 
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Reaching the city of Kuala 
Lumpur and beyond: being  
a Pentecostal megachurch  
in Malaysia
Jeaney Yip
The indigenisation of megachurch Christianity:  
Jesus is Lord in the Philippines
Jayeel Serrano Cornelio
THE JESUS IS LORD (JIL) Movement is one of the biggest 
independent megachurches in the Philippines and has even 
been described as one of the fastest growing churches in  
the world. It claims four million members in the Philippines  
and 55 other countries.
In 2013 JIL celebrated its 35th anniversary at the open-air 
grounds of the Luneta Grandstand in Manila. With an estimated  
20,000 in attendance, the event adopted the theme ‘Revolution 
of Righteousness’, which organisers have explained in two 
ways. On one hand, the revolution pertains to a spiritual 
transformation that individuals have to undergo for the sake 
of salvation. Clearly, this idea cannot be detached from JIL’s 
evangelical ethos. On the other hand, as far as JIL is concerned, 
such an idea has implications too on the way it sees Philippine 
society. Speaking at the anniversary, Bro. Eddie Villanueva, 
founder and senior pastor, emphasised that “the triumph of 
justice and righteousness must prevail, because, the Bible says, 
justice and righteousness are the foundations of God’s throne.” 
The anniversary’s theme neatly defines JIL and its social location 
as an evangelical church in contemporary Philippines. It has 
clearly repackaged itself as a force in Philippine society, from  
an emerging Charismatic church in the 1970s, to a religious 
entity with political leverage and ambitions today.  
What is interesting about JIL is that throughout its history,  
it has maintained a particularly Filipino identity that differ-
entiates it from many other megachurches in the Philippines, 
while also sharing architectural and cultural features with 
their counterparts in the US and Asia. In view of its leadership 
structure, presence around the world, style of worship, and 
political ambitions, JIL has a strong Filipino sense that marks  
it as an indigenised form of the megachurch phenomenon.  
It is precisely this indigenisation that shows how JIL is a unique 
case of doing megachurch today. So while it is evangelical and 
charismatic and thus shares theological positions with many 
other conservative churches in the West, JIL is also an example 
of how world Christianity is enriched through its localisation  
in many parts of Asia.
The indigenisation of megachurch Christianity, insofar  
as JIL is concerned, takes shape in three respects. First, it is  
mainly catered for the working class, which predominantly  
constitutes the population of the Philippines. Helpful in  
making this assertion is the church’s assertive use of the  
Filipino language and the production of local worship songs, 
some of which have also become mainstream within evangelical 
Christianity in the country. It is also fast expanding among 
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). Second, its indigenisation 
lies in its organisational structure. Its leadership is very Filipino 
and it does not hold itself accountable to any international 
PENTECOSTALISM IS SAID to have arrived in Malaysia in the 1930s and its 
domestic growth has been consistent with the global charismatic movement 
of the 1970s. Pentecostal churches have flourished among ‘those from the 
margins of society’, but have also increasingly resonated with the middle and 
upper classes. In Malaysia, the political marginalisation of the ethnic Chinese 
has seen Pentecostalism become a vehicle for the consolidation of the 
Chinese identity as a modern, individualised subject in the Malaysian state. 
Calvary Church is a Pentecostal church based in the capital city, Kuala 
Lumpur. Established in 1960 as a mission church, it is the largest Assembly  
of God (AOG) church in Malaysia. However, the Second Malaysia Plan in  
the early 1970s restricted the stay of foreign missionaries to no longer than 
ten years, resulting in the appointment of Prince and Petrina Guneratnam  
as Calvary’s first Malaysian senior pastors in 1972; positions they hold up  
to the present time. 
Calvary Church’s congregation comprise middle and upper middle- 
class ethnic Chinese, with a demographic profile that is predominantly 
made up of middle-aged and baby-boomer cohorts. Diversity among 
the church is evident with the presence of ethnic Indian members, while 
newer members include transnational workers like Filipinos, Nigerians, 
Cambodians and Dutch. As of 2014, the church had sixteen ministries that 
catered to all segments of its congregation. Cell groups are an essential 
building block for the church structure and are held in highly urban are 
as in Kuala Lumpur. The church conducts services in English, Chinese and 
Bahasa Malaysia. Operating in multiracial, multiethnic and multi-religious 
Malaysia, Calvary Church caters to and facilitates this diversity. Broadly 
though, the church views itself as having a higher calling and takes its role 
in nation-building seriously. 
According to estimates Calvary Church has a congre-gation of 3000 
members and its latest venue – the Calvary Convention Centre – is claimed 
to be the largest in South-east Asia with a seating capacity of 5000. 
According to the church’s website, it is dedicated to the pursuit of “holistic 
activities”, and the convention centre was built as a “non-profit project”. 
The church regards ‘holistic activities’ to mean conventions, banquets, 
seminars, musicals, creative art productions, educational and vocational 
training, in addition to spiritual development that “aim to develop our 
nation’s young, and people of all ages and from all walks of life into useful 
and exemplary citizens of Malaysia”. It is noteworthy that the Pentecostal 
church blurs the distinction between sacred and secular, and frames its  
new venue and itself as a contribution to the project of nation-building.  
In engaging with notions of nationhood and community-building, the 
church is thus able to indigenise itself and exude a non-threatening image 
to the rest of the non-Christian communities. 
Embedded in Malaysia’s multicultural but increasingly Islamic-dominant 
setting, Pentecostal churches like Calvary Church offer non-Malay Muslims 
resources that enable believers to position and re-script their identities  
in ways that provide a sense of empowerment and personal transformation  
in alignment with middle class aspirations. The megachurch’s ability to  
justify the possession of wealth and well-being as a symbol of God’s favour, 
which can be contributed back to community and nation building, has  
made it popular with the Malaysian Chinese middle-class. 
Pentecostalism is known to be adaptable to the local culture in which  
it is located. While it is important to recognise this adaptability, it is equally 
important to refrain from the tendency to homogenise Pentecostal churches 
based on common traits. Asian Pentecostalism, for example, has been argued 
to be recognisable as a global faith yet specific to locality with clear indige-
nous characteristics, while politically and historically different from ‘Western’ 
or ‘American’ models. Calvary Church in Kuala Lumpur is certainly evidence 
of this. It has grown over the years by capitalising on its transnational origins 
and network while operating under a locally sensitive religious environment 
by incorporating theologies (both religious and organisational) that have 
been meaningful to its middle-class ethnic Chinese and Indian congregation.
Jeaney Yip, Lecturer, University of Sydney, Australia  
(jeaney.yip@sydney.edu.au)
Below:Calvary Church in Kuala Lumpur (www.calvary.org.my).
evangelical organisation. It has its own ways of training its 
leaders and organising its local communities. The fact that  
it is independent from American-affiliated denominations 
renders JIL an essentially indigenous Christian church. Such 
independence allows its leaders and members to “bring  
their message to bear on the culture in which they resided”.1 
Finally, JIL sees itself as a prophetic movement to shape the 
future of the Filipino nation. The Philippines is imagined by its 
leaders as a nation belonging to Christ. While this conviction  
is fundamentally spiritual, it is also highly political. 
The transformation of political structures is possible 
through the moral transformation of those in public service. 
If religious leaders themselves are called upon by God to run 
for office, run they do. JIL is part of the Philippines for Jesus 
Movement and Bangon Pilipinas (Arise Philippines) Movement. 
Brother Eddie himself ran for president at least twice.
JIL demonstrates that megachurch Christianity is not  
a homogeneous phenomenon that is often associated with a 
growing middle-class and its accompanying theological and 
political conservatism. While there are megachurches that 
clearly fulfil these expectations in the Philippines and the rest 
of Southeast Asia, JIL presents itself as an alternative precisely 
because of its indigenized identity. In this sense, it is part of 
a wider story concerning the unfolding of Christianity in the 
global South. In other words, indigenization is how a mega-
church sees itself first and foremost as an embodiment of 
Filipino Christianity that at the same time adds to the already 
rich tapestry of Asian Christianities. What is interesting is that 
while it may be theologically conservative as a charismatic 
and evangelical entity, JIL has offered itself as an alternative 
in other respects. It caters for the working class Filipino 
when many other megachurches have proven their success 
by affiliating with the burgeoning affluent and cosmopolitan 
segment of the population. JIL too has presented itself as a 
political alternative that instead of simply supporting a set of 
winnable candidates, has fielded its own under the impression 
that what is more important for society is moral renewal.
Jayeel Serrano Cornelio, Director of the Development 
Studies Program, Ateneo de Manila University.   
(jcornelio@ateneo.edu)
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throughout the sermons and worship appeals to the Youtube  
appetite for the fast paced pastiche of words, sounds, and melo- 
dies of a younger generation. Gigantic screens beam the lyrics 
of songs or verses, and even vows to God for the worshippers  
to recite. The KKR service is “Karaoke Christianity” en masse.2
If such features are characteristic of Pentecostal mega-
churches around the world, what then are the more local 
qualities of Indonesian Pentecostal megachurches?  Following 
the attacks against churches in 1996 and 1998, more ethnic 
minorities have gravitated towards larger events and congrega-
tions for collective healing and sense of security. The collective 
healing worship services appear to be particularly attractive to 
psychologically injured Christians, many of whom are keenly 
aware of their pre-carious existence in the world’s largest 
Muslim-majority nation. Churches located in malls or commer-
cial buildings protected by guards and without obvious symbols 
of Christianity are now preferred over scattered neighborhood 
churches that risk closure for not possessing a legal permit or 
may be vulnerable to attacks. Big numbers in big halls of saved 
Indonesian souls are vital signs of self-empowerment and (divine) 
justification of their presence in the ever-more self-consciously 
spiritual, if not strictly Islamic, Indonesia. 
Against this backdrop of Indonesian Pentecostal ethnic 
minority complex, my chapter examines the traumatizing  
life experiences of the Chinese-Canadian-Indonesian pastor 
Philip Mantofa. I pay attention to his programmes of worship 
such as ‘A Trip to Hell, Army of God’, and ‘Asia for Jesus’,  
and the GMS church’s logic of counting souls. From there  
I shall discuss the international connections of the Indonesian 
Christian KKR, which form part of the global Christian  
network of which GMS is an increasingly important part.
En-Chieh Chao, Lecturer,  
National Sun Yat-Sen University (Taiwan)
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Visiting Fellowships
The Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre (NSC) at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute  
has openings for Visiting Fellow positions for research on:
A. Premodern maritime history in Southeast Asia
B. Buddhist History in Southeast Asia
Visiting Fellowships are for two years with possibility of extension. 
For more details: www.iseas.edu.sg/about-us/opportunities
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MODERN JAPAN has created Japanese-Western fusion  
dishes such as kare-raisu (curry rice), tonkatsu (pork cutlet), 
and korokke (croquette) in the process of adopting Western 
culture. Three factors served as the impetus in the advance-
ment of fusion cuisine in Japan, which fundamentally  
changed the food culture of the country.
Firstly, during the Meiji Restoration, Japan pursued  
a policy of active importation of Western food culture.  
Driven by the agenda for Japan to ‘leave Asia and join  
the West’, the Meiji Restoration was a set of structural 
reforms aiming to Westernize every institution from state 
systems, industries, and military, to education and culture. 
The movement to adopt Western food culture was also 
triggered by these reforms.
Following the Meiji Restoration (1867), Japan started 
brisk imports of Western dishes and ingredients. As is widely 
known, since its debut in the country at the birthday banquet 
for Emperor Meiji in November 1871, French cuisine has been 
invariably served in Japan at all official receptions for foreign 
diplomats. As eating meat had long been prohibited prior 
to the Meiji Restoration, the introduction of Western cuisine 
focused on meat dishes signified a radical transformation  
in the food culture. The announcement that the emperor  
partook of beef was aimed to Westernize Japanese eating 
habits, but it was also intended to weaken the power of the 
Buddhist doctrine of ahimsa, in the process of suppressing 
Buddhism and establishing Shinto as the state religion.
News from Northeast Asia
Since 2009, the Seoul National University Asia Center (SNUAC)  
has been proposing new contents and perspectives on Asia by 
integrating regional and thematic research across Asia. SNUAC 
seeks to be the leading institution for research and scholarly  
exchanges. The center features three regional centers, the Korean Social Science Data Archive (KOSSDA), and seven  
thematic research programs. By fostering ‘expansion’ and ‘layering’ between Asian studies and Korean studies, the 
Center endeavors to shape new frameworks of Asian studies that go beyond a ‘Western-non-Western’ dichotomy.  
The Center will continue to support the pursuit of scholarly excellence in the study of Asia by providing opportunities 
to conduct international collaboration on an array of topics in Asia research. 
For further information please visit: http://snuac.snu.ac.kr/center_eng
After the announcement, Japanese government officials, 
intellectuals, businessmen, and other elites started consuming 
Western food en masse. Representative reformist Fukuzawa 
Yukichi became a passionate proponent of a meat diet after 
drinking milk helped him recover from a serious disease in 
1871. He criticized the traditional taboo on consuming meat, 
saying, “It has been a long-standing custom for over a thousand 
years in this country to consider eating meat as contaminating, 
and many people have recklessly hated it. In the end, it is the 
hearsay of the unschooled and unlettered who know nothing 
of human nature”. Thus, the announcement of the emperor’s 
consumption of meat created favorable conditions for the spread 
of Western cuisine and the development of fusion dishes.
The second factor was the introduction of meal provisions 
in the military, schools, hospitals, and other modern organ-
izations. After the Meiji Restoration, in 1868, the state took 
the initiative, claiming that Japan cannot build a prosperous  
and powerful state if its soldiers are frail, so they should eat  
beef just as Westerners do. Western food came to be associated  
with a strong army and, consequently, a strong nation. Soldiers 
were provided with Western-style meals from the early years 
of the Meiji period. The Japanese government considered the 
consumption of meat as an important part of its strategy for 
achieving national prosperity and military power and started 
canned food manufacturing for the purpose of supplying meat 
in field rations. During the Sino-Japanese War (1894), the army 
received a supply of canned food worth 2 million yen, with 25% 
History and hybridity of East Asian food culture
KIM Chong Min
Formation of Japanese-Western fusion cuisine  
in Modern Japan
Seejae LEE
Asian foodways today are as diverse and multifaceted as the complex political, ecological, institutional, and socio- 
cultural transformations the region underwent throughout its modern history. Extensive inter-cultural exchanges in  
food culture in Asia occurred on the occasions of colonization, wars of various scales, and, more recently, globalization. 
These changes made at macro-political levels often introduce new factors to the local food practices, influencing and 
enriching the ways of preparing and consuming food at the everyday level. In this issue of News from Northeast Asia,  
we have three articles each capturing key aspects of the history of Asian foodways: the article by Seejae Lee examines 
acculturation in the formation of Western-Japanese fusion cuisine in modern Japan that began with the Meiji Restoration 
in late 19th century; Young-ha Joo writes about the history of the instant ramen industry in Korea, Japan and Taiwan, 
which reflects the exchanges and hybridization of food in colonial and post-colonial East Asia; and the article by Zhao 
Rongguang illuminates Chinese national culinary culture, focusing on philosophical, historical and cultural dimensions.
KIM Chong Min, Regional Editor of ‘News from Northeast Asia’; Research Fellow, Seoul National University Asia Centre (snuac_eds@snu.ac.kr)
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of the canned beef imported from the United States. Food  
in cans was a symbol of modernity and viewed very positively 
as food that had already been used by American, British,  
and other Western armies for a long time.
Japan’s modernization involved not only building up  
its military but also establishing a nationwide educational  
system, large-scale transportation facilities, factories, and other 
modern institutions. All of them required the introduction  
of bureaucracy, mass production of food for communal meals, 
standardization, and rationalization of cooking procedures.  
It was thought that, to provide meals in large quantities, Western 
cuisine was more appropriate than indigenous Japanese dishes  
in terms of nutritional balance for one’s health, simplicity  
of cooking methods, and convenience of preparation.
The third stimulus was the Japanese traditional palate.  
No matter how vigorous the Westernization and rationalization 
drives were, one cannot ignore the power of tradition, and 
the aesthetics of taste that the Japanese possessed. Although 
the nutritional aspects were emphasized in the early stages of 
Japanese-Western fusion cuisine development – as reflected in 
the slogan, “Eat beef and get healthier” – even beef dishes were 
prepared using Japanese cooking methods and with Japanese 
seasonings, thereby conforming to the principles of Japanese 
food aesthetics.
As the consumption of meat by the emperor, political and 
military leaders, and other elites increased, Western cuisine 
became more popularized and the demand for it appeared in 
the middle classes. Sayings such as “If you cannot eat meat, you 
are uncivilized” were in vogue. Butcher shops opened in cities, 
and restaurants serving gyu-nabe (beef hotpot), made of beef 
and vegetables seasoned with soy sauce and sugar, sprang up 
everywhere. There is no doubt that beef was a Western  
ingredient for the Japanese since they had not traditionally 
eaten it, but all the vegetables and seasonings for gyu-nabe 
were indigenous and the dish was eaten in the Japanese way. 
In other words, there was no problem with staying true to 
the Japanese cooking system as long as the ingredients were 
Western. 
Japanese-Western fusion cuisine emerged in the early  
20th century through this process of incorporating ingredients  
and some cooking methods of the West. Culinary schools 
appeared and women’s colleges started offering classes 
on Western cuisine around the same time. Familiarity with 
Western food among young men who had served in the 
military and many college students ensured the demand for 
fusion cuisine. By the end of the Meiji period (around 1910), 
fusion cuisine evolved into a harmonious mixture of Western 
and Japanese culinary traditions. Fusion dishes created in 
modern Japan – kare-raisu, tonkatsu, etc. – were disseminated 
to Korea and other regions through colonial rule and gained  
a wide currency.
One of the obstacles to the introduction of Western  
cuisine was the difficulty to obtain ingredients. During  
the early Meiji period, there was a shortage of beef and an  
insufficient supply of Western vegetables such as onions,  
cabbage, carrots, celery, and tomatoes. However, from 
the 20th century, the mass production of onions, cabbage, 
and carrots started in Hokkaido, which contributed to the 
development and spread of fusion cuisine.
The establishment of canned food manufacturing,  
development of refrigeration technology, modernization of 
cooking utensils, and other industrialization projects played  
an important role in the modernization of Japanese food.  
The popularization of korokke was largely related to the  
large-scale cultivation of potatoes in Hokkaido. The early  
20th-century launch of domestically produced curry  
powder, which had previously been imported from England, 
led to wider consumption of kare-raisu. Cooking the dish in 
Japanese homes became possible when the manufacturing  
of solid curry roux began in 1950. Japan also started the 
industrial production of coarse breadcrumbs for tonkatsu  
and exported them overseas. The simultaneous industrial-
ization and modernization of the country was a decisive  
factor in the development of Japanese-western fusion  
cuisine. 
So far, rice has maintained its position as the primary 
staple in fusion dishes. If bread replaces it, this will trigger 
another major transformation in Japanese food culture.  
It may usher in a new stage of food Westernization,  
following the introduction of Western cuisine during the  
Meiji Restoration and the proliferation of Japanese-Western 
dishes. On the other hand, culinary traditions from other 
countries in Asia and beyond are entering Japan, rapidly 
shifting its food landscape in the multicultural direction. 
Consequently, the Westernization/modernization fervor is 
not as strong as it was during the Meiji period, even though 
Japanese-Western fusion cuisine continues to serve as an 
important platform for changes in the food culture. It will  
be interesting to observe how Japanese cuisine will transform 
in the future based on the influences of different cultures.
Seejae LEE, Graduate NGO Studies Program,  
Sungkonghoe University (seejaelee@gmail.com).
Imperialism and  
colonialism in the  
food industry in East 
Asia: focusing on  
instant Ramen
Young-ha JOO
ONE EVENT OF PROFOUND INFLUENCE on the food cultures 
of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan after World War II was the supply 
of surplus wheat by the United States in the form of grants 
or on credit. In 1953 and 1954, American farms yielded an 
extremely bountiful wheat harvest. From the position of the 
US government, it was a surplus product. In the early post-war 
years, American surplus agricultural produce was given as aid 
to the countries of Western Europe. However, as the productive 
capacity of European agricultural industries quickly recovered, 
they no longer needed American surplus products. In this 
situation, Washington turned its focus towards Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan as potential destinations for its excess farm  
commodities. The three countries shared important similarities:  
all of them suffered from shortages in staple foods and 
all three were under the political, economic, and military 
umbrella of the United States.
In 1945–1953, during the periods of the United States 
Military Government and the Korean War, the United States 
supplied a substantial amount of foodstuffs to Korea under 
the Military Defense Assistance Act (MDAA). For instance, 
between 15 December 1948 and 31 December 1949, the 
grant-type food assistance amounted to US$ 13million.  
From 1953 to 1961, surplus agricultural produce was supplied 
along with military aid under the Mutual Security Act (MSA). 
In 1954, the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), which 
was in charge of planning American overseas assistance, 
shipped to Korea barley worth US$ 1.785 million, wheat  
worth US$ 2.007 million, and beans worth US$ 0.691 million. 
Korea received even more aid in accordance with the 1956 
revised Public Law 480 (PL480). Barley alone amounted  
to US$ 13.863 million. 
The circumstances in Taiwan and Japan were not much 
different. Inflow of American surplus wheat to Japan would 
eventually lead to the invention of instant ramen in the coun-
try. The historical reason making such an invention possible 
was Taiwan’s experience of Japanese colonial rule. Japan’s first 
instant ramen was developed by the founder of Nissin Food 
Products Co., Ltd., Momofuku Ando (1910–2007). Born in 
Taiwan, he started his own business in Osaka in 1933, married 
a Japanese, and was naturalized in Japan. There is a good 
chance Ando’s Chikin Ramen (chicken ramen) was inspired by 
jī sī miàn ( , shredded chicken noodles) of the southern 
region of China. In this way, the occupation of Taiwan by  
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Chinese food: basic  
theories and diverse 
realities
Rongguang ZHAO
the Japanese Empire and naturalization of a Taiwanese as  
a Japanese citizen prompted the invention of instant ramen. 
According to Ando’s biography, he came upon a 20–30  
meter queue in front of a black market food stall on a cold 
winter’s night; they were all waiting to buy a bowl of ramen. 
“The faces of the people who were slurping warm ramen 
looked happy. The Japanese really like noodles. Looking at  
the line in front of the stall, Ando got a feeling that there was 
a big demand hiding there. The sight printed a proto-image  
of ramen in his mind.”
Momofuku Ando developed his chicken ramen against  
the background of a surplus supply of wheat from the  
United States after the war. The Japanese government  
of the time actively encouraged the Japanese to eat bread  
made with that wheat. Critical of the policy, Ando said in  
1947 to Kunidaro Arimoto, who worked for the Health 
Ministry, “With bread, you need toppings or side dishes.  
But the Japanese are eating it only with tea. It is not good  
for their nutritional balance. In the East, there is a long  
tradition of eating noodles. Why not also promote noodles, 
which the Japanese already enjoy, as a flour-based food?”  
To his bold question, Kunidaro replied, “Why don’t you solve 
this problem?” Ten years later, in 1957, Ando purchased  
a second-hand noodle-making machine, Chinese pot,  
18 kg of wheat flour, cooking oil, and other ingredients,  
and embarked on a study of noodles that one can easily  
make, at his home in Osaka. Instant ramen under the  
trademark ‘Chikin Ramen’ came into being and entered 
Japanese stores the following year, in 1958.
In Korea, Samyang Ramen was first produced in 1965.  
The founder of Samyang Foods Co., Ltd., Jung-yun Jeon 
(1919–2014) had been interested in the Japanese ramen  
industry since 1965. He adopted the instant ramen  
technology of a Japanese company which, unlike Nissin  
Food Products, had the soup separated from noodles in the 
product, and put the ramen business into orbit with the  
surplus wheat imported from the United States. Making 
noodles for ramen once he had a noodle-making machine  
was not a difficult problem. The manufacturing process  
was relatively simple: he poured the water mixed with  
salt and soy sauce on wheat flour, kneaded the dough,  
spread it thinly, and drew noodle strips from the machine.  
The problem, however, lay in the quality of the flour.  
From 1955, the US government provided aid mostly with 
non-processed wheat, explaining the change as being  
due to the large stock of wheat in the United States.  
Milling it with Korean domestic technology of the time  
meant that the quality of flour was inconsistent. 
Consequently, it was hard to make uniform dough,  
and the noodle strips were often deformed or snapped.  
The noodles would then have to be fried in edible beef  
tallow or lard. To do so, Samyang Industrial Corporation 
processed the green oil obtained from slaughterhouses 
in-house or used soybean oil provided to the military.  
In the end, Jeon requested the assistance of the Korean 
government and was able to import edible beef tallow  
and lard from the United States.
In the case of Taiwan, American excess farm commodities 
were brought in from 1945. Wheat turned out to be highly 
efficient in resolving the food shortages. It was the main  
ingredient for staple foods to many Han Chinese who 
migrated from China’s mainland. Accustomed to noodles,  
the Taiwanese imported Chikin Ramen from Japan ten years 
after it was invented. Taiwan’s Uni-President Enterprises  
in cooperation with Japan’s Nissin Food Products released  
a ramen product with separate seasoning in 1970.
However, Uni-President’s ramen failed to attract con-
sumers’ attention at first. There already were different kinds 
of noodles on the market and the locals who moved from  
the mainland after the 18th century consumed them as a 
staple food. It was only after Uni-President developed Tǒngyī-
miàn ( , Uni’s noodles) – a variety of ramen similar to 
yóu-miàn ( , oil noodles) which had a long history in Tainan 
– and coordinated its launch with a television commercial 
campaign in 1971 that people noticed the company’s ramen. 
To cook the product, one had to put the noodles into a bowl, 
A CHINESE PROVERB GOES, “Different kinds of water and soil 
raise different kinds of people ( ).” There is a 
similar saying in the West: “You are what you eat”. Only when 
you know the entire history of a nation can you fully under- 
stand its food culture. 
The basic concepts and theories of Chinese food science  
that exercised a profound influence on the diet and food culture  
of the Chinese were largely determined during the Warring 
States period (5–2 centuries B.C.E.). They can be summarized  
by the following four principles.
1) Unity of food and medicine ( ): In traditional 
Chinese pharmacology, whose history goes back over  
4,000 years, medicine originates from food. The idea of the 
unity of diet and treatment was systemized and popularized 
during the Zhou dynasty (11–3 centuries B.C.E.). Food and 
medicine were considered distinct yet inseparable from  
each other.
2) Nursing one’s health with food ( ): Lao-tzu and 
Chuang-tzu emphasized that, when consuming food, one  
should remember “the tongue cannot be satisfied”. According  
to them, not until one restrains his desire, common for all 
humans, to try every taste, can he gain health; and even though 
the tongue wants delicious food, one should not have it if  
it is harmful to one’s health.
3) Theory of the nature of taste ( ): The Chinese,  
since olden times, have contemplated the ‘nature of the  
taste’ of ingredients, the taste of food, and the influence that 
the interaction of the two has on a person. Believing that  
the nature of an ingredient is revealed in its taste, the  
ancient Chinese attached great importance to the type of  
an ingredient’s taste.
4) The food philosophy of Confucius and Mencius ( ):  
A food philosophy that mainly refers to “be refined on two 
things, be appropriate with three issues, and avoid ten wrongs” 
( ) - from Confucius’ and 
Mencius’ idea that “One cannot eat just for survival but has  
to work hard to get food, more than that, one has to get food  
in a proper way as well as respect and practice food rituals.” 
( ) It is worth mentioning that some of these 
ideas are extensions to the ‘nursing one’s health with food’; for 
instance, maintaining an authentic taste, being rational and 
refraining from excess, following rules of nature, and seeking 
peace by nursing one’s health.
Chinese food.  
Image reproduced 
under a creative 
commons license 
courtesy of Run 
Mizumushi-Kun 
on flickr.
sprinkle the seasoning over the noodles, and add hot water.
Momofuku Ando’s son and current president of Nissin  
Food Products, Koki Ando (b. 1947) posed the question of 
how instant ramen, a processed food product, could become 
a global hit. His own answer? “In every country, there is a cook 
who did his best to recreate [in ramen] the taste inherited in 
that country for generations. The product itself is convenient 
and easy to localize. In this way, ramen swiftly penetrated 
into the everyday life of people in every corner of the world.” 
Koki Ando considered localization the main reason for the 
popularity of ramen with five spices in China and ramen with 
tom yam soup in Thailand. When discussing Korea, he pointed 
out the spicy flavor of kimchi, selected by Nongshim Co., Ltd. 
for its Shin Ramyun, as a typical example. He said, “It is not 
simply spicy, as many Japanese would assume. We have tried 
several times, but it is very difficult for a Japanese to achieve 
such a savory spiciness.”
Thereby, every country has adopted the Japanese techno-
logy for making instant ramen and given the product its own 
flavor. However, instant ramen derives its basic production 
technique, marketing strategy, and distribution method 
from the Japanese modern food industry, which emerged 
in the late 19th century. The addition of American surplus 
wheat made the invention of instant ramen and its expansion 
possible. Furthermore, during the colonial period in Korea 
and Taiwan, the Japanese modern food industry acquired the 
image of being advanced, and this contributed to the rapid 
dissemination of instant ramen in those markets.
In short, it is no exaggeration to say that the combi- 
nation of ‘old imperialism’ symbolized by Japan and the  
‘new imperialism’ represented by the United States gave  
birth to instant ramen. Even though the colonial period was 
formally over, the flavors of food products spread by an 
empire in its colonies were continuously reproduced in their 
localized forms by the former colonial peoples after liberation.
Professor Young-ha JOO, Graduate School of Korean 
Studies, Academy of Korean Studies (duruju@aks.ac.kr).
The food culture of the Chinese nation is characterized by  
five features, in terms of its forms and historical development: 
the broad spectrum of available ingredients, abundance of 
dishes, flexibility of cooking methods, continuity of regional 
customs, and cultural exchanges between different regions. 
These features underlie the tradition and essence of the Chinese 
food culture to this day.
China has always been very diverse geographically, and this 
explains the existence of the wide variety of food ingredients 
and the extensive range of their distribution. The Chinese made 
edible many living things that are not known or considered 
taboo in other nations; some of these became delectable dishes.
It is this wide scope and abundance, along with the unique 
Chinese ideology on food and culinary art that predetermined 
the flexibility of traditional ways of Chinese cooking. “Collecting 
experience by hand” is an important characteristic of the  
traditional Chinese cuisine, stemming from its history.
Areas with different food cultures have developed in China 
separately from each other. From the perspective of food history, 
the culture and character of each of those areas has evolved 
gradually through a long historical process. In China of the 
Middle Ages, different regions were able to maintain their 
distinctive features for a relatively long time because of their 
isolation, self-sufficient natural economies and the conservative 
feudal politics on one hand, as well as the primitive commodity 
economies and poverty of the common people on the other. 
The scenes of daily life in rural, mountainous, and border areas 
in premodern China are well described in the following saying: 
“Neighboring states face each other, can hear when a neighbor’s 
rooster cries and dog barks; yet their people grow old and  
die without stepping outside of their state.”
Despite the economic and systemic barriers, there were 
frequent exchanges between the areas. Merchants and travelers 
play an important part in the introduction and dissemination 
of different cultures. Wars and chaos stimulated food cultural 
exchanges widely, quickly, and aggressively. While another 
significant route for foodways were appointments of public  
officials, study trips of Confucian scholars, hired labor, stationing  
of armies, expulsion of criminals, migration, escaping 
turbulence, and so on.
Professor Rongguang ZHAO, Chinese Dietary  
Culture Institute of Zhejiang Gongshang University 
(zhaorongguang126@126.com).
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China Connections
Islam in China
Lena Scheen
Terrorism, war, refugees, niqab, Syria, ISIS or Daesh. It is hard to find a recent newspaper  
article on Islam that does not contain one of these words. But how often do we read about  
the twenty-five million Muslims living in China? Ever since the first Muslim traders arrived  
in the Chinese Empire over 1400 years ago, Muslims have played an important role in  
Chinese history. For this first issue of China Connections – a series on China’s relation to  
the world and hosted by the Asia Research Center (ARC-FD) at Fudan University and  
the Global Asia Center (CGA) at NYU Shanghai – we invited four scholars to write about  
their research on Islam in China. Together they explore questions such as: Why did the  
Qianlong Emperor issue an imperial edict to conduct an empire-wide investigation of Hui  
Muslim communities in 1781? How did a small town in Yunnan Province become a center  
for Islamic learning? And how do its current residents deal with the haunting ghosts of  
1600 Muslims killed in 1975? How does institutionalization play a role in the unification  
of the spatially dispersed and ethnically diverse Chinese Muslim communities? And how  
does a Chinese Muslim studying in Egypt experience the Arab Spring? It is through these  
stories of cultural exchange, conflict, and integration that we hope to provide a deeper,  
more layered understanding of Islam today.
Lena Scheen, Assistant Professor of Global China Studies at NYU Shanghai,  
and Regional Editor for ‘China Connections’ (lena.scheen@nyu.edu).
Center for Global Asia  
at NYU Shanghai
The Center for Global Asia at NYU 
Shanghai serves as the hub within the 
NYU Global Network University system to  
promote the study of Asian interactions 
and comparisons, both historical and 
contemporary. The overall objective of 
the Center is to provide global societies 
with information on the contexts for the 
reemerging connections between the 
various parts of Asia through research and 
teaching. Collaborating with institutions 
across the world, the Center seeks to 
play a bridging role between existing 
Asian studies knowledge silos. It will  
take the lead in drawing connections  
and comparisons between the existing 
fields of Asian studies, and stimulating 
new ways of understanding Asia in  
a globalized world.
Asia Research Center  
at Fudan University
Founded in March 2002, the Asia 
Research Center at Fudan University 
(ARC-FDU) is one of the achievements  
of the cooperation of Fudan and the 
Korean Foundation for Advanced  
Studies (KFAS). Throughout the years, 
the center has been working tirelessly  
to promote Asian Studies, including 
hosting conferences and supporting 
research projects. ARC-FDU keeps close 
connections with the ARCs in mainland 
China and many institutes abroad.
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in Hezhou, Gansu 
province.” Source: 
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Who were the Hui?  
The first empire-wide  
investigation of  
Hui communities in  
Qing China.
Meng WEI
ON 29 MAY 1781, the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-95) of  
China issued an imperial edict to conduct an empire-wide 
investigation of Hui communities. The order was in response  
to the ‘FanHui’ rebellion (also known as the ‘Salar Rebellion’)  
by the Hui minority in Gansu province. It was immediately 
passed down to the lowest levels of Qing government and  
detailed reports were sent to the governors or governor- 
generals of the eighteen provinces (‘China proper’) for invest-
igation and then made known to the Emperor. The results 
of the investigation provided the Qing state with a renewed 
understanding of the Hui landscape of its empire and con-
stituted the basis for future policymaking towards the Hui.
The ‘FanHui’ rebellion was inspired by Ma Mingxin (1719-81), 
a native of Gansu and a Sufi leader who had introduced the 
‘new teaching’ to the region following his return from several 
years of study of Jahriya Sufi practices in Yemen. In a simplistic 
view, ‘Fan’ is a term often associated with non-Han populations 
neighboring ‘China proper’, while the term ‘FanHui’ in this 
context mainly refers to the Salars, a Turkic Muslim group in 
Gansu. The introduction of new elements into Islam triggered 
dissention and even violence among adherents of different 
and competing Islamic teachings. However, the prime cause of 
open conflict between the new-teaching ‘FanHui’ and the Qing 
state was the Qing state’s inconsistent legal implementations 
and misconceptions over peoples classification during the 
transitional period when the regions that used to be ‘Fan’ were 
becoming an administratively part of ‘China proper’ as a result  
of the Qing westward expansion in the eighteenth century.
After the rebellion, the ‘new teaching’ was labeled as a 
‘heterodox teaching’ (xiejiao) by the Qing state. On 29 June 
1781, the Qianlong emperor issued another imperial edict  
to command that the investigation had to remain unalarming 
in order not to cause further disturbances. During the invest-
igation, anyone found involved with the ‘new teaching’ would 
be seized immediately, interrogated strictly by provincial  
governors or governor-generals in person, and punished 
severely. Under this climate of suspicion, the investigators 
devised and deployed various strategies to access and probe 
into the Hui communities. For example, a Governor of Henan 
province selected local officials who, dressed in Muslim attire, 
had to go undercover among the Hui community. In another 
instance, a Governor-general of Sichuan brought in for inter-
rogation as many as nineteen senior Hui residents from the 
provincial capital and its suburbs and four ‘headmen’ (xiangbao) 
selected by local officials and responsible for maintaining  
public safety as well as managing secular matters. Secret 
investigations into various Hui communities throughout the 
province were made afterwards to testify their testimonies. 
The main goal of the edict was to find out whether there 
existed any positions or titles such as ‘imam’ (zhangjiao)  
and ‘imam-superior’ (zong zhangjiao) among the Hui com- 
munities, and, if so, to abolish them in an effort to prevent 
other rebellions by such religious leaders. The Qianlong 
emperor was probably relieved to find out these positions or 
titles were in fact not found in most of the provinces being 
surveyed. In addition, unlike the Hui in the ‘Fan’ regions, 
the Hui in ‘China proper’ turned out to be mostly peaceful, 
law-abiding, and not infected by the ‘new teaching.’
This little-studied yet pivotal episode opens a rare window 
onto the Hui landscape in Qing China and offers a unique 
insight into the ways in which the Qing state perceived, 
identified, and managed the Hui. One striking feature found 
in the official reports is that, not distinguished from the Han, 
the Hui were all registered as ‘commoners’ (minren or qimin) 
into the baojia system, an instrument of social ordering 
implemented by the Qing.1 However, although the Hui and 
the Han fell under the same legal category, by employing 
various investigative methods, Qing investigators still found 
their ways to single out and identify the Hui, evident by the 
number of Hui households and mosques they kept record of  
in their reports. In the very process of exhaustively searching  
for and recording the quantities of Hui households and 
mosques at every corner of ‘China proper,’ the Qing state 
envisioned the Hui communities in its various provinces as 
belonging to a same group, one that the state could keep 
monitoring ever since.
Meng WEI is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department  
of History at New York University (mwei@nyu.edu)
References
1  “Baojia was a system under which households were regi-
mented into nested decimal groupings of ten, one hundred, 
and so on for purposes of assigning collective responsibility 
in public security and other matters and for fixing personal 
responsibility for the group on a single ‘headman’ at each  
level of the hierarchy”. Rowe, W.T. 2001. Saving the World:  
Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century 
China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p.388.
Shanghai Forum
28-30 May 2016, Shanghai 
http://www.shanghaiforum.fudan.edu.cn/en
The Shanghai Forum, launched in 2005, is known as one 
of the most famous international forums held in Shanghai. 
Co-hosted by Fudan University and Korea Foundation for 
Advanced Studies, and undertaken by Fudan Development 
Institute (FDDI), the Forum is a non-governmental and 
non-profit academic organization, which holds an annual 
symposium each May in Shanghai. This year’s theme  
was “Economic Globalization and Asia’s Choice –
Interconnectivity, Integration and Innovation: Building 
Community of Common Destiny in Asia”.
Shanghai Forum takes its mission to “Concentrate  
on Asia, Focus on Hot Issues, Congregate Elites, Promote 
Interactions, Enhance Cooperation and Seek Consensus” 
seriously. It endeavors to build an interactive platform for 
multi-sided communication amongst academic, political, 
commercial, and press circles through which significant 
problems both in Asia and the world will beare discussed  
comprehensively and profoundly, so as to seek consensus 
on Asia’s economic, political, social and cultural progress. 
Shanghai Forum opens application to the world. Many  
well-known think tanks, universities, enterprises, media  
and other organizations apply to host roundtables 
/sub-forums every year.
Over the years, numerous political dignitaries,  
distinguished scholars, and business leaders have been  
invited to share their thoughts and wisdom at Shanghai 
Forum, including Chen Zhili (former Vice Chairman of the  
NPC of China), Cheng Siwei (former Vice Chairman of the 
Standing Committee of the NPC of China), Lee Kuan Yew 
(former Prime Minister of Singapore), Han Seung-soo  
(former Prime Minister of Republic of Korea), Shaukat Aziz 
(former Prime Minister of Pakistan), Robert Alexander  
Mundell (known as the ‘“father”’ of the Euro, 1999 Nobel 
Laureate in Economics), Robert Shiller (2013 Nobel Prize 
Laureate in Economics), Vladimir Yakunin (President of  
JSC Russian Railways), and Robert Zoellick (former President  
of the World Bank Group). Shanghai Forum also receives 
strong support from the Shanghai Municipal Party  
Committee and the Shanghai Municipal Government.
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Shadian’s Muslim communities and trans-local 
connectivities: observations from the field
Hyeju (Janice) JEONG
Islam in contemporary China: an overview
Jianping WANG
Shanghai Archaeology Forum
13-17 December 2015, Shanghai
http://shanghai-archaeology-forum.org/
Founded in 2013, Shanghai Archaeology Forum (SAF) is  
a global initiative dedicated to promoting the investigation, 
protection and utilization of the world’s archaeological 
resources and heritage. The 2015 SAF was co-organized by 
the Shanghai Academy, the Institute of Archaeology at CASS, 
Shanghai Municipal Administration of Cultural Heritage, and 
Shanghai University. The forum aims to provide a better 
understanding of the importance of the field of archaeology 
and the protection of cultural heritage for our common future. 
To celebrate the excellence of archaeological research the 
SAF Awards were presented to those individuals and organiza-
tions that have achieved distinction by making major discoveries 
and producing innovative, creative, and rigorous works in the 
past three years. The World Archaeology Keynote Lecture Series 
presented case studies illustrating key issues such as diverse 
forms of social and cultural interaction, the formation and trans-
formation of cultural and social identities, the complexities and 
ambiguities of cultural identities and power relations, the active 
roles of indigenous agency, practice and ideology in structuring 
colonial interaction, cultural persistence and the importance  
of historical contingency and local context.
The Public Archaeology Lecture Series promoted public 
awareness and knowledge of the ever-increasing wealth of 
archaeological finds. The Public Archaeology Lecture Series 
invited three important archaeologists, Charles Higham,  
Lothar von Falkenhausen, and Colin Renfrew, to share their 
experiences on archaeology with students, and the general 
public. After the public lectures, the audience was given the 
opportunity to engage with these famous archaeologists, 
discussing archaeological findings, as well as their concerns  
on the appreciation and protection of cultural diversity and  
the challenge of vanishing heritage in our globalizing world.
Qiaowei WEI ( ) is Associate Professor in  
the Department of History at Shanghai University  
(weiqiaowei@gmail.com)
I REACHED SHADIAN TOWN after a three hour drive from 
Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province, China. As I stepped 
out of the car in the chill of a late November night, the site 
of Shadian’s magnificent Grand Mosque and the call to night 
prayers reminded me that I was in a zone quite different from 
Kunming.
Shadian has ten mosques, with the Grand Mosque - mod-
eled upon the Al-Masjid al-Nabawi mosque in Medina and 
completed in 2009 - as its symbol. Almost ninety percent of 
Shadian’s fifteen thousand residents are Muslims, belonging 
to the contemporary Hui minority of China. However, Shadian 
is also known for the so-called Shadian Incident of 1975, in 
which villagers forcefully opened closed-down mosques dur-
ing the last years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The 
‘incident’ left 1,600 people dead at the hands of the People’s 
Liberation Army. “The old Islamic schools in Shadian used to 
have valuable library collections, but everything has been 
burnt,” lamented my informant, Mr. Ma. Across the Mosque 
was the Islamic Culture and Arts Center that exhibits and 
sells Sino-Islamic artworks. Within a few blocks of the Grand 
Mosque, one senses a mix of forward-looking aspirations and 
painful memories, reflecting a continuing history of repres-
sion and resilience of Islam in China.
Shadian’s trans-local networks in history
Islam in Yunnan expanded during the Yuan dynasty 
(1271–1368), when Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din from Bukhara 
(current Uzbekistan) was appointed as the provincial 
governor, promoting both Islamic and Confucian institutions. 
According to Mr. Ma, “he also built aqueducts, without him 
you would not see present-day Yunnan”. Following waves of 
Muslim settlement into the town since the thirteenth century, 
Shadian became a part of caravan trade routes between 
Yunnan and Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and India. 
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, trade became so 
important that, just before the Chinese communist victory  
of 1949, around 700 out of Shadian’s 980 families, had two  
to three horses conducting commerce across northern 
Thailand and Myanmar.1
In the first half of the 20th century, Shadian also emerged 
as a significant center for Islamic learning. For example, of 
the thirty-three students from China who studied in Cairo’s 
al-Azhar University in the 1930s and 1940s, five came 
from Shadian alone. They were heavily sponsored by Bai 
Liangcheng (白亮诚, 1893–1965). A scholar and an official,  
Bai Liangcheng founded the Yufeng Elementary School in 
1914, one Islamic Girls School, and several Islamic periodicals. 
The old Yufeng Elementary School now displays an exhibition 
on Bai Liangcheng and Shadian’s notable Muslims. Here  
I learned that Bai also initiated industrialized tea commerce 
based in Yunnan’s southernmost Xishuangbanna. With  
imported technology and machineries from Japan and  
India, he constructed a large-scale tea factory, creating  
trade networks domestically and across the borderlands  
of Thailand and Myanmar. These connections would later  
provide permanent homes for Shadian diaspora, who 
migrated to Thailand and Myanmar in the late 1940s and  
early 1950s, and formed Sino-Islamic enclaves. In November 
1948, Bai Liangcheng and fifty others left Shadian, most  
likely to flee Communist rule. The following year, fourteen  
of them undertook the pilgrimage to Mecca. “It’s embarrassing 
to say you’re escaping,” said Mr. Ma. “So you say you’re  
going on the pilgrimage.” 
Return to Kunming
Back in Kunming, I told my Chinese host family about my 
experiences in Shadian, but was met with somewhat perplexed 
and worried expressions flashing across their faces. Later 
in the evening, my host forwarded me an article on Zhihu 
Ribao, a Chinese online platform where articles are posted 
anonymously. The article drew parallels between the Shadian 
Incident and the contemporary Islamic State in the Middle 
East – “both groups being violent, self-unifying and terrorist in 
essence” – echoing the dominant and official narrative in China. 
The rich histories that I observed in Shadian, rooted in southern 
Yunnan with its critical ties outwards that have shaped the 
province’s many landscapes, are apparently not making their 
inroads into the audience who needs them the most.  
Hyeju (Janice) JEONG is a Ph.D Candidate in the Department 
of History at Duke University (janice.jeong@duke.edu)
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CHINA IS HOME to a large Muslim population. According  
to the Islamic Association of China, the country has over  
25 million Muslims, 40,000 mosques and more than 50,000 
Akhond, a Persian title for the Islamic clerics who serve  
the scattered communities all over the country. Every year,  
more than 10,000 Muslims make their pilgrimage to Mecca, 
while - over the past thirty years - nearly 12,000 Muslim 
students have completed their Islamic studies abroad,  
and another 100,000 have studied Islam in the madrasa 
(religious school) in China. All these figures show that  
Islam is not an insignificant issue for contemporary China’s 
political and social landscape. 
After being banned during the Cultural Revolution  
(1966-1976), Islam in China has undergone a revival since the 
reform and opening-up policy of the late 1970s. In just thirty 
years’ time, it has transformed from an underground religion 
into an Arabian-style religion that is officially recognized as 
one of the five religions in China (Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, 
Protestantism, and Catholicism). Whether wearing their long 
robes, turbans, or hajibs, Muslims can be found all over China; 
from the big cities of Beijing and Shanghai to the island of 
Hainan, from Inner Mongolia in the north to Yunnan in the 
south, from the western border of Tibet to the eastern coastal 
region. However, more than half of the Muslim population  
lives in Northwest China, particularly in the Uygur Autonomous 
Region of Xinjiang, the vast region where 23,000 mosques 
serve various ethnic communities, including Uygur, Kazak, 
Kirghiz, Tajik, Uzbek, Tatar, Salar, Hui, Dongxiang, and Bao’an. 
Islam is also flourishing in the academic world: there are more 
that sixty Islamic periodicals, Muslim professors and scholars 
teach and research Islam in various universities or research 
institutions, and many conferences, workshops and forums  
on Islam are being held all over China, often sponsored  
and organized by Muslim elites. 
The three pillars of the Islamic network in China
However, although China has more Muslims than any  
Arabian country, they are in fact still a vulnerable minority 
in Han-dominated China. While Muslims profit from govern-
mental policies giving preferential treatment to ethnic 
minorities (‘affirmative action’) and officially enjoy freedom  
of religious practice, they are supervised carefully and restric-
tions remain in place over the activities of madrasas, religious 
ceremonies, religious organizations, etc. In order to maintain 
their Islamic tradition and to uphold their monotheistic iden-
tity, it is important for the widely dispersed Muslim enclaves  
to build a strong network in and outside of China. Three  
Islamic institutions form the backbone of this network. 
Firstly, the mosque plays a central role in the Chinese 
Muslim community. Besides its religious function as a place  
for ritual praying, mosques in China also have social, economic, 
and cultural functions, such as administrative management, 
festival celebration, social mobilization, economic enterprises, 
cultural education, or even daily life affairs. Hence, the mosque 
is a stronghold that binds its local community, while stretching 
out its external relations with communities in other areas,  
in order to establish the umma (Muslim nation) in the context 
of an unreceptive environment. 
Secondly, the maktab (grammar school, or primary level) 
and madrasa (Islamic college or high level) provides the Chinese 
Muslim community with education in Islamic knowledge,  
faith reinforcement, and passes Islamic tradition to the next 
generation. Most maktabs and madrasas in China are attached 
to the mosques, however, there are also quite a few madrasas 
set up independently and open to all Muslims in society.  
They are not only responsible for the maintenance of Islam 
and to cultivate young Muslims, but also to strengthen and 
revive Islamic consciousness of Muslims of all ages. Maktabs 
and madrasas often regenerate the vitality of the community 
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Above: A village mosque near Sancha Town, Xunhua Salar  
Autonomous County, Qinghai Province. (Aug 2011).
Below: Imam and Hui Muslims in the courtyard of Gucheng Mosque, 
Wuzhong City, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. (Aug 2016). 
Photos by author. 
Snapshots of Sino-Muslim students living in Egypt
Shuang WEN
You Must Create?
7-9 April 2016, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong
http://acgs.uva.nl/news-and-events/news/content/2016/04/
you-must-create.html
You must create – to be less bored, to be more authentic, to  
be free in the digital world? These questions were the linchpin 
of a three-day event of conferencing and site visits held early 
April in Hong Kong and Shenzhen.
The event took place in the historical juncture when  
creativity has become an imperative, when China aspires to 
move from a ‘made in China’ towards a ‘created in China’ country 
(Keane 2011), to transform creativity and culture into a crucial 
source for innovation and financial growth as well as part of its 
‘soft power’ to both the citizenry as well as the outside world. 
“You Must Create? Boredom, Shanzhai and Digitization  
in the Time of ‘Creative China’” opened with scholarly talks  
and a roundtable discussion with practitioners to map out  
the field and major concerns of the three themes. The second 
day involved a site visit to the ambitious West Kowloon Cultural 
District, Hong Kong, where more artists, cultural administrators 
and government officials joined in discussions. The final day 
took place in different localities of Shenzhen: Wenbo Gong,  
a state-promoted creative district; Dafen Village, known for  
its fake paintings; and New-Who Art Museum, a bottom-up  
art village. Young researchers also reported their findings  
on a diversity of topics, ranging from water calligraphy,  
eco-documentaries, to the aesthetics of overabundance.
 “You Must Create?” was jointly organized by the 
Amsterdam Centre of Globalization Studies, University  
of Amsterdam and the Department of Humanities and 
Creativity Writing, Hong Kong Baptist University, as part  
of the European Research Council funded project “From  
Made in China to Created in China – A Comparative Study of 
Creative Practice and Production in Contemporary China”.  
The five-year project is led by Professor Jeroen de Kloet (UvA).
Explorations during the event will be organized and 
developed into an open source set of (audio-visual) materials, 
scheduled to be published by the Amsterdam University  
Press in the summer of 2017.
Yiu Fai Chow is assistant professor in the Humanities 
Program at Hong Kong Baptist University  
(yfchow@hkbu.edu.hk)
Jeroen de Kloet is Professor of Globalisation Studies and 
Director of the Amsterdam Centre for Globalisation Studies 
(ACGS) at the University of Amsterdam (b.j.dekloet@uva.nl)
World Forum on China Studies
20-21 November 2015, Shanghai
www.chinastudies.org.cn/english.htm
Sponsored by the State Council Information Office of the 
People’s Republic of China and the Shanghai Municipal 
Government, the World Forum on China Studies is a 
Shanghai-based biennial academic event jointly organized by 
the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and the Shanghai 
Municipal Information Office. Founded in 2004, the Forum is 
held every two years in Shanghai and has convened seven times 
including two symposiums. The Forum has served as a platform 
for distinguished scholars to communicate with each other and 
explore the past, present and future of China studies. It is also 
dedicated to reflecting on the state of art in the field of China 
Studies while fostering an informed mutual understanding 
between China and the world.   
The forum has established its fame internationally in 
academia, with the attendance of around 1600 scholars, 
experts and veteran politicians from over 40 countries and 
regions all over the world. Meanwhile, diplomatic institutions 
and representatives of think tanks from more than 50 countries 
have participated in the Forum, which received extensive cover-
age by dozens of professional media outlets as well.  Academic 
circles at home and abroad speak highly of the forum; scholars 
from Russia, the United States, Japan, India and other countries 
have widely quoted the important academic points of view 
proposed during the forum.
Themed “China’s Reform, Opportunities for the World,” the 
6th World Forum on China Studies was held in Shanghai on 
20-21 November 2015. Over 200 scholars and opinion-leaders 
of different professional specialties and cultural backgrounds 
discussed a range of topics on China’s reform in the current 
global setting.
that is in perpetual competition with a non-Muslim Chinese 
community over the limited economic resources, and has 
to survive in a context of social and cultural tension. Islamic 
education is like the soul of the community, binding all  
Muslims into a strong organization, regardless their social, 
economic, or political background. 
Thirdly, the qubba (tomb of a Muslim scholar or elderly) 
forms the nexus of the Sufi community of Islamic Mysticism. 
More than one third of the Chinese Muslims are affiliated to 
one or another Sufi order. Many qubbas do not merely function 
as the burial places for the Sufi saints or Sufi leaders, but are 
places of pilgrimage for Sufi followers, turning them into  
a religious complex that combines the functions of a mosque, 
maktab and madrasa, and the tomb. The qubba thus plays  
a comprehensive role in the Sufi social network. 
In conclusion, Chinese Muslims have strategically formed  
a religious, social, and cultural network that has made Islam in 
China an institutionalized entity binding the widely dispersed 
and ethnically diverse Muslim communities or enclaves 
into a considerably coherent, partly unified Muslim umma. 
Confronted with increasing Islamophobia in the wake of recent 
terrorist attacks around the world, these networks are crucial 
for the survival of a minority living in a country dominated  
by a culture of atheism and materialism. 
 
Jianping WANG is Professor of Islamic Studies  
at Shanghai Normal University (wangjp27@shnu.edu.cn).
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA resumed sending Chinese 
Muslim students to al-Azhar University in Egypt in 1982. 
A small number of the students are sent by the Islamic 
Association of China, headquartered in Beijing, and approved 
by the Chinese Embassy in Cairo. These students can enjoy the 
benefits of an education exchange agreement between the 
PRC and Egypt, i.e., they can live in the international student 
dorms at al-Azhar University and receive a modest monthly 
stipend. Most, however, travel on their own initiative; they 
are unable to enjoy the benefits of the education exchange 
agreement and have to fend for themselves. So when the 
Arab Spring broke out in January 2011, their lives in Egypt sud-
denly became uncertain. Below are two snapshots of these 
self-funded Chinese-speaking Sino-Muslim students.1
Nabil
Nabil comes from a pious Muslim family in Henan. He went to 
Egypt in 2008 to study Islamic law at al-Azhar University, aspiring 
to become an Ahong (a Chinese term for imam) upon graduation. 
Because he did not have much prior knowledge of Islamic studies 
or the Arabic language, he did not receive a fellowship from 
the Islamic Association in China. However, he was very driven 
and passionate about his studies. When the uprising in Egypt 
erupted, his family members wanted him to return. However, 
just like many of his fellow Muslim students from around the 
world, he was excited about the revolution. He saw that people 
who held prior grudges for personal reasons became supportive 
of each other, as if they were united by a moment of uncertainty. 
Feeling inspired, he made a conscientious choice to stay in order 
to witness the unfolding of a historical event in the Islamic world. 
He believed that this experience would strengthen his faith and 
enrich his personal growth in life.
Khalid
Khalid is originally from Henan as well, but his family is not par-
ticularly strict with religious practice. Not being able to pass the 
college entrance exam in China, he went to Al-Azhar University 
simply out of curiosity for the outside world. Although the 
tuition and living expenses in Egypt are not beyond the afford-
ability of his family, they are still a financial burden. After a few 
years of trying, Khalid still could not pass the Arabic language 
exam, let alone enter a degree program. Feeling ashamed and 
not wanting to return home empty handed, he decided to open 
a Chinese restaurant in the neighborhood of the international 
students dorm of Al-Azhar University. Although Khalid had not 
been particularly good at academic studies, he did manage 
his business well. Hand-pulled noodles, stir-fries and hotpots 
attracted many curious diners. Khalid not only earned enough 
profit to pay back the original financial support from his family, 
but also sent extra money back to Henan. However, as the Arab 
Spring continued, many international Muslim students – Khalid’s 
restaurant’s major cliental – left Egypt. If the political uncertainty 
continued, he would not be able to keep the restaurant afloat. 
However, if Khalid returned to China without Arabic language 
skills or religious training, his employment prospects would be 
bleak, which was the reason for him to leave in the first place. 
Khalid found his niche in Egypt, but his way of making a living  
is threatened by the political instability. To leave or to stay,  
that was a big question for him when I met him in July 2013.
Khalid’s case is by no means unique among Sino-Muslim 
students at al-Azhar University. In fact, a majority of them are 
like him. Not being able to enter a college in China, they went  
to Egypt without much religious or Arabic language knowledge,  
or even awareness of what to expect. As a result, they needed to 
first take prerequisite language classes. However, as the Arabic 
language is very difficult, most of them cannot pass the language 
exam after repeated trials, which means they cannot enter the 
Al-Azhar University degree program either. Out of frustration or 
financial constraints, they drop out of school, but have managed 
to make the best of their experience in Egypt by finding different 
jobs to make a living. Some Sino-Muslim students work in 
marble-making, shoe-making, and plastic recycling factories. 
Others sell small made-in-China inexpensive products at the 
Khan al-Khalili market. Some even become door-to-door sales 
persons or tour guides. For them, Egypt has become a place  
of survival rather than religious learning.
Shuang WEN is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow  
at NYU Shanghai
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This volume contains an incredibly valuable treasure trove of insights that delve 
beneath the legality of Indonesia’s electoral system. In doing so it shines a light 
on the good, the bad and the ugly ways people win elections in this country. As 
for the good, many of the tactics and strategies deployed would be quite familiar 
to candidates elsewhere in the world in both new and established democracies. 
Building campaign teams, information networks, contact points and understand-
ing community needs are the nuts of bolts of functioning democracies anywhere. 
Kevin Evans
Once a failed state, forever a failed state. That, in a rough synopsis would apply to Pakistan over the last three 
quarters of a century, after its independence from British India. It actually was more a secession from British India 
than independence from England. The separation, on the eve of independence from India, was exerted under 
the slogan of Muslim autonomy and safety. Behind that movement with a religious call for action, to an extent 
in conjunction with the colonial administration, were the big feudal lords and the high brass in the military. 
Kristoffel Lieten
Reviewed titles:
Nicolas Martin. 2016. 
Politics, Landlords and Islam in Pakistan
London and New York: Routledge
ISBN 9781138821880
Syed Mohammad Ali. 2015.
Development, Poverty, and Power in Pakistan:  
The Impact of State and Donor Interventions on Farmers 
London and New York: Routledge
ISBN 9781138804531
THE STATE THAT EMERGED in 1947 was deficient and 
remained deficient in many respects. It continued to have 
all the ingredients of backwardness, such as low levels of 
industrialisation, stark poverty, mass illiteracy, a chaotic 
and deficient infrastructure, etc. In addition to the various 
interconnecting features of underdevelopment, it had two 
additional circumstances which would put a spanner on 
development and justice: the economic and political power 
of the landlord-military combine and the strategic role 
of Pakistan in the Cold War (against the Soviet Union and 
Afghanistan), and nowadays in the Coalition of the Willing. 
This Coalition induced the United States and an international 
consort to financially bail out and sustain the regime, however 
badly it managed its own affairs and its democracy. Such 
financial, political and military support have failed to provide 
the panacea  to either development or  a victory over ‘Muslim 
terrorism’. 
Both features of landlord power and international con-
nivance have been addressed in two recent books, which go  
a big way in accomplishing the analysis of Pakistan. Scholarly 
studies have been few, and quite a number of them have 
focussed on politicking and terrorism. Nicolas Martin has 
Reviewed title:
Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati (eds). 2016.
Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics,  
Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots
Singapore: NUS Press
ISBN 9789814722049 
ANOTHER FEATURE of contemporary Indonesian electoral politics, noted in this  
volume, is that the political ‘bad’ of electoral violence is largely absent. Even in 
Aceh, a region whose people have long suffered from civil strife, levels of violence 
and intimidation are now declining towards the national norm. This also reminds 
that efforts at future electoral and wider political reform 
need to take account to preserve those positive factors that 
represent the strengths of the existing system all the while 
redressing those areas that are poor and in need of redress. 
The volume also reveals other unusual dynamics. Most 
notable is mutual candidate support at different levels  
(from national, provincial to local) and quite intriguingly 
among candidates across parties but based upon other 
primordial affiliations that transcend partisan loyalties.  
This finding should beg for further research and under-
standing certainly by party leaders. 
Indeed this issue also offers an insight into another  
element of the political system in Indonesia that calls for  
more detailed exploration, namely the very weak and frail 
structure and place of the political parties. Frequent refer-
ences by party activists interviewed to the old Soeharto 
era concept of the ‘floating masses’ in terms of politically 
disconnected voters reminds us that it is actually the political 
parties that are floating. They are clearly unanchored from 
community and ultimately very vulnerable. The impact of 
the open list PR system on the further enfeeblement of the 
party system needs to be seen in the context of the wider 
problem of the incapacity of parties to regularise internal 
political competition without degenerating into monarchies 
or splintering into several parties. The impact of the latter 
has been to thwart the emergence of genuinely large parties 
despite all the regulatory efforts to restrict the entrance  
of new parties into the system. 
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produced an anthropological study on how control over 
resources, particularly land, allows the landed elites to keep 
the impoverished rural population under their thumb and 
the country poor. The result, he writes, after a careful study 
stretching over 25 months of field work, starting in 2001,  
is everyday violence and disempowerment which in turn 
creates a state of vulnerability and fear among the poor.
New forms in an old straightjacket
In the introduction, Martin writes: “It is a world inhabited 
by absentee landlords with vast estates, large retinues of 
servants, peasants, cattle rustlers, criminals, peasant girl 
mistresses and unscrupulous farm managers, bureaucrats 
and politicians… Their mansions in Lahore are staffed with 
valets, butlers, drivers, cooks, and maids, all brought from the 
villages on their estates. Here parties are hosted where high-
ranking military officers, politicians, businessmen and civil 
servant gather and drink smuggled Black Label Scotch whisky. 
Their children study in prestigious universities in the United 
Kingdom and, increasingly, the United States.” After such an 
introduction, as the entire book written in a fluid style, one 
could be tempted to put the book aside, for is this not the 
old-fashioned stuff which characterised academic research  
in the 1970s? One would be advised to read on, for the  
various chapters offer such a detailed report of what rural 
life really looks like, that in the end, the bottom line of the 
introductory statement is validated.  
It is a book on the world behind the utter luxury.  
It questions theories such as by Anatol Lieven (Pakistan:  
A Hard Country, London: Allen Lane, 2001) that patronage  
mitigates poverty and exploitation and provides the  
impoverished population with the minimum basic needs  
of subsistence. It questions the benign broker status of the  
new rural lords whose position, rather than helping the poor 
getting access to the state institutions and thus contributing  
to democracy, impoverishes, disempowers and entangles. 
The ethnography presented in the book looks at the 
functioning of various mechanisms, such as monopoly of re-
sources, debt bondage, electoral politics, decentralisation of 
state institutions and the recourse to Islam, in the emergence 
of a new class of political and economic entrepreneurs from 
within the middle – and upper sections of the old landed class.
Doing research in such difficult, sensitive and inhospitable 
circumstances (in the green revolution Sargodha district, 
the grain ‘California of Pakistan’) requires the co-operation  
of the rich and powerful. Martin was in the lucky position that 
these gatekeepers provided him with all necessary support 
during two weekends in a month that they come down from 
their palaces in Lahore. The rest of the week, he could mingle 
with the various layers in the villages and learn the details of 
the local drug trading, bootlegging, buffalo theft, electricity 
theft, and the various forms of embezzlement of government 
funds. To obtain power and wealth, “people stole, killed, 
kidnapped, bribed, and sold adulterated goods, trafficked 
heroin, and engaged in bootlegging”. Interestingly, the moral 
disorder, perceived as degradation in comparison with the 
earlier days, was ascribed to the entry of western social values 
(which to an extent goes to explain the attraction of the  
jihadi movements). Another explanation for the resurgence  
of religious adherence is being provided in the last chapter: 
the political recourse to Islam by the regime (and its interna-
tional backers) helped to deflect the attention of people away 
from issues of social justice. Islamisation brought issues of 
moral righteousness, rather than social justice and economic 
development, central on the agenda. It ultimately backfired 
by giving birth to radical movements. It once served as a 
shortcut for the regime, bent on stifling economic reforms 
which would affect the rich.
Landlord power
Martin’s book deals with some of the very essentials of village 
life. It explains how, despite the rapid transition to capitalist 
farm management, debt bondage continued to play a pivotal 
role in keeping labour unfree. The debt relationship binds the 
nominally independent workforce. Martin argues that the use 
of kinship ties in the servicing of debts displaces the potential 
class conflict onto the kinship groups and keeps the labourers 
divided. A minority of the poor has benefitted from post-
feudalism, but the controlled access by the wealthy to public 
services, such as health care, housing and education, keeps 
the common family disempowered. The forms of patronage,  
it could be added, have helped the selected retinue of poor 
but disenfranchise the majority of poor. Landlord power is 
bent on blocking the emergence of impersonal governance, 
the rule by the canon of modern state management. This,  
as Max Weber had argued in the 19th century, is the pre-
requisite for development. 
The last chapter in Martin’s book brings us close to  
the subject matter of the other book under review –  
the study of Development, Poverty and Power in Pakistan  
by Syed Mohammad Ali. It deals with market development  
and with devolution, designed in consultation with a variety 
of international aid agencies. It is considered to be the  
answer to the authoritarian (and failed) state from above: 
democratize the institutions of state by bringing them closer 
to the people in the localities and increase transparency, 
participation and accountability. 
Ali also is an anthropologist but his book has many 
cross-linkages with political science and political economy. 
Chapter Three actually is political economy. It provides a 
short but solid brief on the changing ownership relations 
and the abysmally stark inequality, especially in the lower 
Sindh province. On the basis of macro-data, it argues along 
the same lines as Martin has done with his quantitative data:  
a nexus of dependency characterised by debt bondage and 
insecurity which keeps poor peasants and agricultural labour-
ers in poverty and the country in underdevelopment.
 
A powerful nexus, including NGOs
Although capitalism has pervaded Pakistan, it operates through 
pre-capitalist forms of social organisation and state function-
ing. The problems which face Pakistan, Ali argues, emanate 
from the uneven landholding patterns which also allows a 
disproportionate control over state resources:  
“The Pakistani’s state patronage of the landed rural elite not 
only helps them capture state resources, but to also avert 
reforming major causes of prevailing rural inequalities…  
Since donor agencies have not directly contended with altering 
power relations associated with landownership in rural areas, 
they have further enabled the capture of state-led and donor 
supported agricultural schemes by large landowners” (p. 22).
The book indeed addresses the question as to why –  
despite all the fantastic programmes that have been 
developed, the financial resources that went with it and the 
good intentions which probably many of the (international) 
bureaucrats in the official NGOs must have had – the results 
in the field have been close to null and void. The many golden 
bullets of the recent past, the much trumpeted Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers of the World Bank being one  
of them, seemingly have underwritten the golden luxury  
of the wealthy.
It is a grim picture of the nexus of international agencies, 
state institutions and NGOs. Some would argue that it is too 
grim a picture. It possibly is, but in that case, which other 
explanatory model do we have to explain for the failure  
as a developmental state with some measure of justice for 
around 200 million people?
Ali has done well in looking for some hope in the instances 
of resistance by Pakistan farmers. He devotes an entire 
chapter to it. Movements have been a frequent occurrence, 
but also this chapter ends in a grim mood. The only successful 
movements, one may add, have been the extremist Islamic 
organisations, but it is not quite improbable that they have 
some kind of commonality of interests with the elite. 
The Taliban anyway had been created by the United States 
and the then military rulers of Pakistan as the battle troops  
in the battle with the communist regime in Afghanistan.
Gatekeepers
Both anthropological studies are robust specimens done 
by scholars with their feet on the ground. Whereas Ali has 
interviewed a few hundred men and women over large tracts 
in Pakistan, Martin has been hovering around in a small area, 
collecting bits and pieces. Unfortunately Martin has not 
talked to women. He had been told that approaching them 
would have been “a threat to the modesty”. That is very 
unfortunate, because Punjabi women are very outspoken 
and knowledgeable about gender-specific aspects. My own 
experience, doing field work in the area, has been that these 
women are very much accessible. Martin was inhibited by the 
fear that it would lead to gossiping, but the main reason for 
not talking to women independently may have been the gate 
keepers, the gatekeepers who, as stated earlier, had provided 
him magnificent channels into rural society, but who, on the 
other hand, obliged him not to approach the women folk.
Nevertheless, Martin’s book remains a great study on the 
ground of a failed state. Ali’s study, on the other hand, clarifies 
why large international aid programmes do not work.
Kristoffel Lieten, University of Amsterdam.  
(g.c.m.lieten@uva.nl)
Public and media attention with the great and powerful 
individuals who dominate their respective parties have  
led many to presume that parties are powerful. This volume 
strips such perceptions naked. The ease with which party 
structures are breached through cross-party alliances of can-
didates, the fact that candidates effectively rely on their own 
resources, efforts and networks, rather than party networks 
and resources, in addition to the electorally self-destructive 
conflicts among candidates, suggest the party structures  
are anaemic and impotent. 
The key ugly issue revealed in virtually every case study 
was the dangerous penetration of money into electoral 
processes. The incentive to compete publicly with members 
of one’s own party for votes, a practice both reflecting and 
causing the lack of internal party cohesion, coupled with the 
almost universal reference to the intensified deployment of 
money directly to voters in 2014, constitute challenges to  
the healthy consolidation of Indonesia’s democratic systems.  
The frequent observations that distributing money and 
other semi-valuable goods to voters using euphemisms and 
hiding behind the social legitimacy of religion and culture 
when doing so reflects a wider ‘fog’ of obscurity in Indonesia 
that seeks to cover the stench of corruption with the fragrance 
of cultural and religious legitimacy. As such it links electoral 
corruption with wider forms of corruption found elsewhere in 
Indonesia. It suggests that practitioners recognise that what 
they are doing is wrong, even sinful, but that they believe 
they can make it palatable through deploying (abusing) the 
legitimacy of cultural and religious symbolism. Other common 
refrains to emerge included the impact of incumbent candi-
dates’ access to legislated slush funds to support initiatives  
in their electorates. This implies a distinctly unlevel playing  
field among candidates. 
A number of case studies presented information indicating 
that even where money was deployed, it was not always a 
guarantee of electoral success. Equally the special public funds 
incumbents could deploy as pork barrelling were also shown to 
be less than a guarantee of re-election. Many case studies sug-
gested that this may because the candidates concerned were 
simply not ‘professional enough’ to make optimal use of these 
financial resources and manage networks of clientelism rather 
than suggesting that money as such was not enough. The wider 
impact of the increased resort to money to secure election 
victory begs the very question of who actually pays? 
Since the 2014 election ever more MPs have been arrested 
for corruption, not from the election process as such, but rather 
since they have taken their seats in Parliament. The almost 
complete removal of public funding since 1999 has left the par-
ties almost totally dependent for serious contributions upon the 
wealthiest of citizens to be viable. The ‘privatisation’ of electoral 
funding is reflected very sadly by the concept that campaign 
funds are not seen as contributions but rather as investments. 
The predominance of the logic of the market is sorely in need of 
redress from the nation’s elite to its grass roots. Pushing back 
against these political investors will surely not be easy especially 
when a popular view from civil society in Indonesia is that public 
funding is a form of ‘legalised corruption’.
The impact of non-transactional and microlocal factors 
including personal and familial connections on the potential for 
victory, while generally sidelined as determinants of potential 
success or failure, nonetheless did break through. Several 
writers noted that despite all the gamesmanship around  
the campaign period party leaders did also concede glumly 
a mood shift by voters. A better understanding of what leads 
to this shift in voter mood would be a very valuable future 
form of research. Comments like ‘the party had long been the 
dominant force in local politics, and many former supporters 
were becoming disappointed with its performance’ suggest a 
clear need to explore what moves voters beyond the tactics of 
campaign time. Could it be that voters also take account of the 
performance of their elected leaders and their governments 
in deciding how they will vote regardless of who pays them or 
how much? Do these members of the voting public represent 
a significant enough number that party leaders and incumbent 
MPs should actually consider their actual performance for the 
almost five years leading up to the campaign period?
While the studies provided sobering insights into the 
dynamics of the open list PR system for electing party based 
MPs, including women, in the House of Representatives from 
national to local levels, they provided essentially no informa-
tion on election to the second chamber of the national 
Parliament, namely the House of Regional Representatives 
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah). Given the exclusion of parties 
from that House plus the much higher levels of victory by 
women in the House of Regional Representatives and the  
operation of four-past-the-post, not PR, for election to 
the House of Regional Representatives, the potential for 
comparison and the learning of lessons that might better 
inform the dynamics of election to the House of Regional 
Representatives suggest a major opportunity was forgone.
The timing of the release of this volume could hardly 
be better. The country will soon begin to focus on further 
improving its electoral systems and procedures. The detailed 
information provided at quite granular levels offers excellent 
evidence of the impact of the electoral system and of wider 
issues of electoral management.
Kevin Evans, Founder www.pemilu.asia.  
(kemitraan@hotmail.com)
of a PhD thesis and definitive monograph on one of Bali’s 
major temples Pura Besakih and as highly respected within 
the academy as outside it. But he prefers to downplay these 
credentials and his career has in fact been largely in the 
ill-defined borderlands of the academic world – as compiler  
of the definitive (pre-digital) bibliography of literature on  
Bali, long-serving (now retired) librarian of the National 
Museum of Ethnology in Leiden and freelance scholar writing 
since the 1970s on Balinese arts, religion, and culture. Pray, 
Magic Heal is written deliberately for a popular audience and 
its subject is a pop-culture phenomenon but it is based on 
decades of in-depth research. 
The second author, Made Wijaya, died, suddenly, 
 unexpectedly and tragically, between the writing and 
publication of this review, which now takes on an element  
of obituary. He was a veteran of the expatriate community 
in Bali, tropical landscape designer extraordinaire, one-man 
multimedia production machine and much more. His book 
masquerades as a picture book about ‘style’, and wields its 
erudition lightly, but it is actually a contribution to the study 
of Javo-Balinese history that deserves to be taken seriously, 
not least for its innovative methodological approach to 
interpretation of cultural transmission. 
Both authors are gifted and well-qualified amateurs  
(in the original sense of the term) speaking over the fence. 
But who is listening? To date I can find no reviews of either in 
scholarly journals and only one of each in other media. This 
is a loss for us all, on both sides of the fence. In my discipline 
(anthropology) we frequently bemoan our failure to com-
municate our (usually inherently interesting) knowledge  
to non-specialist audiences and I understand it is so in 
other disciplines. Likewise, scholars outside the academic 
system have real difficulty getting their (sometimes very 
well-informed) views heard within the circuits of academic 
discourse. Some of this fence is structural – a system of 
academic recognition that increasingly privileges sophisticated 
(i.e., theoretically framed) and accountable ‘academic’ values 
over more everyday ones of readability and accessibility,  
and in effect becomes a system of gatekeeping. Likewise  
the mainstream media are, in my experience, surprisingly 
resistant to contributions of academic knowledge unless they 
happen to address the sensational issue du jour. But some  
of it is also habitual and often it becomes easier not to try.  
The result is that we are all the poorer – on both sides of 
the fence. These two books remind us of a greater mission  
for which we all have some responsibility and that we lose 
sight of at our peril, especially in a time when universities  
are, ironically calling for our research to be more relevant and 
publically accessible as exemplified by the growing media 
genre of (sometimes well-informed) ‘science journalism’. 
Majapahit Style
Wijaya was perhaps the best known of the talented expatriates 
who arrived in Bali in the 1960s and 70s, many of whom have 
lived there ever since. In addition to his day job as a designer 
of spectacular and romantic gardens for hotels across Asia, 
he was a one-man multimedia factory – producing an endless 
stream of photographs, videos, cultural commentaries, and 
public satires, much of it cleverly disguised as social gossip. 
Among all of this he has consistently studied and analysed 
Balinese architecture and developed a series of arguments 
about its structural, spatial and aesthetic principles and 
practices. Majapahit Style (Volume 1) is the latest chapter  
in this opus magnum, expanding his thinking about Balinese 
architecture to, but also from, its historical origins in neigh-
bouring Java and beyond. 
Majapahit Style presents itself, I suspect somewhat tongue-
in-cheek, as yet another offering in the glossy coffee-table 
book genre of (this or that) style. But what it represents is 
the fruit of decades of research, exploring, documenting and 
reflecting on architectural, aesthetic and ritual practices, first 
in Bali, then across Indonesia and further across Southeast-, 
South- and East Asia. The resulting text moves across time 
and space and between anecdote and analysis, expert 
opinions and personal ones, assertions and speculations, but 
between them is a thread of argument, not always explicit, 
but recurring and systematic: that while the direct evidence of 
Majapahit material culture, especially architecture, has largely 
disappeared from its historical heartland, it lives on in the 
material design heritages of other places and times – spread 
across the archipelago and especially in Bali, where aspects  
of it survive in living traditions of aesthetic and ritual practice. 
This argument is implicit in the structure of the book, which 
moves historically from earliest to latest manifestations 
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One of the recurrent problems faced by producers of academic knowledge  
is its institutional separation from not only the people it is about, but from  
many of the people who would like to read it the most (try getting anything  
non-sensational published in the mainstream media). A converse problem  
is the system of institutional gatekeeping that prevents those without proper 
institutional credentials (implicit as well as explicit) from joining the disciplinary 
conversation (try getting something into an academic journal without  
institutional affiliation, let alone proper referencing style). Bali, because it is as 
popular among uncertified scholars as certified ones, and among popular readers  
as academic ones, is a fruitful case study for exploring these contradictions. 
Graeme MacRae
Reviewed titles: 
Made Wijaya. 2014. 
Majapahit Style (Volume 1)
Sanur: Wijaya Words
ISBN 9786027136700
David Stuart-Fox with Ketut Liyer,  
edited by Charles Levine. 2015. 
Pray, Magic, Heal: The Story of Bali’s  
Famous Eat, Pray, Love Folk Healer
New York and Leiderdorp: New Saraswati Press
ISBN 9780986335105
THE MOST INTERESTING early scholarship on Bali was in 
fact done by gifted amateurs – expatriate artists (Miguel 
Covarrubias, Colin McPhee, Walter Spies), colonial admini-
strators (e.g., F.A. Liefrinck) and eccentric escapees from  
the stifling normalities of European society (e.g., R. Goris).  
A few certified academics (Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, 
Jane Belo) did also produce books but ironically almost nobody 
reads them, then or now. Today there is a constant discourse 
about the multiple issues that Bali is facing, some (but not all) 
well-informed and thoughtful. There is also a substantial read-
ership of expatriates and thinking tourists hungry for books 
which translate academic knowledge about Bali into accessible 
form, but relatively few books really serve this market.
Two recent books speak into this in-between market, but 
from outside the academic arena: Majapahit Style by Made 
Wijaya and Pray, Magic Heal, by David Stuart-Fox. Stuart-Fox 
has credentials as an academic specialist on Bali – author 
Images of the Canton factories
The port city of Canton (now Guangzhou), China, served as a vital hub in the early phase of modern global trade.  
In the 18th century, numerous European companies set up shop in the designated foreign quarter of factories and 
warehouses. Like their peers around the world, Chinese artists adapted quickly to the sweeping social, economic,  
and aesthetic changes wrought by these mercantile aspirations on a world scale. The resulting artworks – often  
labeled as ‘export art’ –  have long been characterized by art historians as inauthentically hybrid, and thus not  
deserving of scholarly attention. As a broad category, export art encompasses a great diversity of objects made  
by artists throughout China in a variety of styles and mediums. These include paintings, fans, textiles, decorative  
and utilitarian ceramics, lacquer ware, and much more.
Hope Marie Childers
Reviewed title:
Paul A. Van Dyke and Maria Kar-wing Mok. 2015.
Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822: Reading History in Art
Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press
ISBN 9789888208555
THIS OBJECT-ORIENTED VOLUME, co-authored by Paul Van Dyke and Maria Kar-wing 
Mok, examines representations of Canton via a specific type of Chinese export art, 
using fresh eyes and new angles. Bookended by an introduction and conclusion, 
the volume consists of nine chapters: six are chronological surveys, each spanning 
approximately a decade; the remainder consist of thematic 
analysis. The introduction provides a succinct history of the 
founding of Canton’s European merchant district, beginning 
with the construction of China Street in 1760 (p. xx). The 
study concludes with the years preceding the Great Fire  
of 1822, when the entire quarter of factories burned down, 
thus changing the landscape forever. 
The authors train their lens on painted panoramas of 
the Canton factories, specifically those found on porcelain 
punchbowls and on two-dimensional surfaces, from small 
gouache panels to large canvases in oil. Their objective, as 
referenced in the book’s subtitle, is ‘reading history through 
of Majapahit architecture, expands geographically across 
the vast region of Majapahit influence and architecturally 
across forms, elements and local aesthetic traditions. The 
argument is supported, and indeed most compellingly made, 
by a primary visual text of photographs, maps and drawings, 
juxtaposing similarities of form, colour and decoration, 
materials, methods, and names.  
Embedded in this empirical argument is a methodological 
one, perhaps even more important for academic consid-
eration, of the provocative power of comparison of spatial 
organisation, structural form and especially aesthetic style 
as a method of analysis across time, space and even cultural 
transformation. Recognising the evidence of Majapahit 
culture and interpreting it through the lens of contemporary 
Balinese architecture and ritual was the starting point of 
this work, but its systematic expansion into a comparative 
method is what makes this work compelling. 
I will not be surprised if historians and architectural  
scholars find plenty to disagree with here, but to date  
there is no evidence of them having read, let alone reviewed 
it. I’ll leave them to assess the historical veracity of Wijaya’s 
evidence or its intersections with the established corpus  
of Majapahit scholarship, but I think any criticisms in terms  
of deficits of certified academic practice miss the point,  
both of its vast empirical sweep and its methodological 
innovation. 
Pray, Magic, Heal
This is an unusual book, 45 years in the making and  
unavoidably entwined with its (in)famous twin Eat, Pray,  
Love, but it is not what the title might suggest. Stuart-Fox  
is another of the extraordinary generation of dedicated Bali 
scholars who lived in Bali through the 1970s and 80s, became 
fluent in local languages and for whom deep research into 
Balinese culture was not a job but a way of life. He knew Ketut 
Liyer long before his dubious fame through the Eat, Pray, Love 
book/film phenomenon. At this time Liyer was just one of 
hundreds of balian [priest/healer/seer] in villages across Bali. 
But he was a good one and also a painter of some repute. 
Because of this and his proximity to the culturally/spiritually 
oriented tourist centre of Ubud, foreigners began seeking  
his services in the 1990s and in 2002 Elizabeth Gilbert was  
just another foreign client. But her book changed his life 
forever and from 2005 onward he received and counselled a 
constant stream of foreigners. He charged for these services, 
considerably more than for his local clientele, and his family 
prospered as a result. Opinion is divided as to the genuineness 
of the advice he provided to foreigners and also as to his 
motivation in doing this work.
But that is not what the book is about. The first chapter 
relates some of this story briefly, but the majority of it is 
based on conversations between Liyer and Stuart-Fox, mainly 
during the 1970s and 80s, in which Liyer outlines the theory 
and method of his practice. The result is a very readable 
account, quite personal in a way, through which we gradually 
get to know both Liyer the man and the nature of his practices 
and the beliefs embedded in them. 
This book belongs on the same shelf as the Jero Tapakan  
films by Linda Connor and Tim Asch, Barbara Lovric’s work  
on magic and healing, Angela Hobart’s on healers and Hildred 
Geertz’s final books about paintings, temples and artists.  
They all take us deep into the heart of real grass-roots Balinese 
spiritual belief and practice, often obscured behind the 
spectacular beauty of temple ritual and the increasingly banal 
and sanitised simplifications of official, universalised ‘Hinduism’. 
This is a domain of powerful and potentially dangerous forces, 
embodied in a range of (usually) invisible beings who need to  
be placated and managed or sometimes fought and defeated 
by magical tools and techniques at the disposal of a skilled prac-
titioner. Liyer, notwithstanding the somewhat bizarre distortions 
of his later career, was for many years a genuine practitioner of 
these arts. The successive chapters of the book take us through 
Liyer’s repertoire of tools and techniques – meditation and 
mantras, holy water and incense, magical objects, drawings 
and sashes. These are described and explained in considerable 
detail, often including normally secret mantras and instructions 
and reproductions of magical drawings. The book is generously 
illustrated with these drawings and photographs and like 
Majapahit Style, these are more than just illustrations, they are  
an equal part of the text.  
What makes this book work, is that Stuart-Fox resists the 
(academic) temptation to over-interpret and tell us how or 
what to think about Liyer – despite 40 years’ experience and 
insight into Balinese culture, he steps back and lets Liyer speak 
for himself, allowing us to make what we will of the imperfect, 
improvised ordinariness of Balinese healing, but without deny-
ing the magic and mystery of it. The Liyer we meet in these 
pages is neither mystic, magician nor religious scholar, let 
alone celebrity – he is more like a village craftsman, working 
with a limited kit of practical tools and a disarming awareness 
of the limitations of his understanding of the powers behind 
both sickness and healing. My only disappointment was not 
learning what he really thought about his later years.
Ways of knowing Bali
Both these books tell us something about Bali: one unpacking 
a one-man pop-culture phenomenon and informing our (mis)
understanding by relocating him, by way of biography, back 
into the tradition from which he was plucked by international 
celebrity culture. In the process, the reader is educated,  
gradually and accessibly, into the workings of Balinese ritual, 
healing and artistic practice. The other (by a one-man pop-
culture phenomenon) works at a different level, addressing  
one of the biggest themes in Southeast Asian history, but  
by way of an innovative approach, largely self-taught and 
pursued and expressed with an infectious exuberance.  
Both are well-written and easy to read, but in both cases,  
much of the work is done by visual means. 
It is, I think, no coincidence that both authors are veterans 
of the expatriate scene of the 1970s, which in some respects 
more resembled the golden age of Baliphilia of the 1930s than 
the present and before Bali was transformed, as one of them 
put it, “from a user-friendly magic kingdom into a high-density 
Paradise theme park”2 in the 1990s (and something else again 
since then). This was an extraordinary period in which a loose 
community of talented and dedicated foreigners immersed 
themselves into local community and culture. Many of them, 
like their predecessors in the 1930s, straddled the fence, pro-
ducing books (Diana Darling), photography (Leonard Lueras)3 
and films (Lawrence and Lorne Blair, John Darling) which have 
proven classics in contemporary academic understandings of 
Bali. Some of them moved deeper into local Balinese worlds 
by way of marriage (e.g. Rucina Ballinger) and engagement 
with their local commu-nities (Garret Kam). Others (e.g. Michel 
Picard) crossed the fence into academia from where they 
continued to provide some of the most insightful studies  
of Balinese culture. Since then, both expatriate and scholarly 
engagements with Bali have moved on, the former away  
from local community and culture into a generic expatriate 
community that could almost be anywhere in the world;  
the latter toward more circumscribed and specialised studies 
based on much shorter (and I fear sometimes shallower) 
periods of research.  
Stuart-Fox and Wijaya both had the privilege of living and 
working in Bali at this time, and since then have had successful 
careers in other fields, but both have chosen to honour  
and repay these privileges with books that are simultaneously 
serious contributions to Bali studies and effective translations 
of expert knowledge about into accessible form. One is a 
model for bringing academic knowledge to a wider readership,  
the other offering deeply grounded knowledge to the 
academy for us to engage with. We have something to learn 
from them both – about Bali and about the way we share our 
knowledge and understanding.
 
Graeme MacRae, Massey University.  
(g.s.macrae@massey.ac.nz)
References
1  Fences are a common metaphor in antipodean cultures such as 
Australia, where both authors and the reviewer originate, but are 
perhaps less familiar to European readers. They refer to borders 
and boundaries between places and spaces, in this case the  
well-guarded ones between academic and popular knowledges.  
A Balinese cognate would be the pervasive tembok [masonry 
walls] that mark divisions between domestic and public, sacred 
and profane places/spaces.
2   Roberts, Scott. 1995. Introduction. In: Wijaya, Made. Stranger in 
Paradise: The Diary of an Expatriate in Bali 1979-80. Sanur: Wijaya 
Words.
3   Rio Helmi is absent from this list, only because he occupies a 
special place between the expat and local worlds – another fence.
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art’. This is achieved using a kind of dialogical method: close 
scrutiny of archival sources enables the authors to weave an 
intricate chronology of each European company’s presence 
and activity in Canton, depending on the waxing and waning 
of their commercial fortunes. As Van Dyke and Mok suggest: 
“This ongoing rivalry between Europeans – combined with 
the Hong merchants’ willingness to make the changes they 
wanted so long as they paid the costs – resulted in the gradual 
transformation of the landscape” (p. 12). In turn, that shifting 
panorama of factories and warehouses along the quayside  
can be recognized in visual form on pots and paintings.
The study is distinguished by two fresh approaches 
brought to bear on the many portraits of China Street and its 
shifts over time. The first is their painstaking cross-referencing 
of logistical minutiae gleaned from the archives against close 
observation of fine details in the artworks. Careful observation 
 of painted elements confirm that numerous scenes serve  
as fairly reliable documentary evidence of the district’s 
transformation over time. Grounded in this method, Chapters  
1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8 offer meticulously sourced narratives, 
visual and textual, of the factories. The list of aspects that the 
authors consider is impressive: the construction/alteration  
of buildings; architectural features; interventions by key  
personnel; increase in rents (affecting occupancy); the  
presence (or absence) of national flags; seasonal clues;  
scale and perspective; the impact of fires. Moreover, they 
have cross-referenced their analysis with colonial-era  
maps to corroborate their findings.
Equipped with such detail, the authors posit a more 
precise dating of the painted scenes than previously possible. 
This matters, they argue, because the factory portraits are a 
category apart from ordinary export art “such as Chinese life 
scenes, landscapes, daily activities and images of plants and 
animals” (p. xxi). Rather, they suggest that “factory paintings 
were a type of historical record that buyers wanted to display 
in their homes to represent their experience in China” (p. xxi). 
As such, customers expected a certain level of verisimilitude 
and a recognizable sense of place in these souvenir objects. 
This understanding paves the way for the volume’s second 
notable contribution: Chapters 3 and 5 offer brief analyses 
of the technical circumstances behind the production of the 
porcelain bowls and the paintings, revealing key disparities 
between the two mediums. For example, the punchbowls  
are characterized by far less accuracy in rendering a particular 
moment in time than are the paintings. This may be due partly 
to their manufacture in pottery centers at some distance 
from the site, or because the patronage and sales practices 
demanded more flexibility in content for these utilitarian 
objects (p. 23-7). 
In contrast, the paintings are shown to be highly reliable 
in their representations of narrow, identifiable slices of time 
in Canton’s history. Further, though the paintings are often 
extremely similar, no two are alike, as artists avoided the  
use of templates or direct copying methods (p. 22). Indeed,  
the uniqueness of each painting serves to dispel the common-
place claim that Chinese artists were merely skilled copyists. 
Most engaging is the Chapter 5 discussion about the skilled 
use of vantage point and perspective by the artists to 
emphasize a distinct set of aesthetic and compositional 
values. The authors assert that “rather than inferring an 
ignorance of ‘Western’ perspective, the Chinese artists’  
work unveils their knowledge of indigenous Chinese ideas  
of perspective” (p. 49). They provide details of factory paint-
ings on maps, silk, and reverse painting on glass as examples 
to demonstrate the influence of multiple perspectives as  
used in traditional scroll painting. 
The result is an interdisciplinary volume that closely 
entwines object histories and archival context, thus elevating 
it above the descriptive, evaluative literature of connoisseur-
ship so common to this era of art production. It furthermore 
stretches trade and economic histories beyond their usual 
boundaries, to encompass cultural expression.
The shortcomings of the book are minor. A number  
of passages make for rather dry reading, an unavoidable 
trade-off for a factually dense, detailed chronicle. Another 
quibble is the lack of a list of illustrations and no page refer-
ences in the majority of captions. These omissions diminish 
the ability to enter the volume via the artworks themselves 
– surely a standard starting point for most readers, especially 
artists, art historians, collectors, and the like. Rather, the 
arrangement requires readers to access the images through  
a mostly linear path through the text itself (which does 
provide Plate- and Figure-numbers). This discourages casual 
browsing, ultimately limiting its audience. 
The book’s many strengths include its well-ordered  
and comprehensive bibliography, an appendix indexing 
primary sources pertaining to early company movements,  
and scrupulously cited detail. The authors mine data from  
not only the usual colonial-era archives (i.e. British and 
French), but under-utilized collections in Denmark, Sweden, 
and Belgium, as well as Chinese-language sources newly 
available online. While not a theory-driven study of the  
genre, this extensively illustrated (100 color plates and  
32 black and white figures), fact-rich analysis will serve as  
a vital reference for specialist scholars, such as collectors  
of Chinese export art of the period and historians of global 
trade in the early colonial era. It should also have broader  
appeal among art historians, who have taken greater  
interest, of late, in such popular, but non-traditional forms. 
The hallmark of such art is its fast-moving fusion of varied 
interests, styles, mediums, and markets. Historically, this 
cross-cultural hybridity has been viewed with skepticism,  
yet it seems that scholars of Chinese art history are  
beginning to acknowledge this intriguing and vital – if 
undervalued – stage in China’s formidable aesthetic legacy.
Hope Marie Childers, New York State College of Ceramics  
at Alfred University. (childers@alfred.edu)
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The ICAS 10 Asian Studies Book Fair
ICAS 10 in Chiang Mai, Thailand, 2017, will host our first ever Book Fair, focused on Asian studies publications. The ICAS 
Asian Studies Book Fair will not only provide a platform for books in the English language, but also in Chinese, French, 
German, and Korean, to reflect those additional languages now eligible for the ICAS Book Prize. It will be the perfect 
showcase for all your Asian studies publications. 
ICAS 10
The International Convention of Asia Scholars is the  
largest international gathering in the field of Asian studies, 
ranked among the top five percent of conferences worldwide  
in terms of attendance (source: ICCA). It attracts participants 
from over 60 countries to engage in various dialogues on  
Asia that transcend boundaries between disciplines and 
geographic areas. 
ICAS 10, hosted by Chiang Mai University, will take  
place from 20-23 July 2017. 1250-2000 participants are 
expected to attend. ICAS 10 will offer a unique opportunity 
for participating institutions and individuals from various 
academic, cultural and political domains, to explore outside 
of their specialisations and engage with professionals and civil 
society actors from Thailand, Southeast Asia and beyond. 
Reserve your place at the Book Fair
Exhibition booths can be reserved for the duration of the  
Book Fair, providing you with an area to display and sell 
products as well as showcase your services to potential 
clients, authors and collaborators. Trasvin Jittidecharak  
of Silkworm Books will be our local host extraordinaire  
for all exhibition-related issues. 
Advertising with IIAS/ICAS
The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS),  
based in the Netherlands, is a global humanities and social 
sciences institute, which supports programmes that engage 
Asian and other international partners. IIAS runs a fellowship 
programme, facilitates academic events, publishes multiple 
book series, produces the scholarly periodical The Newsletter, 
and administers newbooks.asia, our academic book review 
website for Asian Studies publications. IIAS also hosts the  
ICAS Secretariat at its offices in Leiden. 
Contact us via iiasnews@iias.nl about all our advertising 
opportunities, including discounts for multiple issues or 
combination packages. 
The Newsletter 
Print run of 8000; global readership of 50,000
Freely accessible in print and online:  
iias.asia/the-newsletter (prices per printed issue)
Full page 280x360 mm €750 
Half page 280x180 mm/140x360 mm €375 
Quarter page 280x90 mm/140x180 mm €225 
Websites  
(price per month) 
IIAS website, homepage  €600 
(yearly page views: 95,000) 
IIAS website, fellowship page  €300 
(yearly page views: 20,000) 
newbooks.asia  €300 
(yearly page views: 45,000) 
Digital updates  
(price per mailing, 20,000 addresses)
The IIAS Update (monthly institutional news) €300
The Paragraph (monthly update for newbooks.asia) €300
ICAS Matters (conference updates) €300
ICAS
ICAS 10 programme book €250
ICAS 10 conference bag insert €400 
ICAS Matters €300
The ICAS 10 Asian Studies Book Fair
Chiang Mai Convention Centre 
Thailand, 20-23 July 2017
icas@iias.nl | www.icas.asia
new
books.asia
Newest titles - First reviews
Publishers – get in touch!
Provide us with a list of your latest Asian studies English-
language publications, and we make them available to 
our reviewers. We order review hardcopies the moment 
one of our reviewers requests a title. Ideally we also ask 
for (pre-publication) PDFs to be sent to reviewers first. 
Reviews are posted online, shared through social media, 
and a selection is also published in The Newsletter.  
Promote yourself
newbooks.asia offers a number of promotional opportunities:  
banners, discount codes, event announcements. 
Reviewers
If you too would like to contribute to our growing collection 
of reviews, register as a reviewer and request a title. 
The Paragraph
This is the newbooks.asia digital monthly update,  
informing subscribers of the newest reviews, available  
review titles, and a selection of publisher/book news.  
The Paragraph is sent to everyone on the IIAS/ICAS  
mailing list (20,000 addresses).
Reserve your exhibition booth at: 
http://icas.asia/en/sponsorship-and-exhibition
Call for Papers
13th International Conference on Thai Studies  
‘Globalized Thailand?’ Connectivity, Conflict, and 
Conundrums of Thai Studies 
15-18 July 2017; Chiang Mai, Thailand
Conference to take place immediately prior to ICAS 10 
Deadline for individual abstract submission: 30 Nov 2016
Information: www.icts13.chiangmai.cmu.ac.th
The 13th International Conference on Thai Studies aims to 
encourage Thai and international scholars to reflect upon Thai 
society, politics, economics, culture, and environment in the 
context of globalization that concerns relationships between 
Thai and other Tai-speaking groups residing in and outside 
of Thailand. The conference will review and analyse issues in 
Thai society, including problems and conflicts arising from 
processes of development. At the same time, the conference 
will allow scholars to explore the state of knowledge in Thai 
Studies and identify gaps in the knowledge base that should  
be filled in order to keep pace with societal change.
The price for a booth has been kept to a minimum at  
only €400, which includes 1 free registration. Additional 
booth personnel can register at a discounted amount of  
€125 per person. 
For a comprehensive book fair info package visit:  
http://icas.asia/en/sponsorship-and-exhibition
Become an ICAS 10 co-convener
Institutions and publishers are invited to build and sponsor a 
programme of activities to enhance their visibility at ICAS 10. 
A tailormade institutional programme will increase exposure 
and deliver a richer experience, with more opportunities 
for interaction with potential partners. A programme could 
consist of a mix of panels, roundtables, workshops, a booth at 
the Book Fair, exhibitions, book presentations, performances, 
documentary screenings, receptions, and so on. All ideas 
are welcome. This same opportunity applies to individual 
participants, who are free to design (and sponsor) a broader 
programme of activities. Proposals for Programmes will  
be duly reviewed by the ICAS 10 Organising Committee.  
Send your proposals to icas@iias.nl
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Burma and ethnicity tend to be closely associated in people’s minds when thinking about the diversity of the country, 
or when analyzing the conflicts there, many of which have yet to be resolved. Ethnicity forms such a naturalized part 
of the intellectual landscape dealing with the country that few have stopped to consider its complex relationship with 
language. The decades-long closure of the country means that the ideas of earlier scholarship still continue to hold 
powerful sway. With new possibilities for travel and research inside, thanks to the political changes starting in 2010, 
foreign researchers have recently been able to move around more in the country, to observe patterns of language-use,  
and to speak with people about their thoughts concerning their own identities. This special issue moves forward a 
long-stalled reconsideration to argue that the relationship between language, ethnicity, and identity in Burma is not 
necessarily timeless, a given, or set in stone. Rather, language may be one element informing an ongoing process and 
negotiation that various groups engage in to define themselves in relation to others.  
Patrick McCormick
Contextualizing language and 
ethnicity in the study of Burma
theFocus
The Newsletter | No.75 | Autumn 2016
Burmese youth. Image reproduced under a creative commons license courtesy of Thaths on flickr. Palaung Woman. Image reproduced under a creative commons license courtesy of Fabulousfabs on flickr.
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Burma and Burma Studies
Burma is open for business. Recent changes in government 
have meant positive developments for those doing research 
in and about the country. While some foreign researchers 
already found ways to do research inside in the 1990s, it was 
not until the early 2000s that greater numbers started to  
arrive. Even if many of the technical difficulties and restrictions, 
such as obtaining long-term visas or access to areas outside 
major cities, still remain in place or are only gradually begin-
ning to ease, more people inside the Burmese system may  
be embracing the idea of openness, change, and possibility. 
Just in the past few years, an ever-growing number of scholars 
and researchers have been spending time in the country. 
Moving intellectual conversations forward in the study 
of Burma has been a slow process, and it is worth reviewing 
how this came to be. For decades, Burma Studies mostly fell 
off everyone’s radars. Before WWII, much of the scholarship 
related to Burma was the work of scholar-officials of the 
British colonial administration, including historian D.G.E.  
Hall, J.S. Furnivall, and archaeologist-art historian-linguist 
Gordon Luce, and their Burmese protégés, such as Taw  
Sein Ko, Pe Maung Tin, and Htin Aung. After WWII (followed  
by independence in 1948), several foreign researchers 
conducted fieldwork through the early 1960s, and some  
of the resulting scholarship remains influential even today, 
such as the work of anthropologist Melford Spiro. 
When U Ne Win came to power in 1962, he effectively  
shut the country off from the outside world, and access for 
foreigners was tightly restricted. Many scholars who had 
intended to study Burma chose alternative research sites, 
although others tried to study the country by proxy by doing 
research among cross-border communities who either lived 
on both sides of the Thai-Burma border, or had moved to 
Thailand to escape conflict inside Burma. Research on Shans, 
Mons, Akha and some other upland groups falls into this  
category. Few of those researchers spoke Burmese or had 
much direct experience with the country, so that it was  
difficult for them to place their observations in a larger 
Burmese – as opposed to Thai – context. Finally, there were 
some scholars, such as historians Victor Lieberman and 
Michael Aung-Thwin, and the political scientist Robert Taylor, 
who were either able to negotiate access to the country  
or the nature of their work allowed them to make use  
of documents and other sources available outside of  
the country. 
This decades-long, near-total hiatus in research and  
scholarship has put Burma Studies in a rather different  
situation than found in other nearby countries. Scholarship  
on Thailand or Indonesia, for example, is now in its third  
or greater generation, meaning that much of the earliest 
scholarship produced – during the colonial period or contact 
with the west – has been reexamined, built upon, rethought  
or discarded. Next door in India, generations of local and  
international scholars have engaged in lively debates to 
rethink much of the received wisdom on the Subcontinent. 
These efforts have included projects of intellectual 
decolonization. 
In Burma Studies, however, the earliest classical scholar-
ship of the colonial era (and just after) is still highly important, 
simply because there have been so few scholars to revisit  
it. In many fields, vast amounts of primary sources have yet  
to be properly processed. In history, for example, primary 
sources in Burmese, Pāli, and local languages have yet to 
be read and catalogued, much less annotated or analyzed. 
Within Burma itself, early colonial work has come to define 
how Burmese understand themselves, not to mention  
how they practice academia.
From an institutional perspective, universities through-
out the world offer some support to Burma Studies, most 
importantly the Center for Burma Studies at Northern Illinois 
University, which opened in the 1980s. While the Center is  
a huge boon for Burma Studies, throughout the rest of North 
America, Europe, Australia and Japan, faculty working on 
Burma-related topics, not to mention actually offering  
instruction in the Burmese language, have been all too few 
and far between, especially in comparison with Indonesian, 
Thai, or Vietnamese. Now, however, Burma Studies are finally 
moving forward, with new researchers working on Burma-
related topics. Within Burma itself, opportunities impossible 
even just a few years ago are slowly emerging, such as 
working with local universities and faculty. In 2015, a foreign 
student studying anthropology was allowed to spend time  
in a Burmese village, something which, as far as I know,  
has not happened since the 1950s. 
Towards the future
The most recent change of government may bring about 
many positive changes. Over the next several decades,  
the economic and political situation may foster much  
greater prosperity. The brain drain may reverse, or at least  
be stemmed, and educated people may start to see the  
possibility of having the kind of life they want inside the  
country. As has happened in India with the rise of the  
middleclass, there may be a greater demand for the use  
of local languages, even in higher education. 
Thongchai Winichakul has written of ‘home scholars’  
to talk of Thais educated abroad, but who write or produce  
in Thai, with local audiences in mind.1 While home scholars 
may now be a common feature of the Thai intellectual 
landscape, they have only recently begun to appear in Burma. 
One such appearance is in the burgeoning Burmese-language 
print media, which is thriving after censorship restrictions 
were eased. The numbers of such home scholars may 
continue to grow and acquire a greater voice. The possibilities 
for genuine collaboration and collegiality between foreign 
and local researchers may also grow. In the Philippines and 
Singapore, such academic collaboration between colleagues 
has been possible. These two advances have obvious links 
with language: the possibility of a genuine Burmese-language 
intellectual milieu developing, while at the same time, having 
the self-confidence and English-language skills to engage 
with international scholars. Or, as in Japan and increasingly  
in Thailand and elsewhere, providing foreigners with oppor-
tunities and incentives for learning the local language. 
I would like to end on a final note of caution with regard  
to what may be a form of narcissism: the assumption that 
once Burma improves its educational system its intellectual 
ideas will be similar to those of the West. Today, many 
Burmese speak of education in the country as having fallen 
behind or having been cut off from the rest of the world, and 
as needing to catch up. Outsiders voice similar sentiments, 
speaking for example of how old-fashioned ideas have 
lingered in the country, or how academia is in a ‘time warp’.  
It would be dangerous, however, to think that as more 
Burmese are educated in universities with better resources 
and teaching methods, that their research interests or 
perspectives will become ‘just like ours’. 
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To illustrate, we can return to the example of Thailand. 
Even though Thais have been exposed to western-style  
education and ideas for decades, many Thai research agendas 
reflect local perspectives and interests. Research in history, 
for example, is very much informed by the royalist-nationalist 
school of historiography taught in schools. History is a 
good example of differences in what is at stake depending 
on whether one is embedded in local, national intellectual 
worlds, or writing as an international scholar. For local 
scholars, history is deeply imbricated in ideas about the self 
and identity, which are taught early on. Many are reluctant  
to allow the interpretation of ‘our’ past to fall into the hands 
of outsiders. International scholars, however, tend to see 
questions of history in abstract ways and engage in conver-
sation more with each other than with local audiences.  
More importantly, the way they deal with the topic –  
supposedly in ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’ ways – may ride  
rough over cherished local interpretations and ideologies. 
Language does not always equal ethnicity
I am happy to bring together the work of several scholars  
who have been working on questions of language, script, 
ethnicity and identity in Burma. This collection comes out  
of the Language, Power, and Identity in Asia conference, 
which the IIAS held in Leiden in March of this year. If there  
is one question that unites these papers, it is one of ‘origins’. 
Ethnic names and categories have such a solidity in Burma, 
and indeed ethnicity and ‘difference’ have long been both a 
cause and consequence of conflict and violence. In discussing 
their research topics, each author teases out strands from  
the solid-seeming categories of ethnicity and language. Tug  
on Palaung scripts and language, and we find Shan models 
and vocabulary. Pull at Kachin, and we find that not all of  
the groups under the label necessarily think of themselves  
as belonging there. Yet we find that linguistically some of the 
core Kachin groups share features among each other, but not 
with either their neighbours or with their closest linguistic 
relatives. Aspects of Shan reflect contact with Burmese, while 
the names for the Burmese dialects have changed and shifted 
over time. The sounds of some of the Burmese dialects reflect 
contact with speakers of surrounding languages, as over  
time they have shifted their own language and identities.
In bringing these contributions together, I hope to bring 
some nuance to conversations about language, ethnicity,  
and identity. I would like to foster disciplinary border crossing. 
As someone who has worked both as a linguist and as a 
historian, I have seen how historians struggle to understand 
linguistic concepts, and linguists often use historical writing 
uncritically to interpret linguistic data. When talking about 
language-contact or multilingualism, non-specialists often 
think this results in a language meltdown, with people  
speaking ‘pidgins’ and ‘creoles’. The contributors to this  
Focus section provide concrete examples of what actually 
does happen – how speakers of one language replicate  
the words and grammar of another – while describing the  
context of hierarchy in which these replications occur.  
Looking at how speech communities stand in relation  
to each other, how those positions can shift over time, and 
how the communities themselves change over time, all 
gives us some insight into how definitions of language and 
ethnicity are processes with a time depth. In revisiting and 
rethinking some of these ideas, or looking into the evolution 
of languages and scripts, we recognize that even if categories 
of language and identity are in some sense constructed,  
they still have a reality and a vital importance to the  
people to whom they belong.
Our contributors are affiliated with institutions in 
Switzerland and Japan. Jenny, McCormick, Müller and 
Weymuth are all at the Department of Comparative 
Linguistics at the University of Zurich, where we have been 
working on a project funded by the Swiss National Science 
Foundation on the history of language contact in what  
we call the ‘Greater Burma Zone’, which we understand  
as Burma, but in a looser way than the current political 
boundaries. Cultural and religious networks have also  
connected peoples in what is now Burma, with parts of 
Northeast India, Bangladesh, Yunnan, and northern Thailand. 
Badenoch, Imamura, Kojima and Kurabe are linguists, 
anthropologists, and geographers doing trans-disciplinary 
studies at Japanese institutions. Much of the Burma-related 
work coming out of Japanese universities is not well known 
in English, which is particularly regrettable in that Japanese 
scholars place particular emphasis on the importance  
of long-term fieldwork. 
All of us would like to thank the countless number of  
local people in Burma and elsewhere who have worked with 
us and given us support in so many ways. The Greater Burma 
Zone project would also like to gratefully acknowledge the 
help and participation of the Anthropology Department  
of Mandalay University. 
 
Names, spellings, classifications
The authors in each of their contributions have followed  
their own spellings and used terms related to the names  
of countries, ethnic groups, and languages in their own way. 
This diversity reflects the fact that knowledge related to  
the country is still emerging and in process, without any  
kind of definitive consensus. Badenoch, Kojima and Weymuth 
each classify varieties of the Palaung languages differently. 
Some authors have used the term ‘Myanmar’, while others 
prefer ‘Burma’. The term ‘Myanmar’ in English merges  
together language, people, and country, and its spelling 
reflects an attempt to represent the sounds of British English, 
hence the spelling with a final -r. The change from ‘Burma’ 
to ‘Myanmar’ affects only English, and no other language 
(French, Thai, or the indigenous languages of Burma other 
than Burmese) has been forced to modify their usage. 
Patrick McCormick, Researcher, Department of 
Comparative Linguistics, University of Zürich, and 
École française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO), Yangon  
(mccormick.efeo@gmail.com)
The author, Mathias Jenny, and André Müller would  
all like to acknowledge the generosity of the Swiss 
National Science Foundation, whose grant has made  
this research possible.
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The Shan of northern Myanmar speak a language of the Tai-Kadai family  
found from southern China, across Mainland Southeast Asia, through northern 
Myanmar and into Northeast India. Names connected with the Shan give us some 
insight into the historical range and connections between speakers of Shan and  
its relatives. ‘Shan’ itself is a Burmese name related to the old name for Thailand, 
‘Siam’, and the second syllable in the name Assam of Northeast India and the 
‘Ahom’, a Tai-speaking people after whom Assam is ultimately named. The Shans 
call themselves ‘Tai’, as do speakers of many related languages. 
Mathias Jenny
AS A LINGUISTIC AND HISTORICAL TERM, ‘Tai’ refers to a 
branch of the Tai-Kadai family, while ‘Thai’ refers specifically 
to the language of Thailand. Widespread as the Tai-Kadai 
family is, only two languages have official status as national 
languages: Thai in Thailand and Lao in Laos. Depending on the 
definition, many peoples, languages and scripts may fall under 
the term ‘Shan’, but here I just consider the largest language 
and script of Burma. Today Shan is a medium of instruction in 
informal and monastic education, although there is pressure 
on the central government to change its decades-old policy 
of only allowing Burmese to be used in government schools. 
Shan has been a literary medium for a few centuries, for  
both religious and secular texts. There are a few different 
writing systems that have been used for Shan, but the most 
widespread has been in use for centuries, although it was 
modified to represent all the sounds of the language only 
in the late 1960s. Today a substantial number of books and 
journals are published regularly in Shan, together with online 
magazines and newspapers.
Before being firmly attached to the Burmese state  
through British colonial policies, Shan speakers in the 
language’s many varieties tended to live in the valleys of  
the uplands throughout northern Myanmar (what is now  
Shan State, parts of Kachin State, and parts of Sagaing and 
Magwe Regions), where they tended to be at the top of the 
local sociolinguistic hierarchy. The traces of Shan on other 
languages, and their traces of influence on Shan, tell us  
about the history of relations between these groups, and 
something about their relative positions in terms of prestige 
and hierarchy. Relatedly, we find that even today, in the  
age of ethnicity and nationalist logic, not just speakers of  
Tai languages, but sometimes even speakers of Austroasiatic 
languages consider themselves ‘Tai’ or ‘Shan’. The Tai Loi, 
for example, consider themselves Shan but still speak their 
Austroasiatic language at home. Such situations give us 
insights into the process of language-spread and historical 
identity formation not only in Myanmar, but places like  
Laos and Vietnam where similar conditions exist. 
Forging an ethnicity through language and history
Today many Shans understand themselves, and their position 
in relation to their neighbors, through ideas that developed 
during the nineteenth century. At that time, Siamese intel-
lectuals created a narrative of the origins of the Thai people 
in response to expanding European colonialism in Southeast 
Asia. They based this account mainly on western ideas and 
sources, including the travelogues of European missionaries 
and traders. Some traced the history of the Thai and Tai 
peoples back to Central Asia, from where the Tai migrated 
into Sichuan and Yunnan, where they established the Nanzhao 
(Nan Chao) kingdom in the eighth and ninth centuries AD. 
When Mongol troops invaded in the twelfth century, the 
Tai were pushed further into the Southeast Asian mainland, 
where they split and became the Shan, the Lao, and Thais, 
some with their own kingdoms. 
This narrative lacks historical and linguistic evidence to 
support it, and in fact there is much evidence contradicting 
it. Recent scholarship has revised the dates of the Nanzhao 
kingdom and has shown that the main body of people spoke  
a Tibeto-Burman language. Nevertheless, this narrative 
remains the standard, official view of Thai history in Thailand, 
and has proven successful in building national pride both 
among the Thais and among speakers of related languages. 
Thailand’s Tai-speaking neighbors have a complex relationship 
with Thailand, but nevertheless see Thai ideas as model. 
Until the final Anglo-Burman war in 1885, the Shans had 
lived in small principalities with allegiances to the Burmese 
court, China, and sometimes other powerful neighbors. The 
British allowed these principalities to retain their traditional 
leaders, the cao pha [lords of the sky] (or sawbwa in Burmese), 
a privilege they kept during the first decade after indepen-
dence in 1948 (Supposedly fearing the disintegration of the 
country, the Ne Win government finally abolished sawbwa 
rule in the 1960s). With their close incorporation into Burma, 
many Shans resisted and resented first the close association 
with Burma and thereafter direct Burmese rule. 
Shan elites sought to write a Shan history independent  
of Burma, Burmese institutions, or if possible Burmese  
connections. Ready-made narratives from the neighboring 
Thais were useful in this process. No doubt they saw being 
part of a larger Tai nation as preferable to being part of  
a Burman-led Burmese nation.
Shan in relation to other languages: Shan as a donor
Pshan language is widespread in Shan State and neighboring 
areas, including a sizeable Shan community in Thailand. For 
political, social, and economic reasons, its use is weak in some 
formerly Shan-dominated places, such as Taunggyi, the capital 
of Shan State. By law, Burmese is the sole official language of 
the country (although the government also makes extensive 
use of English), so that Burmese tends to compete with, if not 
always displace, other languages in the cities. Furthermore, 
sizeable numbers of people of Burmese, Chinese, and Indian 
and descent live in Taungyi (as in most other capitals of the 
ethnic states), all of whom tend to use Burmese. 
Even if the position of Shan language and culture is not 
quite as extensive today as it once was, the numerous Shan 
loanwords in smaller languages, such as Palaung and Pa-O, 
show the historical dominance of Shan. Speaking generally, 
social relations between speakers of various languages, and 
the position of given groups in a hierarchy (that is, which 
languages and associated cultures have greater prestige and 
power), have a direct influence on the outcomes of language 
contact. Languages in a lower position in the language 
hierarchy generally replicate the matter (words) and patterns 
(grammar and syntax) of languages in a higher position.  
In the Palaung and Pa-O languages, even numerous words  
for everyday objects and activities come from Shan. 
The exact phonetic shape of Shan loanwords in these 
languages tells us something of the history and timing  
of when these words were borrowed, hence revealing how  
long speakers of the various languages have been in contact. 
We know that a wave of sound changes swept through many 
of the languages of Southeast Asia, perhaps beginning as early 
as the thirteenth century. One aspect was that such voiced 
initial sounds as /g  d b v z/ became voiceless /k c t p f s/. 
Shan has undergone this change, but Hsam Long (Shwe) 
Palaung has not. The fact that some Shan loanwords in Hsam 
Long preserve the old sounds suggests that they entered the 
language quite early on. The Hsam Long word m [follow] 
apparently reflects an earlier Shan pronunciation * m,  
now c´ m in modern Shan. Other loans, however, are more 
similar to modern Shan, suggesting more recent borrowings. 
For example, Palaung pɛ [be able], is nearly identical to 
modern Shan pɛˆ [win, able], which comes from a Tai root,  
*bɛ´1 Another interesting example is the Palaung word r t, 
meaning ‘arrive’, which in modern Shan is h t. We know  
that the sound /r/ has changed to /h/ in languages like Shan 
and Lao (although the sound is preserved in Thai), and so  
this loan must date from before that sound shift happened. 
Although lexical influence from Shan is strong in Palaung, 
we cannot detect much structural borrowing, probably 
because of the typological closeness of the two languages. 
One possibility is the use of the third person plural pronoun 
(‘they’) to make nouns plural. Palaung pj r-ge [bees], literally 
‘bee + they’, is an obvious calque of Shan ph ŋ khˇ w, meaning 
the same thing. 
Shan vocabulary also shows up in languages outside  
of present-day Shan-speaking areas, suggesting the power 
of the language to reach beyond where its speakers are, or 
perhaps a wider sphere of influence in the past. In Jinghpaw, 
for example, Shan loans are found throughout the language, 
including everyday vocabulary. As other authors in this Focus 
discuss, Jinghpaw itself is a dominant language in Kachin  
State and functions as lingua franca. 
The large number of Shan loans, together with the absence 
of Jinghpaw elements in Shan, show that Shan was dominant 
over Jinghpaw at least at some point in the past, even in areas 
where Shan has long ceased to be spoken. As in Palaung, Shan 
loans into Jinghpaw form layers of borrowing, in some cases 
combining elements of the two. In the word for ‘coconut’, 
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In another twist, some Burmese words have entered 
Jinghpaw through Shan. Many of these words uphold older 
Burmese pronunciations, still preserved in Burmese spelling. 
One example is Jinghpaw panglai [sea], ultimately from an 
early pronunciation of Burmese pinlɛ, written /PAN˙LAI/  
(in his Focus article McCormick discusses the role of Written 
Burmese in reconstructing the history of sound changes in 
Burmese). Another is kawngmu [pagoda]. The fact that the 
word has the same meaning as in Shan, which in turn slightly 
shifted from the Burmese source, shows that it came through 
Shan. The Burmese word kàun-hmu´ – written /KON˙H
˙
 MHU/ 
[merit, good deed] – refers to donations, including pagoda 
building. 
Shan in relation to other languages: Shan as a subordinate 
language
Throughout its history, Shan has been in greater and lesser 
contact with Burmese, the language of the powerful lowland 
courts and the more recent central government in Myanmar. 
However, politics has never been the sole reason for contact 
between Shan and Burmese. The Burmese language also has 
close associations with court culture and Buddhism, and so 
has long been a prestigious language in the region. Taking 
part in a larger Burmese linguistic and cultural sphere does 
not necessarily mean that other peoples, like the Shan, who 
participate in Burmese networks of prestige, agree to current 
political arrangements. 
The linguistic influence of Burmese can be seen on all levels 
of Shan vocabulary, and can incidentally be found far afield, 
even in places that today are not, or no longer, connected 
to the Burmese sphere, such as Meuang Sing in Laos. When 
comparing Shan to other closely related languages such as 
Thai Kheun (the language of Keng Tung, closely related to 
Lanna Thai), some of the sound differences are striking.  
While all those languages have an ‘imploded’ /d´/ and /b´/ sound 
(as McCormick also discusses in this Focus), and the ‘fricative’ 
/f/, Shan lacks these sounds, just as Burmese does. Shan does 
have the sound /sh/, an ‘aspirated fricative’, which is quite rare 
throughout the world, but which is also found in Burmese. 
Structurally, it seems likely that Shan speakers have 
replicated certain Burmese patterns. For example, to say  
‘in the house’, Shan speakers say ti n´j hɤ´n  (literally ‘at + in  
+ house’), which is exactly the same (if in a different order) as 
the Burmese ein d  ´hma (literally ‘house + in + at’). The same 
phrase in Lao (which may be closer than Thai) would simply  
be naj hêuan. 
Today, Burmese influence is clearest in borrowings. 
Burmese terms abound in all domains of the Shan lexicon. 
While this was already the case in older classical texts, the 
number of Burmanisms has increased in modern prose, 
especially in formal and academic texts. Burmese is the 
sole language of state education and administration in the 
country, and the main language of media and commerce. 
Based on our project research, many Shan – especially 
younger people – are more at ease talking about professional 
or official affairs in Burmese, even though they describe 
Shan as their first language and the language of choice for 
personal conversations. Books and popular music, videos, 
and movies are much more widely available in Burmese than 
in Shan. While such media do exist in Shan, their production 
and distribution is more restricted. As is the case for many 
Burmese minorities, many Shan in Burma are therefore more 
fluently literate in Burmese than Shan. 
Shan is a medium of instruction in non-formal education, 
for example in monastic schools. Shan-language textbooks 
and readers are often translations of Burmese government 
textbooks. As sometimes happens in these cases, the Shan 
has been translated following the Burmese a bit too closely. 
Not only can the Shan be awkward, but such texts foster 
language which converges ever closer to Burmese models. 
As was the case with Shan loanwords in Palaung, Burmese 
loanwords tell us a lot about how long Shan and Burmese 
speakers have been in contact, and approximately when the 
word was adopted. In many respects Shan and Burmese have 
rather different sound systems, but it is obvious that Shan 
phonology has been able to preserve sounds from earlier 
stages of Burmese. The Shan word pré.krí [capital] preserves an 
earlier pronunciation of Burmese pyigyì, one fairly close to that 
of Rakhaing today. Similarly, Shan has cén.cá for Burmese sìn.zà 
(written <CAÑ.CĀH
˙
>), which suggests that the loan came  
into Shan around the eighteenth century, when Burmese /c/  
had not yet shifted to /s/ and when /añ/ had not fronted to  
/in/, but was /en/, as is found in British sources of the time.2 
‘Little brother’ Thai and its influence on ‘older brother’ Shan 
In Thai, the name for Shan is Tai Yai [Big Tai], in contrast to one 
of the historical names for the Thai, Tai Noi [Little Tai], possibly 
in reference to historical relations and settlement patterns. 
Today, however, Thailand is very much the big brother to the 
Shan: large numbers of Shan speakers in Burma know Thai from 
their experience as migrant workers in Thailand. Being culturally 
and linguistically closer to Thai than to Burmese, Shan has been 
under increasing influence from its ‘big brother’ to the south. 
The huge Thai entertainment industry, producing soap operas, 
movies, and popular music and karaoke videos, has long been 
a welcome alternative to Burmese State TV programs. Thai has 
become the language of choice for many Shan when it comes 
to globalized culture. Burmese influence enters Shan mainly 
through official channels like education, administration,  
and commerce, and historically also through religion. 
A number of Shan political and cultural organizations, 
including online news magazines, are based in Chiangmai. 
Many Thai words for scientific and political concepts, which 
are often already phonologically and structurally close to 
Shan, can easily be turned into Shan-like words. Some of these 
loans may be difficult to detect, especially if they consist  
of indigenous Tai elements, like Shan kǎn mɤ´ŋ [politics] from 
Thai ka n m ŋ, or t´ .su [fight] from Thai t ´ -suˆ  .3 We know 
these are Thai loans because one of the parts exists in  
Thai but not Shan. More obvious are Thai loans from Khmer,  
which are otherwise all but absent in Shan. Structurally,  
Thai influence on Shan would be much harder to detect 
because the languages are very close grammatically. 
In Shan areas close to Thailand, especially where there are 
substantial numbers of returned migrant workers, there may 
be some phonological convergence at work; one case is the 
reversal of the historical shift of Proto-Tai /f/ to Shan /ph/.  
We find this shift in the Shan word ph´ j [fire], which many 
young people now pronounce f´j, following the pronunciation 
of the Thai cognate /faj/. As one young Shan migrant worker 
explained, “it sounds old fashioned to pronounce such words  
as f´j with ph. Maybe some old people in the villages still  
speak like that”.
Positioning Shan
Shan, while an important language of administration and 
education in the past, has itself long been situated between 
two powerful languages, Burmese and Thai. Both languages 
have at different times exercised influence on Shan on different 
levels and in different domains. The pull towards Burmese has 
been increasing, with the greater integration and acceptance 
of the Shan into Myanmar, while Thai remains an attractive 
alternative that, at least superficially, strengthens a sense of 
pan-Tai identity. Shan cultural and political elites may be more 
interested in Thai connections, although common people may 
take a much more pragmatic approach, adopting whatever 
language they see as being useful in their daily lives. 
Mathias Jenny, Senior Researcher, Department  
of Comparative Linguistics, University of Zürich  
(mathias.jenny@uzh.ch)
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mă-un si, the mă part represents the Shan generic term  
màk [fruit] and the Shan pronunciation of an earlier Burmese 
loan òun [coconut], here combined with Jinghpaw si [fruit]. 
Jinghpaw and Shan have a different ‘constituent order’,  
referring to the ordering of words in a sentence. Shan, like Thai 
and English, has subject-verb-object order, while Jinghpaw, 
like Burmese (and Turkish and Japanese), has subject-
object-verb order. This difference has implications for how 
compounds are formed. Some Shan loanwords have been 
rearranged to follow Jinghpaw order: the Shan expression  
for ‘food market’, kàt kh w (literally ‘market + food’) has been 
switched to form Jinghpaw khau kat. Other words are kept  
just as in Shan, although the sounds are adopted to Jinghpaw. 
The Shan word for ‘oil’, nˆm m´n (literally ‘liquid + fat’),  
is nam man in Jinghpaw. 
Left:  
Kachin Book cover.
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Speakers of the various Kachin languages often use the expression ‘Kachin’ or ‘Kachin language’ when  
speaking in English or Burmese to refer to the Jinghpaw language. There is, however, no single ‘Kachin’ language. 
The languages included in the super-ethnic category ‘Kachin’ include Jinghpaw itself, also spoken in China and  
Northeast India, where it is called ‘Singpho’; Zaiwa (Atsi), Lhaovo (Maru or Langsu), Lashi (Lachik or Lacid),  
Lisu, Rawang (Krangku), Ngochang (Maingtha or Achang, Ngachang), Pola (Bela), and Hpun. Pola has around  
400 speakers and Hpun may no longer be spoken. As the recent work of Sadan,1 Robinne, and others has  
shown,2 the Burmese-language term ‘Kachin’ to refer to these peoples arose fairly recently in the context of  
colonial Burma. As a category, ‘Kachin’ may make sense most fully in English or Burmese, given that the term was  
created and given more meaning by successive governments to denote a category of people useful in the British 
colonial army. The question of how the people who now fall under this category may have understood themselves 
and their interconnections in the past and how their views have changed, may ultimately be unanswerable. 
André Müller
THE RISE of the term ‘Kachin’ throws into relief a perspective on 
ethnicity as a ‘process’. The ideas and practices of pre-colonial 
Burmese courts, pre- and post-colonial local elites, soldiers  
and nationalists, common people, British officials, and local and 
international scholars have all contributed to the imagining, 
creation, and maintenance of the Kachin category. Over time, 
the meaning of Kachin – who is Kachin and who is not – has 
changed. Jinghpaws may not recognize their non-Christian 
ancestors as Jinghpaw or Kachin, and not all the people or 
groups who today fall under the Kachin umbrella necessarily  
accept their position there. For example, some Lisu speakers, 
but certainly not all, have associated themselves with the 
Kachin since the late nineteenth century, when the former 
moved into the Kachin region. We can think of a ‘core Kachin’ 
group, or linguistic and socio-cultural complex, which includes 
Jinghpaw, Zaiwa, Lashi, and Lhaovo, while the others, such as 
Lisu and Rawang, are ‘peripheral Kachin’. 
What, if anything, is the linguistic evidence for any kind 
of close association between speakers of the language falling 
under the category ‘Kachin’? All of them are part of the Sino-
Tibetan family, but come from several branches of the family.3 
Jinghpaw itself, the largest of the Kachin language and the 
lingua franca among most of the languages, is often put in the 
‘Sal’ group, together with languages never considered Kachin, 
such as Kadu of Burma and Bodo of Northeast India. On the 
other hand, Zaiwa, Lashi, Lhaovo, and especially Ngochang 
are closely related to Burmese.
‘Genetic’ or ‘arboreal’ models of language relatedness 
helps us understand only so much about the linguistic 
situation. The classic model is the Indo-European family, the 
first language family to be established and which serves as a 
model for other projects of establishing language relatedness. 
English and Dutch are on the same Germanic ‘branch’ of  
the tree; we think of them as ‘sister’ languages. But when 
speakers of various languages are in close, long-term contact 
and many people speak each other’s languages, aspects of 
their languages come to resemble each other, even if the 
languages are not ‘genetically’ related. We often think  
about loanwords or ‘matter’ – what most think of when they 
hear of ‘language contact’ – but also of ‘patterns’, or how 
words are put together. Following this idea, we can then 
understand how even though English and Dutch are close 
‘sisters’, in some ways the Dutch verb system works more  
like it does in German and French than in English. Surprisingly, 
aspects of the English sound system and even its grammar 
may come from early contact with the Old Brythonic or  
British language, which survives today as Welsh. 
Connections – linguistic and otherwise
My research is part of a larger project on the ‘areal linguistics’ 
of what we have called the Greater Burma Zone, which 
includes modern Myanmar but also parts of Northeast India, 
Yunnan, northern Thailand, and Bangladesh. A lot of discus-
sion and research has gone into defining ‘linguistic areas’, 
such as Western Europe, Meso-America, the Balkans, South 
Asia and even Mainland Southeast Asia. The idea is that when 
there is widespread multilingualism, no matter what language 
family the languages come from, or how closely or distantly 
they are related to each other ‘genetically’, they come to 
take on each other’s features. In other words, they say things 
the same way and replicate similar grammatical structures, 
without necessarily borrowing a lot of ‘words’ or ‘matter’ 
from each other. Some of these features are shared with other 
languages spoken in the Greater Burma Zone, for example 
Burmese or Shan, while others are restricted to the languages 
spoken by those who identify themselves as Kachin.
Focussing on the Kachin languages, we have found 
evidence of intense contact between at least some of the 
languages. My findings are based on our work both with 
native speakers of various Kachin languages in Burma and an 
analysis of texts and grammatical descriptions. The linguistic 
evidence suggests that these languages form a socio-cultural 
complex within the Greater Burma Zone – a close relationship 
such as contact between the languages over an extended 
amount of time. Our findings fit well into the idea of shared 
social structures, an overarching clan system that determines, 
for example, who can and cannot marry whom. The clans 
connect the Kachin groups so that many people identify  
more with their clan and their connections with other clans 
than with their native language. The various subgroups share 
a common Kachin practice: they do not necessarily think  
of themselves either by the name of their language, nor  
as ‘Kachin’, but as members of their clan, related to other 
clans by marriage. 
Patterns of exogamy and mutual obligations between  
the clans play a large role in maintaining contact between  
the various languages. The various groups share rituals 
and traditions, most importantly the mayu-dama system, 
exogamous marriage patterns that specify which clan is 
‘husband-givers’ and which ‘wife-givers’. This system often 
fosters cross-linguistic marriage. It is common to find multi-
lingual families with the children speaking two or three Kachin 
languages. The evidence for a local Kachin linguistic complex 
comes from a comparison of the structures and words of the 
languages. Unsurprisingly, the influence of the Jinghpaw on 
the other languages is pronounced: the other languages have 
‘converged’ towards Jinghpaw by replicating Jinghpaw pat-
terns. In the phonology or sound systems of the languages, 
we find that Zaiwa, whose speakers are in closest contact 
with Jinghpaw, has a sound system that is more similar to 
Jinghpaw and less so to its closest relatives, Lhaovo and Lashi. 
Both Jinghpaw and Zaiwa have approximately the same set of 
‘rhymes’, a term used to describe the combinations of vowel 
and final consonant that a language allows. Lhaovo and Lashi 
have a set that is more similar to Burmese, especially written 
Burmese, which preserves an older stage of the sound system 
of the language. For example, Lhaovo, Lashi, and Burmese 
allow diphthongs before final consonants whereas Zaiwa,  
like Jinghpaw, does not. 
In terms of vocabulary or words, there appears to  
be widespread borrowing from Jinghpaw into the other 
languages. There is a large number of loanwords ranging from  
special to everyday vocabulary, even grammatical words.  
Examples include the word for ‘very’: Jinghpaw grài, borrowed  
into Zaiwa, Lhaovo, and Pola as kyài, and into Rawang as  
grv`y/gày; another being ‘because’: Jinghpaw m `, borrowed 
into Zaiwa as m˘ O`, and into Lhaovo as à O`. Anyone who  
is familiar with the Burmese language will note that the 
same change of /r/ to /y/ appears to have happened in some 
of these languages, also. Of all the languages in the Kachin 
complex, Zaiwa appears to have the largest number of 
Jinghpaw loanwords. 
British anthropologist Edmund Leach was the first to  
point to the close relationship that exists between Shans  
and various Kachins.4 The phonetic shape of words can tell us 
that certain Shan words (which themselves may be Burmese 
in origin) came to the other Kachin languages through 
Jinghpaw. One example is the Jinghpaw word for ‘garden’, 
sún, borrowed from Shan shoˇn. Speakers of Jinghpaw regularly 
perceive the o of Shan (and Burmese) words as more similar 
to their own Jinghpaw u than to their own o sound, which is 
more open, similar to the ‘aw’ in English ‘jaw’. Even though 
these two vowel sounds in Zaiwa are actually closer to the 
Shan, Zaiwa nevertheless also has sún for the word ‘garden’, 
suggesting the word came from Jinghpaw and not directly 
from Shan. According to native speakers and interviews 
with faculty of the Anthropology Department of Mandalay 
University conducted in January 2016, Jinghpaw kinship  
terms also appear in Lhaovo and Rawang. 
This, that and yon – versus that up there and that  
over there
Research into language contact and convergence is in its 
infancy, and so it is not surprising that little has been done 
about the languages of the Greater Burma Zone. I have 
found some intriguing evidence from the languages under 
the ‘Kachin’ name which suggests that their demonstratives 
(words for ‘this’, ‘that’, and ‘yon’). The core Kachin languages 
(Jinghpaw, Zaiwa, Lhaovo, Lashi and Pola) all share two 
common traits, which they do not with their closest relatives: 
‘relative height distinctions’ in their demonstratives and 
variation in where in the sentence they place these. In all the 
core Kachin languages, speakers make the same distinctions 
in how high an object is from the perspective of the speaker. 
There are single words meaning ‘that up there’, ‘that over 
there’, and ‘that down there’. There are one or two words that 
also mean ‘this here’. Making such distinctions in height is a 
common feature of many languages spoken in mountainous 
areas, such as in the Caucasus and the Himalayas. 
Lhaovo, for example, has only one pronoun referring to some-
thing or someone close to the speaker – hɛ`– regardless of 
the height. For objects or people further away, the language 
distinguishes between xù [that up there], thø`  [that over there], 
and m` [that down there]. The forms in Lashi, Zaiwa, and 
Pola (all closely related languages) are very similar and make 
basically the same distinctions. The system in Jinghpaw,  
a language from a different part of the Tibeto-Burman family, 
also makes basically the same distinctions, with the addition 
of forms distinguishing ‘this near me’ and ‘that near you’. 
Top: Young 
Lacid Women, 
Myitkyina, 2016.
Middle: Interview 
with Rawang 
Man, 2016.
Below: Lisu Students 
Taungyi, 2016.
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by author.
The Focus | 35
The Newsletter | No.75 | Autumn 2016
The actual words for these demonstratives in Lhaovo, 
Lashi, Pola and Zaiwa are all similar in form, which is not 
surprising given that the languages are closely related.  
The forms in Jinghpaw, Anong, and Lisu, all of which make 
similar height distinctions, are of different shapes, which 
shows that the words were not merely borrowed.  
The evidence from some of the other languages is less 
clear. Rawang could be called a peripheral Kachin language 
and is from yet another part of the Tibeto-Burman family. 
Here we find no distinctions in altitude. But its close relative, 
Anong, spoken in Yunnan and adjacent Burma, does make 
height distinctions. Lisu, which some native speakers see as 
falling under Kachin while others do not, does make altitude 
distinctions. According to Ethnologue, speakers of Anong  
are shifting to Lisu.5 
When we consider the systems in closely related languages, 
we find a rather different picture. Burmese is closely related to 
Lhaovo, Lashi, Zaiwa, and Pola, yet does not make any height 
distinctions. Instead, the system focusses only on relative 
distance: di [this], ɛ`di [that], and ho [yon] or ‘indeterminate 
distance’. Kadu is a relative of Jinghpaw, but has a system  
basically the same as Burmese. As Leach first described,  
speakers of the Kachin languages have long been in contact 
with Shan, which as Jenny describes elsewhere in this Focus,  
is a wholly unrelated Tai-Kadai language. The Shan forms 
closely parallel those of Burmese and Kadu. Even though  
Shan speakers live at a relatively higher altitude than the 
Burmese, they are still valley dwellers. 
Another related grammatical feature that ties the core 
Kachin languages together is where these demonstratives are 
placed in the sentence. The equivalent of ‘this cat’ and ‘cat 
this’ are both possible. We find this variability in two short 
Zaiwa sentences:
nò hıˆ  gè àkóŋ mā. 
cow this (topic) colorfulness be.in 
“This cow is colorful”
moˆ  póŋtín b`-gu  kân-a ! 
that pen help-pick.up put.in-(imperative) 
“Pick up that pen down there!”
The peripheral Kachin languages, such as Lisu and Rawang, 
do not show this kind of variability. Rather, the demonstrative 
always follows the noun: literally, ‘cat this’. In some of the 
close relatives of these languages, such as Burmese and  
Kadu, the demonstrative always comes before the noun  
(‘this cat’). It is not common in the languages of the world 
to have variation like this, so finding it here among the core 
Kachin languages is significant.
Variable participation in being Kachin
These two small – yet tantalizing – examples suggest that 
through close contact, as fostered through the clan and 
marriage systems, the core Kachin languages have converged 
in certain aspects of their grammar. In areas of Papua New 
Guinea and the Amazon, where cross-linguistic marriages 
have been institutionalized in similar ways as among the 
Kachin, we find similar patterns of convergence across 
languages. The evidence of the shared words and systems 
among the core languages suggest that the contact has 
been more long-term and closer than the contact with the 
peripheral languages like Lisu and Rawang. Indeed, the Lisu 
themselves know that they started moving into the area  
as late as the nineteenth century. Only a small part of the 
overall Lisu population participates in the Kachin clan system, 
and its exogamous marriage tradition. Only some speak 
Jinghpaw.6 Among the Rawang, only those in close contact 
with other Kachins share the kinship and clan system, even 
though they are linguistically strongly influenced by Jinghpaw, 
as manifested in a large amount of loanwords in nearly all 
domains, including grammatical words.
Not only peripheral Kachin groups contest being affiliated 
with the Jinghpaw, or being part of the Kachin system. In the 
past decades, each Kachin subgroup has founded its own 
‘literature and culture’ committees (the term ‘literature’ 
in these names follows a Burmese English usage, which 
we would call ‘literacy’), promoted its own orthography, 
published primers and Bible translations. The Kachin Baptist 
Church, with its focus on Jinghpaw, was initially antagonistic 
to these efforts to create individual literary languages. 
These subgroup committees usually attempt to ‘purify’ their 
languages by replacing commonly used Jinghpaw words with 
newly coined words in a process similar to those in French, 
Icelandic, or Turkish. In places like northern Shan State where 
‘pure’ Jinghpaw speakers are the minority, some subgroup 
Kachins prefer to speak their mother tongue (be it Lhaovo, 
Zaiwa, or Lashi) instead of using Jinghpaw as a lingua franca 
when talking to speakers of other Kachin languages. The 
closeness of many of these non-Jinghpaw languages facilitates 
this process, since the level of shared vocabulary among them 
is high enough to allow people to quickly gain passive fluency 
in the other languages through exposure. We thus see some 
evidence among some speakers of separating linguistically 
from the larger, otherwise more prestigious, language  
and emphasize their identity as Lhaovo, Lashi, or Zaiwa.
 
André Müller, PhD student, Department of Comparative 
Linguistics, University of Zürich (andre.mueller3@uzh.ch).
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Jinghpaw, the majority language among the Kachin  
people of northern Myanmar, has come to enjoy vibrant 
vernacular media. If you visit Myitkyina, the largest  
city in Kachin State today, you cannot help but see  
colorful posters advertising the latest Jinghpaw-language 
music. On the internet there are countless Jinghpaw-
language websites, from frivolous to serious. This situation 
is remarkable because the language did not even have  
a writing system 125 years ago. Today the Jinghpaw  
media may be the most vigorous among the many  
minority language media of upland Southeast Asia.  
We explore how the Jinghpaw orthography became  
established and how vernacular media have grown.
Keita Kurabe and Masao Imamura
Fig.1 (left): Kakhyen 
Spelling Book (1883). 
This orthography de-
vised by Cushing would 
be later superseded by 
Hanson’s orthography, 
still in use today. 
Fig.2 (right):  
Jinghpaw Prat,  
a short-lived secular 
Jinghpaw-language  
newspaper (1958-63).
The linguistic landscape of the Kachin region
The term ‘Kachin’ refers to a complex of upland people living 
largely in Kachin State and the northern part of Shan State 
in Myanmar, but also in neighboring areas of northeastern 
India and Yunnan, in southwestern China. Kachins speak many 
languages, including Jinghpaw (also called ‘Singpho’ in India and 
‘Jingpo’ in China), Zaiwa, Lhaovo, Lacid, Rawang, and Ngochang 
(whether or not Lisu or ‘Lishaw’ is a Kachin language is a question 
that Müller takes up in his piece in this Focus). While these 
languages are all of the Tibeto-Burman group of the Sino-Tibetan 
language family, they belong to distinct branches and are 
mutually unintelligible. Furthermore, even within one language, 
for example Rawang, the dialectal differences may be so great 
that speakers cannot communicate with each other. While many, 
speaking in Burmese or English, use the term ‘Kachin’ to refer  
to what is actually the Jinghpaw language, we use ‘Jinghpaw’  
to distinguish it from the other Kachin languages.
In this world of multiple languages, Jinghpaw has  
functioned as a lingua franca. According to David Bradley, 
the Jinghpaw population is by far the largest, estimated at 
650,000.1 The Zaiwa, Lhaovo, and Rawang populations are 
estimated to be 170,000, 100,000, and 110,000 respectively. 
The Lacid and Ngochang are considerably smaller. 
Multilingualism is common; we can easily find people  
who can speak, for example, Jinghpaw and Lhaovo. This multi- 
lingualism, however, is not reciprocal, because not all the Kachin 
languages are considered equal in status. Jinghpaw is clearly 
dominant and of higher status. The vast majority of people who 
speak only one Kachin language are Jinghpaw-speakers. Those 
who speak Jinghpaw do not seem to be interested in learning 
another minority language, similar to how few native Burmese 
speakers are motivated to learn a minority language. 
The development of the Jinghpaw orthography
Given its predominance, it is not surprising that Jinghpaw was 
the first Kachin language to acquire an orthography. The set  
of conventions used today for writing Jinghpaw was devised by 
Protestant missionaries at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Indeed the history of Jinghpaw orthography and vernacular 
media is inseparable from global literacy campaigns of 
Protestant evangelism, whose most visible driver today is  
the Summer Institute of Linguistics International. 
Starting with Adoniram and Ann Judson, who arrived in 
Burma in 1813 and translated the entire Bible into Burmese by 
1834, a succession of American Baptist missionaries came to 
Burma to translate Christian scripture into the local languages. 
Among the Buddhists, the missionaries were not successful. 
They did notice, however, that ‘tribal peoples’ who lacked  
writing, such as the Karen, reacted much more favorably to 
them. The missionaries therefore shifted their focus to upland 
tribal groups. Because these languages were wholly oral and 
not written, the evangelists had to come up with an ortho-
graphy for each language before translating the scripture.
A myriad of local languages created much confusion 
among the missionaries who encountered them. Missionaries 
‘discovered’ the Jinghpaw language in the first quarter of 
the nineteenth century, but it took quite some while before 
Jinghpaw was identified as a separate language. At first,  
missionaries in Burma were working on Jinghpaw without 
realizing that fellow missionaries in northeastern India were 
working on the same language. 
Efforts to reduce Jinghpaw to writing in northeastern  
India were initially vigorous; the Baptists used the Roman  
alphabet to transcribe Jinghpaw and produced a phrase book 
and vocabulary list in the early 1830s. Their efforts, however, 
did not last long; perhaps because they realized that the 
number of Jinghpaw speakers in the region was rather small.
Paul Ambroise Bigandet, the French bishop of Rangoon 
known for his pioneering study of Buddhism (The Life, or Legend, 
of Gaudama, the Buddha of the Burmese), made visits to Bhamo 
in northern Burma in 1856 and 1865, marking the beginning  
of Roman Catholicism among the Kachins. During his first visit, 
Bigandet made a short vocabulary list of Jinghpaw, which was 
published in 1858 as a comparative lexicon of Shan, Jinghpaw, 
and Palaung. This work of Jinghpaw, written in the Roman 
alphabet, is one of the earliest references to the Jinghpaw 
spoken in Burma.
It was the Baptist missionaries in Burma who made gains in 
studying Jinghpaw systematically and in devising an orthography 
for the language. In 1873, Francis Mason, who had played a major 
role in translating the Bible into Sgaw Karen (1843) and Pwo 
Karen (1852), arrived in Bhamo in northern Burma and spent two 
months studying Jinghpaw. Josiah Cushing, who had translated 
the Bible into Shan, paid his first visit to Bhamo in 1876. Much 
neglected in previous research have been the group of young 
Karen missionaries, such as Bogalay, who accompanied Cushing 
and stayed in the region to study Jinghpaw. 
Cushing and his team put the Gauri dialect of Jinghpaw 
into writing. They borrowed various elements from the Karen, 
Burmese, and Shan orthographies, all of which were Indic in 
origin. In 1877, Cushing then translated into Jinghpaw a portion 
of the Baptist catechism, which Ann Judson had written in 
Burmese. He also collected 1500 Jinghpaw words and published 
a grammatical note in 1880. In 1879, another missionary 
named William Henry Roberts arrived in Bhamo; he stayed for 
thirty-four years among the Kachins. Roberts used Cushing’s 
orthography to publish a small spelling book in 1883, and 
translated the Gospel of Matthew into Jinghpaw in 1885.  
The use of Cushing’s orthography, however, did not gain 
traction, for reasons unclear to us (see fig.1).
The Baptist missionaries, it appears, decided to do away 
with the Cushing orthography and create a new one. Ola 
Hanson, a Swedish-American missionary, who had a good 
command of Swedish, English, German, Hebrew, Greek  
and Latin, arrived in Bhamo in 1890. Soon he created an 
original orthography for Jinghpaw using the Roman alphabet 
instead of the Indic scripts. Hanson chose the Roman alphabet 
perhaps because he found it easier to capture Jinghpaw sounds. 
While translating the New Testament (completed in 1911),  
he and his local assistants, such as Damau Naw, enthusiastically 
promoted the use of the new orthography by publishing  
a spelling book (1892), a grammar book (1896), a dictionary 
(1906), and a reader (1908). Danau Naw, an assistant helping 
Hanson in literary work since 1893, became one of the earliest 
Jinghpaw writers, publishing a small booklet in Jinghpaw  
in 1906.
Jinghpaw vernacular media
In the 1910s, a variety of reading materials in Jinghpaw began 
to appear. In 1914, the Baptist church published the first 
periodical in the language, a bi-monthly (later a monthly)  
newsletter called the Jinghpaw Shi Laika [Jinghpaw News].  
The British colonial government also found the Jinghpaw 
orthography to be useful, and so commissioned the church 
to produce school textbooks in Jinghpaw. In 1915, a Textbook 
Committee was organized under the Deputy Commissioner  
in Bhamo. Much of this work was actually carried out by  
J. Frank Ingram, a Baptist missionary and his assistant La Nau, 
who were also stationed in the same city. They published five 
series of readers in Jinghpaw for children and the first four 
grades. Textbooks for various subjects including geography 
(1918), arithmetic (1918), and basic science (1920) were also 
produced by the Baptist missionaries. A handbook on hygiene 
and public health (1931) was made available at the request  
of the government. In this period, the Baptist church, run  
by American missionaries and the British colonial government 
worked together to ‘civilize’ the natives; literacy campaigns 
were central to their civilizing project. 
The Second World War interrupted publication activities; 
Jinghpaw Shi Laika, for example, discontinued in 1941. This did 
not, however, mean that there were no publications during  
the wartime. In fact, Jinghpaw language materials were printed 
in India. The British and Foreign Bible Society in Calcutta,  
for example, printed the Jinghpaw Bible. 
Jinghpaw media recovered after the war and grew rapidly 
after Burma’s independence in 1948. The most noteworthy 
event in the post-war period was the growth of secular media. 
By the late 1950s, Jinghpaw media had grown to publish 
independently of the church. In 1958 a secular newspaper, the 
Jinghpaw Prat [The Jinghpaw Times] was founded in Rangoon. 
This full-fledged weekly, full of catchy photos, covered a wide 
range of topics, from a beauty contest in Myitkyina to the latest 
world news like the Cuban missile crisis (see fig. 2). Although 
the Jinghpaw Prat was discontinued in 1963, this publication, 
which enjoyed broad readership, represented the Jinghpaw 
public sphere of the era more than any other. 
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Fig.3 (above):  
A store in Myitkyina 
selling Jinghpaw-
language music. 
Fig.4 (below): 
Jinghpaw-language 
bookstore in 
Myitkyina. 
The Jinghpaw secular media, however, did not survive  
the draconian measures towards the minority-language press 
imposed by Ne Win, who seized power in a coup in 1962. 
Although the public media were suppressed, Jinghpaw literacy 
classes were by then so well established that they were able 
to maintain their work through their ever-expanding church 
network. 
The churches had grown significantly in the 1950s in terms  
of their printing capacity. In 1957, the Kachin Baptist Convention 
established Hanson Memorial Press, equipping themselves  
with their own printing facilities. They purchased a used press 
in the US and had it shipped to Rangoon. A Bible school student 
with photography and printing skills, Lazing Gawng, was sent 
to Rangoon for practical training and he became the manager 
of the new press in Myitkyina. This enabled the resumption 
of the Jinghpaw Shi Laika, the same as the pre-war periodical. 
In the 1960s, the press was led by Saboi Jum, one of the most 
prominent Jinghpaw intellectuals of the post-war era, who 
later exerted considerable influence on Kachin politics as the 
Secretary General of the Kachin Baptist Convention. 
The production capacity of Jinghpaw literature increased, 
and so did the readership. A good indication of readership 
growth was the opening of the bookstore ‘Laika Nau Ra’ in 
Myitkyina. This downtown store originally sold traditional 
medicine only, but it began to carry Jinghpaw-language 
publications in 1965 and it grew as a bookstore. Today the store 
offers the largest selection of Jinghpaw-language books, selling 
more than one hundred titles in Jinghpaw (see fig. 4).
Throughout the era of Kachin insurgency against the  
central government – since the founding of the Kachin 
Independence Army in 1961 to the ceasefire agreement in 
1994 (brokered by Saboi Jum) – churches were practically the 
sole patron of Jinghpaw literature. The most prominent among 
these was the Kachin Baptist Convention, which continued 
its literacy campaigns through its childcare program, Sunday 
School, and ‘summer school’ (that is, during the annual school 
break) courses. The churches also produced newsletters, which 
they circulated by cleverly printing ‘limited circulation’ on the 
cover, thus allowing them to bypass the official censorship 
board of the central government. 
Another way that Jinghpaw media bypassed the government 
interference was having a production site outside the country.  
In 1982, the Catholic Church began broadcasting in Jinghpaw 
from the Philippines through their Radio Veritas Asia program. 
Jinghpaw and media technology
As the case of the Radio Veritas program indicates, Jinghpaw 
media have been quick to adapt to new technologies. During  
the 1980s, young people in Myitkyina started making Jinghpaw- 
language movies with smuggled cameras. The showing and 
circulating of these movies was difficult because all the  
equipment, including a television and a VCR player, had to  
be carried around. Precisely because it was so difficult, when  
a showing did take place, people treated it as a festival. 
In the 1990s, VCDs began to come into the country from 
China. VCDs became extremely popular because VCD players 
were affordable; the disks themselves were easily copied  
and transported, and survived high humidity. In much of the 
Kachin region, VCDs allowed ordinary people to see movies for 
the first time. In addition to pirated Hollywood blockbusters, 
Jinghpaw producers created original Jinghpaw videos, some  
of which proved very popular (see fig. 3).
In the early 2000s, the Chinese mobile phone network 
covered areas of Burma across from the Chinese border.  
As a result, affordable mobile phone services were available  
in the periphery of the country far earlier than the central  
regions. Chinese CDMA networks reached the Kachin areas 
near the Chinese border, including Myitkyina, by the early 
2000s, a full decade before networks were made widely 
available in Yangon. Mobile phones were also useful for sending 
messages. Jinghpaw speakers had the advantage of being able 
to send text messages in their language using even a very basic 
mobile phone because, unlike the Burmese or Shan, Jinghpaw 
orthography does not require any special fonts.
Internet shops also started to open about the same  
time. Young people in particular spent hours there to chat 
through social networks. A Kachin web-developer even  
created a service called Wunpawng Zupra [Union Meeting 
Place], which proved popular until it was eventually over-
whelmed by Facebook. 
In the development of the Jinghpaw digital media the 
diaspora communities played a major role. While pastors and 
pop singers drove the media development inside the country, 
journalists and activists in exile provided news and advocacy. 
In 2003, a group of young journalists launched Kachin News 
(kachinnews.com) in Chiang Mai, Thailand. These websites 
presented breaking news, hard-hitting advocacy, and insight-
ful analysis to the Jinghpaw readership that was hungry for 
information and analysis on political issues. The number of 
news sites has increased since the resumption of the war 
between the Kachin Independence Army and the Myanmar 
military in 2011.
The Jinghpaw vernacular media continues to thrive  
today despite the ongoing conflict. Looking back at its history, 
it would be difficult to exaggerate the role played by Protestant 
evangelism. The series of Jinghpaw Readers are still in use 
today in modified versions. Baptist churches continue to run 
summer schools. At the same time, digital technology has 
radically decentralized media production, allowing journalists, 
intellectuals, artists, and musicians to work and distribute  
their products more readily and widely. On YouTube are  
countless Jinghpaw-language videos ranging from reports  
on the controversial Myitsone dam to the stand-up comedy  
of a Baptist pastor.
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During the British colonial period (1885-1948), various Palaung groups used the 
Shan script to write their languages. Since independence in 1948, these groups 
have come into more direct contact with the Burmese people and their language, 
through government and educational institutions. Since the 1960s, the influence 
of Burmese has become stronger, displacing the older role of the Shan language 
in Palaung intellectual life. As a result, recent efforts to create Palaung ortho-
graphies have followed Burmese models. 
Takahiro Kojima
TO READ THIS CHANGE as ‘assimilation’ may be misleading. 
Rather, Palaung elites see themselves as making efforts to 
establish a ‘standardized’ orthography based on the national 
language, Burmese. Since the political changes in Myanmar 
in 2010, Palaung leaders have created Palaung textbooks in 
anticipation of increased local autonomy in education. Wide 
differences in the varieties of the Palaung language and several 
orthographic traditions have posed a challenge to creating  
a single Palaung orthography. The difficulties in these efforts, 
together with the challenges posed by creating a standard 
Palaung language from among the varieties, highlight the 
evolving internal power dynamics of a diverse ethnic group  
in democratizing Myanmar.
The Palaung, who call themselves Ta’ang (also ‘Deang’ in 
China), are an Austroasiatic upland group living in Shan State in 
Burma (Myanmar) and neighboring countries, and form several 
sub-groups among whom there is great linguistic diversity. 
These sub-groups include the Samlong (or Katur), Rumai, 
Rukhaü, Riang, Thewrai, Palé, Rucing, and Rumau. As an upland 
people numbering about half a million, the Palaungs have 
historically been in close contact with the Shans (or Tai), who 
live in the valleys of Shan State. More recently, Palaungs have 
come into closer contact with the Burmese through education, 
the media, and the state. Much previous writing has stated that 
the Palaung simply imitate or have internalized Shan culture.1 
In the 1910s, Leslie Milne observed that the Palaung chronicles 
were written in Shan.2 In more recent times, Palaungs would 
use Shan texts for teaching and religious purposes, despite the 
fact that Shan is a wholly unrelated language. Most Palaung 
groups are Theravāda Buddhist. When praying, many did so  
in Shan, which they saw as more effective, virtuous, and nicer 
to listen to. Those praying in Palaung risked being looked  
down on for using a low-status language. 
Palaung groups have made use of a variety of scripts to 
write their languages. In 1972, a standardized, official ‘Palaung 
script’ was adopted in Palaung communities. However, in my 
fieldwork during 2011-2016 in areas of Shan State where the 
Palaung languages are spoken, Mandalay and Yangon, some 
people could indeed read the script, but I found few who could 
also write it. Groups of young people have been working to  
create an improved yòunthòunza, Burmese for ‘office-use script,’ 
meaning ‘official script,’ to overcome some of the inadequacies 
inherent in the older systems and in the 1972 script.
I explore some of the reasons for the diversity of scripts 
among the Palaung and how various groups have coped with 
this diversity. On-going efforts to revise the script will have 
to address the continued practice of local communities using 
their local language and script. Indeed, the creation of an 
official script is tied to efforts to create a supra-regional Palaung 
language, called ŋɛ poŋ [the language of the group]. I suggest 
a reconfiguration of ethnic relations, both among the Palaung 
groups, and externally with the Shans and Burmese. 
Creating a ‘united’ Palaung script 
The first person to create a script for a Palaung language was  
a Miss Maclean, an American Christian missionary. As part of  
a larger phenomenon in colonial Burma, missionaries designed 
scripts for local languages. Maclean tried to introduce her script 
in 1912. As Buddhists, the Palaung were not receptive. In the 
following period, however, many Palaung intellectuals took up 
the impetus and created writing systems based on Burmese 
and Shan. These too failed to spread. In addition to the gener-
ally low esteem in which the Palaung held their own language, 
many people already knew Shan writing and thought it enough 
to simply write in that language, rather than in Palaung. 
In the 1950s, the drive to create a script again reemerged. 
The Palaung sawbwa Khun Pan Cing met Thakhin Kodaw 
Hmaing (1875-1964), one of the great Burmese poets, writers, 
and political leaders of the twentieth century. He asked the 
sawbwa [chief, prince] whether the Palaung people had their 
own script. The sawbwa replied they did not. Kodaw Hmaing 
warned him: “ethnic groups which don’t have their own script 
tend to perish”. The sawbwa, hearing Kodaw Hmaing’s national-
ist rhetoric, felt ashamed. U Paw San (1909-2005), a Palaung 
ex-monk who had studied Burmese in Mandalay and Rangoon 
and English in Ceylon, heard the story.3 He too had internalized 
the idea that ethnic groups which lacked their own script were 
low-class, undeveloped people. He decided to devise a Palaung 
script based on Burmese, reasoning that such a system would 
be easy for people to adopt. 
When U Paw San completed the script in 1955, Khun Pan 
Cing recognized his work, awarding him a gold medal. This 
did not, however, ensure that the script was accepted as the 
standard. This new system vied with older ones, such as that of 
Shin Nagatheina, a powerful monk, who had created a system 
based on the old Shan script with which he and many others 
were more familiar. The Shan Council at the time also wanted 
to ensure that the old Shan script continued to be used. 
The role of the Shan Council in the development of Palaung 
writing systems continued. In 1967-1968, they held a council 
in Taunggyi and invited the creators of the competing Palaung 
systems. Scripts were based on old Shan, Yon Shan (a variant 
of the Tham script also used in Lanna and Laos), the ‘Chinese’ 
Shan script, and Burmese. The participants decided to use the 
Burmese-based script. They thought that since most Palaung 
are Buddhists, they should have access to Pāli texts, most of 
which are written in the Burmese script. Moreover, people 
could make use of Burmese typewriters. 
Nevertheless, the other scripts continued to be used locally. 
Six Palaung university students formed a commission and 
created standards. They feared that continuing differences in 
scripts could split the Palaung people into factions, which could 
lead to their eventual disappearance. This narrative stresses 
the importance of unity and the critical role they thought a 
shared orthography could play in promoting it. The commis-
sion incorporated elements from the many different systems 
in an effort to reach a compromise. They composed a sample 
textbook in the language of the Samlong spoken in Namhsan, 
the traditional center of Palaung political power. In 1972, 
representatives of various Palaung groups met and decided 
to adopt the students’ conventions.4 
Creating an official language for the official script
The script adopted in 1972 is still used in non-formal education 
in northern Shan State and Mandalay. A crucial restriction 
to the spread of its use was that under the Ne Win regime 
(1962-1988), no language other than Burmese could be used 
in government schools. In the 1990s, lay education for high 
school graduates gained some momentum. Yet literacy levels 
in the standard script is still low. Among many Palaung groups, 
literacy in their local script tends to be higher. 
The question remains, why do so few use the standardized 
scripts and textbooks? The wide differences in the Palaung 
language are largely responsible. A textbook in Samlong will 
be difficult for speakers from other subgroups to understand, 
even if they are familiar with the script. The lack of a common, 
standard language has meant that if people do create a 
textbook, they use their local dialect. The Rumai use the same 
script as the Samlong, but have created textbooks following 
Rumai usage. The Rucing use a Yon-based script and the  
Rucing monk who originally created it did not stop using  
it himself even after the 1972 conference. 
One young Palaung working on the promotion of the 
yòunthòunza today says, “People are aware of the linguistic 
and social realities which prevent the adoption of a common 
script. Older people, however, do not want to change the 
current system because of the loss of pride. Current committee 
members could take suggestions from the people. That way  
it will be more likely that they will adopt it.” 
Starting in 2011, greater autonomy in education has 
become possible for many Burmese minorities. Palaung have 
been able to teach their language in government schools after 
school hours. The new National League for Democracy govern-
ment, headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, has raised hopes that 
teaching minority languages as part of the regular government 
curriculum will be possible. In 2014, members of local organ-
izations, including the Ta’ang Student and Youth Union (TSYU) 
and the Ta’ang Women’s Organization (TWO), agreed to create 
a textbook to be used in government schools, with the goal 
of introduction in 2017. Members of the TSYU, which provides 
education about human rights and the rule of law, have made  
it a point to communicate only using Palaung languages in their 
offices, rather than Burmese. They say that it was difficult at 
first, but that they got used to each other’s dialects over time. 
Based on their experience, they came to think it possible to 
create a standardized language, not just a script. 
With the agreement of the Palaung Literature and Culture 
Committee, they have translated two books into each of the six 
Palaung languages. They are comparing the vocabulary of each 
language and choose the words common to the most. This 
list of common words will be the basis of the ‘official’ Palaung 
language. For example, the word haw [go] is the same among 
five of the Palaung languages, so it will become the official 
word. This is a straightforward example. Depending on the 
word, some subgroups may have very little input, even though 
they had greater control over their language in the past. 
The biggest question now is whether the Rucing, who  
are the largest group and already have their own script, will 
accept the new official language. My conversations with Rucing 
speakers suggest that while young people may be more used 
to the idea of a standard language and script, even people 
only over thirty prefer their Yon-based script and the Rucing 
language. One Rucing monk in his forties explained that  
for political reasons, adopting a Burmese-based script in the 
Rucing area would be difficult. The Shan State Army is powerful 
there, and there are only four government schools among the 
104 Palaung villages. 
The obstacles on the road to creating a standard script and 
language suggest the continued importance of small, local 
Palaung communities, their own connections, and their older 
writing systems. The response among younger generations has 
been flexibility. As one young person said, “If the Rucing want 
to keep using their Yon script, they can study it in the monas-
tery and learn the yòunthòunza in the government schools. We 
don’t want to stop them from using the Yon script”. 
Takahiro KOJIMA, Tsuda College, Faculty of Liberal Arts, 
Department of International and Cultural Studies, Associate 
Professor (kojima.takahiro@gmail.com)
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The Palaung (or Ta’ang), whose languages belong to the Austroasiatic 
family, live on mountain slopes and ridges in Shan State, adjacent 
Yunnan, and northern Thailand. In addition to the Burmese term  
‘Palaung’ (perhaps itself connected to Blang and Bulang, names of 
another Austroasiatic group), insiders and outsiders have used a  
number of other names to refer to all or some of the Palaung. Besides 
the names Kojima outlines in his article in this Focus, the Burmese 
refer to the Samlong as ‘Shwe’ (Burmese for ‘gold’), and the Rucing  
as ‘Ngwe’ (Burmese for ‘silver’). These terms have their origins in the 
decorations on women’s clothing. The Rumai are sometimes called 
‘Black Palaung’, as the cloth of the women’s dresses is mainly black.  
In terms of language, these three names also indicate varieties that 
are not immediately mutually intelligible.
Rachel Weymuth
Language variation
Many Palaung claim they all speak the same language, which 
they call Ta’ang, and that there is no variation. Such claims reflect 
ideology more than reality. For the past several years, I have 
conducted research on the various Palaung languages, making 
use both of published sources and conducting fieldwork with 
native speakers in Mandalay, Yangon, and Shan State.1 Shwe, 
Rumai, and Rucing each vary in lexicon and considerably in 
grammar, and within each group, there is substantial dialectal 
variation. Given how scattered the Palaung communities are 
throughout a mountainous area, this is not surprising. The 
Rucing in particular live at a significant distance from the 
other groups. To understand just how different the varieties of 
Palaung are, consider the following sentences, all of which mean, 
‘this is not my house’, with the word for ‘house’ in bold letters:
Samlong:  ka mɤh cĭ gaŋ 
Rumai: p˘ nîn aw moh mă kh lɛp ˆw
Rucing: aw muh kaŋ ʔ o ni
In Rumai, the word gâŋ also exists for house, similar to the  
other two languages, but speakers think of it as old-fashioned.  
To think in terms of grammar and structure, each of the sen- 
tences translates roughly as ‘this not be house my’. The way 
speakers make the sentence negative differs slightly in each 
language. In Shwe and Rucing, speakers put the negation before 
the verb (ka and aw, respectively), but in Rumai, they add 
another negator after the verb, mă. The sound systems of the  
languages also differ. Rumai, for example, appears to have a fall-
ing tone, at least in some dialects. The other Palaung varieties,  
like most of the Austroasiatic languages generally, are not tonal. 
Most Palaung are multilingual. Traditionally their second  
language was Shan, but since independence and the intro-
duction of the public school system, Burmese has gained 
more ground. Multilingualism has led to the influence of the 
dominant languages into Palaung varieties. 
Understanding language variation
Language variation among the Palaung reflects not only 
physical distance and geographical barriers, but differences in 
ecological niche and therefore social system. Social hierarchy 
and elevation are usually inverted in upland Southeast Asia: 
groups living in the plains or mountain valleys occupy very 
similar positions in terms of their economics (wet-rice based), 
religious systems (Buddhism), tending to have complex societ-
ies (historically, with royalty and courts), whereas peoples 
living at higher altitudes tend to have small, less differenti-
ated societies, which have a lower overall social status. The 
geographical location of most Palaung settlements implies a 
low social status, lower than that of the Shan who live in the 
valleys and the plains of the mountains. 
Edmund Leach, whose name in Burma Studies is associated 
with the connections between Kachin and Shan groups, had the 
insight that certain crops are closely associated with ritual and 
therefore religious orientation. He found that when Kachins, 
who are an upland people growing dry rice and other upland 
crops, took up wet-rice agriculture, as is the normal practice 
among the Shans, those Kachins quickly became embedded in 
the various rituals and Buddhist practices associated with that 
economic-ecological niche. Unlike the Kachin, the Palaung are 
largely Buddhist, but Leach’s insights into what happens among 
some Kachin may reveal a larger dynamic going on when 
members of upland societies shift their livelihoods to that of 
their low(er)-land neighbors. 
Most lowland Burmese associate the Palaung with tea 
cultivation, and indeed, tea has raised the economic level 
of the Shwe and Rumai to as high as, and sometimes higher 
than, that of the surrounding Shan.2 Rucings live at altitudes 
low enough that they grow less tea, but are able to grow wet 
rice and more cash crops. The connection between econom-
ics, wealth, some kind of social variation and language merit 
further investigation. 
Following the idea of the importance of cultural orienta-
tion and connections with Shan models, we find that in Tawng 
Peng, one of the former Shan principalities whose capital 
is Nam Hsan, Samlong-speaking Palaung saopha (Burmese 
sawbwa) ruled for about two hundred years until shortly after 
the independence.3 The Shwe are highly Shanified and have 
the highest prestige among the Palaung groups. The Rumai 
and Rucing, in contrast, have never ruled over anyone else, 
and have only a headman in each village.
Creating a common Palaung identity
The three Palaung groups I have considered here differ in 
various ways: in their language, economic niche, where they 
live, and the level of prestige they have relative to their 
neighbors. As described elsewhere in this Focus, Palaung elites 
have tried to create a common script and language. They have 
also created a common Palaung flag. All of these markers fit 
in with Burma-wide practices of creating and maintaining an 
ethnic identity. 
Ethnic groups ‘should’ have their own language and script, 
their own written history, a distinct dress, and numerous 
distinctive cultural practices. There is a widespread fear among 
ethnic elites in Burma that they are in danger of disappearing. 
One aspect of this concern is that a lack of unity will result 
in disappearance; this is quite similar to the rhetoric of the 
previous Burmese military government. 
We may reflect on the question of the extent to which, 
historically, ‘the Palaung’ did or did not consider themselves 
to be connected at all. It is possible that in the ‘ethnicized’ and 
‘ethnicizing’ environment of Myanmar today, elite groups feel 
the pressure to create content to ethnic categories that have 
been ascribed to them. As among other ethnic groups, Palaung 
elites, largely Shwe, speak of a struggle of autonomy against 
Burmese and Shan domination. As in other cases in Burma,  
it is not clear how far below the elite level these sentiments 
reach or are being acted upon. Whether these Palaung groups 
will achieve unity is unclear.
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One of our first windows into Palaung society was Leslie Milne’s monograph, The Home of an Eastern Clan:  
A study of the Palaungs of Shan State, published in 1924 after an extended stay in what is now Shan State.  
Through her writings, we learn of an upland people who were deeply integrated into the Shan world – practicing  
Buddhism, producing tea and paying tribute to their own sawbwa. Like the Palaung, many other Austroasiatic  
(Mon-Khmer) speaking groups across the region maintained close relationships with their nearby lowland Tai  
(Tai-Kradai speakers, including the Shan) neighbors. The conventional wisdom is that the Tai dominate the Austro-
asiatic in these relationships, sharing the benefits of lowland civilization with the uplanders. The more we learn about 
these relationships from the perspective of the uplanders, however, the more complex these interactions appear. 
Nathan Badenoch
PREVIOUS GENERATIONS of scholars wrote that uplanders 
simply mimicked the more cultured lowlanders when it suited 
them, but we now understand that uplanders were selective 
in their cultural adaptations, internalizing and localizing 
new practices to fit their worldviews. We also find that the 
cultural exchange went both ways. For example, although we 
find many Tai words borrowed into Austroasiatic languages, 
there is a significant list of Austroasiatic words that were also 
borrowed into Tai languages. 
Documenting the Palaung language
Perhaps one of the most important areas of ongoing discovery 
is the depth of diversity within upland groups. Although  
Milne writes of ‘the Palaung’, she was well aware of the internal 
diversity of this group who speak several related languages 
with varying degrees of mutual intelligibility. Besides her  
ethnography, Milne also produced major works on the 
language. Her Elementary Palaung Grammar, printed in  
Oxford, came out in 1921, followed in 1931 by A Dictionary 
of English-Palaung and Palaung-English, published in Rangoon. 
The language she describes is the Palaung as found in Nam 
Hsan in northern Shan State, whose language the Palaungs 
call Samlong. As Milne describes in her ethnography, Nam 
Hsan was the center of Palaung social, economic and political 
life, with its monasteries, tea plantations and sawbwa’s resi-
dence. The last Palaung sawbwa, Khun Pang Cin, represented 
the Shan states at the Panglong Conference in 1947, where 
General Aung San and the leaders of the Shans, Kachins and 
Chins met to discuss their entering the Union of Burma.
In the introduction to the Grammar, Milne describes how  
she had originally started her recording of the Palaung language 
in the Nam Hkam area, near the Chinese border. At that time 
she was doing work on the Shan, which culminated in her first 
publication, The Shans at Home (1910). During her fieldwork, 
she got to know the Palaungs living in the hills around the 
Moeng Mao basin, which straddles the present China-Burma 
border. The Palaungs there speak Rumai, one of the major  
language divisions of the language, as both Kojima and 
Weymuth allude to in their contributions to this Focus. 
After fifteen months working with the Rumai, Milne made 
her way to Nam Hsan, and began to study the language spoken 
there, particularly that of the sawbwa and his clan. As she tells 
the story, this language was “considered by the Palaungs 
themselves to be the most correct and aristocratic form  
of their language”. In other words, more refined and worthy  
of a dictionary and grammatical description. The political  
and economic position of Nam Hsan provides compelling 
reasons to place importance on the Samlong language.  
It also happens that Samlong preserves an older sound  
system and word structure, while Rumai and the others  
have undergone a series of sound changes, differentiating 
them from Samlong. At the same time, aspects of the 
Samlong sound system gave it an ‘older’ feel, so it is perhaps 
not surprising that the variety has the status it does. 
Milne therefore decided to produce a dictionary based  
on research on Samlong. Yet she comments, “(a)t the same 
time, my previous studies among the Rumai were not wasted, 
as although the pronunciation and even many of the words 
are different in the various clans – none of which have a  
written language – yet the construction of all these dialects  
is the same, and the words, even when they differ, suggest  
a common origin”. 
Luckily, Milne included this Rumai material in her  
dictionary, giving us a glimpse of the diversity of languages 
she came into contact with during her time with the Palaung. 
At the back of her Palaung-English dictionary, she adds a 
section of words from non-Samlong languages, including 
Rumai, but also languages such as Kyusao, Kumkaw, Tiorai, 
Omachawn, Kwawnhai, Hupawng, Pangnim, and Ho-mau.  
To give a taste of the diversity she encountered, let us look at 
the word for ‘day’ (in her own notation), in Samlong sa
˙
-ngī:, 
Rumai śɛ-ngāi, Ho-Mau śa-ngö˛-i, Omachawn śa-ngāi, Hupawng 
śāu, and Kyusao so˛¯h. This information was certainly not 
wasted, as it provided material for linguists to begin system-
atic work on reconstructing the ancestor of all the current 
Palaung languages. Linguistic reconstruction is a comparative 
process that identifies the regular patterns of sound change 
in the history of a group of related languages. Through these 
patterns, linguists can show how the contemporary languages 
have diverged from the parent language, and propose 
structured relationships among those languages. 
Literacy, diversity and diglossia
Milne offered her work as a first attempt to reduce the  
Palaung language to writing and analyze it. Hers was not, 
however, the only effort. As Kojima describes in greater detail, 
Palaungs themselves had started to write their language 
using Burmese, Shan and Yon scripts, often in conjunction 
with Buddhist ritual texts. From the outset of such efforts, the 
Nam Hsan Palaung have been concerned with standardizing 
the written language as a strategy for Palaung cultural and 
political survival within the stronger Shan and Burmese worlds. 
These efforts at standardization form part of a movement to 
establish an inclusive Ta’ang identity, one that can take part 
in the changes and opportunities in contemporary Myanmar. 
In present-day Myanmar, ethnic groups must assert internal 
coherence and cohesion, while demonstrating inclusiveness,  
in order to engage with state institutions. 
As part of these efforts to create inclusivity, when the 
Ta’ang Committee for Literature and Culture published the 
first Burmese-Palaung dictionary (more accurately Burmese-
Ta’ang dictionary) in 2012, they included equivalents in three 
Palaung languages – Samlong, Rumai and Rucing – for each 
Burmese entry. The dictionary gives the Palaung words in 
the Burmese-based Samlong script, which gives some sense 
of the phonological differences between each. At the same 
time, however, the script obscures some important differ-
ences because it was designed for the Samlong language. 
The main entries for Samlong were done by native speaker 
members of the Committee, and the list of words was sent to 
a similar Rumai literacy group in Nam Hkam, who use a similar 
orthography to represent a language with a slightly different 
phonological system. The Ruching data was collected by a 
Nam Hsan scholar, because the literate Ruching use different 
orthography, similar to the Lanna script. While the dictionary 
is an important resource, it is important to consider the work 
done to produce such a dictionary. Here we should recall  
that the ‘reduction’ of a language to writing, mentioned by 
Milne in her introduction, is just that: reducing the variety  
in a real spoken language to an idealized sound system, often 
preferring words from a dominant dialect or variety.
There is also a lexicon of Rumai, glossed in Burmese and 
English, which calls itself a “Ta’ang dictionary”. This work also 
calls to a larger Ta’ang identity being constructed in literary 
terms, but using the orthography to represent features in 
the Rumai language that do not exist in Samlong. Despite 
the historical and linguistic logic that supports Samlong 
claims to legitimacy as a unifying language, the Rumai have 
also been developing educational materials, and moving to 
standardize their variety of the language. I recently heard a 
Samlong-speaking language planner express consternation 
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at the Rumai efforts, saying they will only make it harder for 
Ta’ang literacy to take root in society. Rumai music, however, 
is popular among young Palaung people, suggesting a pos-
sible source of prestige and legitimacy among the upcoming 
generation of speakers.
A further hurdle facing literacy efforts is that the Samlong 
language is itself undergoing significant changes. Spoken 
language is constantly in the natural processes of change.  
Even as the written language preserves older pronunciations,  
the language of young people changes. Today, some sounds are 
being lost. For example, the first syllable of two-syllable words 
are being reduced, and final consonants are also being lost, 
or changing. A young speaker of Samlong may pronounce the 
word k rgrai [to chat together] as k grai. Similarly, a word like  
k nbraan [to be hungry] might be reduced to k braan. There  
are also words that only have a simple k - syllable, such as  
k taam [egg]. A young writer may pronounce the first syllable 
the same, and will have a difficult time knowing how to spell 
the words correctly. When the spoken language diverges  
from the idealized forms in the written language – or more 
accurately perhaps, when a written language is based on a form 
of the language which is much more conservative than that  
of the majority of speakers – a situation of ‘diglossia’, can arise. 
In situations of diglossia, the difference between written and 
spoken language is so great that people learning to read and 
write the language in effect learn another language. Such is the 
classic case between written Arabic and the spoken varieties. 
Changing lingua franca
In the process of studying Palaung, I have been involved 
in many conversations that move freely between Palaung, 
Burmese and Shan. These are the pillars of the typical Palaung 
linguistic repertoire. Many Palaung people are able to use 
more than one Palaung variety, in addition to Burmese, Shan, 
Chinese, and even Jinghpaw. This type of multilingualism is 
common among upland groups that find themselves embed-
ded in webs of political, economic and religious influence 
and opportunity. The Palaung are just one example of the 
dynamism of multilingualism. When we talk of an area such  
as the Shan state as being multilingual, we are often talking of 
a situation where many languages are spoken by groups living 
in close proximity to each other. More interesting than this, is 
the fact that local people use more than one language in daily 
life, making language use choices based on their networks 
of communication. Without the dynamism implied here, the 
value of the diversity is often overlooked; worse, with a lack  
of understanding of dynamic multilingualism, diversity is 
often seen as a hindrance to social organization. 
The social context for these decisions is changing quickly. 
These changes have to do with increased opportunities for 
formal education, economic development, the attraction of 
cities and new connections to regional, national and global 
communities. Young Palaungs commonly speak of two points 
of change in their language use. The first has to do with their 
preference for using Burmese with speakers of other Palaung 
languages. The current generation has usually been educated 
in Burmese, and tend to have less experience in working 
out linguistic differences between themselves and speakers 
of other Palaung varieties. They therefore tend to prefer 
Burmese as a common language. 
The second is the concurrent decline of Shan as a lingua 
franca among the younger generation. I have observed that 
with the increased exposure to Burmese, there seems to be 
an inverse correlation with exposure to Shan. There are many 
Shan borrowings in Palaung, but competence in the language 
seems to be in decline. This could be a matter of convenience, 
but it also likely reflects changing ideas of language prestige. 
For young Palaung, Burmese is the language of economic 
opportunity. More and more, they hear of Ta’ang – together 
with its written form – as a source of cultural pride.
A calendar and ethnic categories
Early in my study of Rumai, a young speaker taught me the 
saying, “the Palaung people (khri- t aaŋ) all eat sour bamboo 
shoots”. The word khri- means ‘descendants’ or ‘relatives’,  
and represents the idea that there is a large grouping of 
people that share a common history, and if we follow from 
the reference to bamboo shoots, a common social and 
cultural background. The common folk classification of 
Palaung sub-groups includes thirteen types of Palaung. For 
someone who is starting to learn about Ta’ang and Palaung, 
the explanation may lie in a look through a calendar with 
pictures of traditional Palaung clothing, each with the name 
of a subgroup. It is probably no coincidence that the number 
of Palaung subgroups perfectly matches the number of  
pages in a calendar, plus the cover. The Shan do a similar thing 
throughout Southeast Asia and in Myanmar in particular; 
‘traditional’ dress often marks ethnic groups, and is considered 
to be especially useful as a visual cue when criteria such as 
language are so complex. Societies perceive and express 
internal diversity in a number of ways – language, dress, 
ritual, kinship, political and economic relations with other 
groups, and residential patterns, among others. The Palaung 
sub-group names on the calendar do not correspond, for the 
most part, with the language varieties known from linguistic 
research. The calendar highlights the differences in local and 
international classification schemes based on different criteria 
and interests. 
The principles involved in linguistic classification offers 
insights into history. Initial efforts to classify Palaung languages 
provided a picture of how Palaung subgroups were related. 
Sound changes may relate to movements of people, language 
contact, or shifting economic or political conditions. The 
diversity of the Palaung languages has been a focus of the few, 
but major, efforts to describe the language. This diversity has 
also featured greatly in evolving ideas about how to create  
a unified Ta’ang community in contemporary Myanmar; that 
is, a community that can respond as a group to political and 
economic opportunities. 
The more we learn about the Palaungs and their languages, 
the more complex the linguistic picture becomes, as does 
the political project of standardization. We also get a better 
picture of the depth of diversity within ethnic categories 
that may or may not be officially recognized. The trade-offs 
between standardization on the one hand and maintaining 
diversity on the other are delicate, yet critical matters not 
only for the Palaung, but for other ethnic groups of Myanmar 
and the region. Elites may try to push forward standardization 
in a rush to create unity, but in their efforts, alienate and 
create ill will among those whose languages are left aside. 
The creation of dictionaries is essential to the standard-
ization and codification of any language that has aspirations 
for official use or as a medium of instruction and writing. 
A dictionary can be a vital source of information about a 
language, a culture, a people’s history and their knowledge 
systems. At the same time, a dictionary is emblematic of the 
political need to reduce diversity in order to engage with 
official institutions. Milne’s Palaung and Burmese-Ta’ang 
dictionaries demonstrate these dynamics. Future dictionaries 
– be they of a standardized and unified Ta’ang or of spoken 
varieties – will highlight the rich diversity of the languages 
themselves, but will also reflect the difficult decisions made  
to create them.
Nathan Badenoch, Associate Professor,  
Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Institute  
for Liberal Arts and Sciences, Kyoto University  
(badenoch@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp).
Above: Image 
reproduced under  
a creative commons 
license courtesy  
of Fabulousfabs 
on flickr.
Above: 
Marma Nuns, 
Yangon, 2016.
Below left: 
Tavoyan Speaker, 
July 2016.
Photos courtesy 
of the author.
42 | The Focus 
Hierarchy and contact: re-evaluating the Burmese dialects
The Newsletter | No.75 | Autumn 2016
We think of Burma as a country of great linguistic and ethnic  
diversity. The government today classifies the population into 135  
‘national races’, most of which they place under eight larger over-
arching categories. The Ethnologue website (www.ethnologye.com),  
which provides information about languages across the globe, says that  
there are 117 living languages in the country. This discrepancy points to 
both differences in classification schemes, but also perhaps highlights 
an expectation – common at least in the English-speaking world – that 
language and ethnicity should be nearly co-equal. Since the colonial 
era, indigenous ways of making sense of identity and community,  
which may or may not have been based on language, have been  
overtaken by a practice that the British introduced: equating language  
first with race, and later, as the idea of race evolved, with ethnic group.
Patrick McCormick
I EXPLORE THIS INTERSECTION between language, identity,  
and the equation between language and ethnicity by looking  
at three examples of variation within the Burmese language  
itself: among the Rakhaing/Marma, Tavoyan and Intha  
dialects. Speakers of Rakhaing, which varies comparatively 
less from Standard Burmese than Tavoyan does, have a 
separate sense of identity, while many speakers of Tavoyan 
generally consider themselves to be ‘Burman’. Such iden-
tifications come out of complex, incompletely understood 
historical and political contingencies. 
Looking at the larger overall picture, in whatever way 
Burmese dialect speakers think of themselves, their com- 
munities occupy a position near the top of local sociolinguistic 
hierarchies. Much scholarship has focused on the hierarchical 
interpersonal relations that are prominent features of lowland, 
court-based Southeast Asian societies. The idea of hierarchy is 
also useful for understanding how entire languages and their 
societies stand in relation to each other. 
Ethnicity in Burma
In Burma, ethnicity is central to social organization, culture  
and politics. When the British arrived in the country in 1824, 
they tried to make sense of the diversity they found. The 
categories of caste and religion, which they had used in India, 
were not useful for categorizing the people. The British created 
a new technology of governance that would allow them to 
create subjects and, for example, recruit suitable people into 
the army: they equated language with ‘race’ to form racial 
categories. Outside of Burma, this earlier concept of race has 
gradually evolved into the concept of ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic 
groups’. Two profound consequences of this first racial (later 
ethnic) thinking have been that groups of people in Burma have 
defined and redefined themselves into ethnic identities, where 
language plays a key, if equivocal role. These identities have 
been both a cause and consequence of long-standing conflict. 
Scholars also disagree about ‘ethnicity’; many resist a 
historicization of ethnicity, that is, a discussion of how ethnicity 
as a way of understanding and categorizing difference  
has arisen in a particular context. Some take such arguments  
as a claim that the British somehow created difference.  
Others choose to downplay the role of ethnicity, treating it 
as a sort of political neurosis, a mania for a particular way of 
organizing the world, of the English-speaking world. I argue 
that difference among human populations has always existed, 
and people have always been aware of it. The practices of 
organizing and understanding difference through ethnicity 
– solid, singular, non-porous, identities, which are projected 
into the past – is a recent development stemming from 
European romantic nationalism. 
In Burma, practices and ideologies of race began evolving 
during the colonial period (1824-1948). Over time, ethnicity 
has encroached on the earlier practices of identification  
from the pre-colonial Burmese empires, but which compete 
with ethnicity. Family and kinship connections, networks of 
patronage and loyalty, religious and cultural practices have  
all shaped how people understood themselves and wider  
communities. Identifications can vary depending on the 
context. In the pre-colonial period, not everyone who  
spoke the same language considered themselves to be  
part of the same community or to have the same identity. 
Following the logic of ethnicity, language is central to 
identifying and recognizing difference. Linguistic scholarship, 
however, validate or falsify claims of ethnic unity or separation. 
It can provide insights into how languages and their varieties  
are connected, how long ago they separated, and how 
languages function in society. Political and historical processes 
have created ethnic communities, not language alone.  
For example, at the level of every day speech, Hindi and Urdu 
are the same language sharing a common origin, yet politics 
have divided them into separate languages. On the other hand, 
as Kojima (in this Focus) discusses the Palaung, who speak 
widely divergent varieties (perhaps even languages), never-
theless consider themselves to form one community. 
The Burmese language and its varieties  
in Burma and beyond 
Compared with the other national languages of Southeast Asia, 
Burmese varies little regionally. Out of a population of approxi-
mately fifty-two million, thirty-two million speak Burmese as 
a native language and another ten million speak it as a second 
language.1 This relative lack of variation perhaps reflects the 
fact that the language has spread from Upper Burma, centered 
in Pagan and Mandalay, only in the past few centuries. Speakers 
are aware of the minor differences between the speech of 
Mandalay, Yangon, and Mawlamyaing, but they tend not to 
attach much meaning to this variation. Rather, they tend to 
be more attuned to the accents of second-language speakers, 
which along with visual cues such as physical appearance and 
clothing, can form the basis of stereotyped evaluations of those 
second-language speakers. 
Dialects differing markedly from Standard Burmese have, 
however, arisen in geographical areas peripheral to the earlier, 
historical extent of the language, even into areas that are 
now other countries. To the far west of Burma, the Rakhaing 
Yoma mountain range cuts off Rakhaing State from the rest of 
central Burma. The state covers most of the historical region 
of Arakan, kingdoms whose power reached well into what 
is now Bangladesh. Rakhaing is the largest and best-known 
dialect, with about 800,000 native speakers in Rakhaing State 
and another 200,000 in Bangladesh. Another million speak 
Rakhaing as a second language, including speakers of Chin 
languages, Chakma (Daingnet), and Bengali dialects. Marma is 
a dialect of Rakhaing spoken by 150,000 people in Bangladesh 
and another 30,000 in Mizoram and Tripura in Northeast India. 
The Marma are the only group of Burmese dialect speakers who 
live entirely outside of Burma, and represent a population who 
fled Arakan after wars with central Burma in the eighteenth 
century. 
On the other side of the country along the Tenasserim 
(Taninthāyi) coast, around 400,000 people speak Tavoyan 
in and around the city of Tavoy (Dawe), control of which has 
passed between Burmese and Thai courts over the centuries. 
The Tavoyans possibly came from further north for trade.  
The sounds of Tavoyan suggest that it broke off from the main  
body of speakers perhaps as early as the Pagan period (approx-
imately 9th-13th centuries AD), just before Burmese was first 
written. To this day, the Tavoyan word for Burmans from 
further north of Tavoy is ganthà, literally ‘Pagan’ + ‘child’, the 
first syllable coming from a reduced form of the name of the 
ancient kingdom, Pagan. Finally, further north, about 90,000 
speakers of the Intha dialect live on and around Inle Lake in 
southern Shan State. Historically, the Shan, who speak a Tai-
Kadai language related to Thai, surrounded the Intha. Burmese 
speakers may have moved to the region as part of a military 
outpost. There are other Burmese dialects, some of which have 
been only sporadically described, including the Yaw and Beik 
(Mergui) varieties, which appear to be fairly close to Standard 
Burmese, and Taung’yo and Danu, both spoken in Shan State 
and which appear to more divergent.2 
Variation and intelligibility
Deciding on the division between ‘language’ and ‘dialect’ is 
fraught with difficulty, and has as much to do with ideology, 
history and politics, as with any kind of ‘objective’ assessment 
of how close or far two speech varieties are. For example, the 
fact that speakers of two varieties can understand each other 
does not guarantee that the one group will automatically 
reject or accept the other as members of their same group. 
Furthermore, what it means for two varieties to be ‘mutually 
intelligible’ also depends on the extent to which the various 
speakers involved have been exposed to language variation. 
When dealing with dialects, the influence and prestige of 
the standard language cannot be discounted – ‘standard’ 
forms can often displace dialectal forms. When trying to 
understand the development of the Burmese language and 
the dialects, linguists rely on how the Burmese language is 
written, or ‘Written Burmese’. To simplify a little, it preserves 
the sounds of the language from an earlier period. Written 
forms, for example, indicate consonant sounds before many 
of the sweeping sound changes that all spoken forms have 
undergone in recent centuries. 
To understand something of how varieties of the spoken 
language diverge, we can consider the word for chicken, 
written <KRAK>,3 which represents an earlier pronunciation. 
Through a series of sound changes, the modern Burmese 
pronunciation is /cɛ /, but in Rakhaing /kra /. In this instance, 
Rakhaing seems to be more conservative than Standard 
Burmese. Judging by British sources, the change of the sound 
of /r/ to /y/ appears to have been continuing into the nine-
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teenth century, and is the origin of such forms as ‘Rangoon’, 
which in current pronunciation is Yangoun. On the other hand, 
the word for temple or school, written /KYON˙H
˙
/, is /càuŋ/ in 
Standard Burmese and Rakhaing, but /kl`ŋ/ in Tavoyan. The 
presence of the ‘l’ sound in Tavoyan suggests that it preserves 
a sound that existed in the oldest stages of Burmese, which 
was first written in the eleventh century AD. 
Imagine this kind of change throughout the sound 
systems, together with differences in vocabulary and a few in 
syntax (or ‘grammar’). Differences in vocabulary can reflect 
borrowings from other languages. The Standard Burmese 
word loungyi [sarong] comes from Bengali lungi, while the 
Rakhaing word is t y` and the Tavoyan is θ ʃ`ŋ, itself from 
Malay sarong.4 Other words are simply made up of different 
native components: ‘boy’ in Standard Burmese is kauŋ.g lè,  
literally ‘animal + little’, compared with Tavoyan phá.sú, liter-
ally ‘male + little’. Tavoyan sú now occurs only as an element 
in girls’ names in Standard Burmese. The calque is another 
mode of more subtle borrowing in which native elements 
replicate a model from another language. ‘Chili’ in Burmese 
is ŋ you .θì, literally ‘pepper + fruit’, but Intha sa .θì, literally 
‘spicy + fruit’, replicates Shan maak phit, ‘fruit + spicy’. 
Differences in syntax are less numerous. They may include 
the example of how questions are asked in Intha. For example, 
pha loʊ  ne (ha) for ‘what are you doing?’ In Burmese, this would 
be ba lou  ne (ð ) lɛ`. The final lɛ`  here indicates a relative question 
(that is, involving who, what, where, when, who), and may  
be dropped off in very casual speech in some circumstances.  
In Intha, however, it appears to be normal to leave it off or  
even replace it with the ha, apparently from Shan. The other 
dialects follow Standard Burmese in this regard. 
Changing names, changing identifications?
Dealing with the names of languages, peoples, and what  
we call ‘ethnonyms’ today is in general highly problematic.  
The exact content of a term, or the people and situations  
in which a term is used, can change radically over time. People 
themselves change names and reinterpret them. One such 
example in English is the term ‘Dutch’, which refers to the 
language of the Netherlands but is cognate with the name 
Germans have for themselves and their language, Deutsch. 
When dealing with Burmese dialect speakers, we  
see similar shifts and changes. In Burmese English, today  
the official name of the country, language and people is 
Myanmar, written <MRANMĀ>. The form <BAMĀ>, the  
origin of such terms as Burma and Burman in English and  
Bamā or Bamar in Burmese English, is from the same word, 
through a particular sound change. According to interviews  
I conducted in 2016, Rakhaings call themselves r khaiŋ and 
their language r khaiŋ.z g`, literally ‘Rakhaing’ + ‘language’. 
Marmas call themselves m r ma and their language  
m r ma. g`. We have already seen how the sound change 
from r to y has affected Standard Burmese, so the connection 
between Marma and Myanma is immediate and intriguing. 
In the nineteenth century, British officials such as Hamilton 
found that terms like Rakhaing and Yanbye referred only to 
local parts of Arakan, and that the people of Arakan used 
Maramā to refer to themselves. They also used the terms 
Maramā-grī and Mranmā-grī. Today, however, this term  
refers only to the Baruas, the Bengali-speaking Buddhist 
population of what is now Bangladesh. 
Tavoyans tend to call themselves Bamā, the same as  
the Standard Burmese name of the ethnic majority, and their 
language b magà, although sometimes (particularly for ideo-
logical reasons), some call themselves d wɛ and their language 
d wɛgà. Inthas call themselves ɛ`nsà and their language  
ɛ`n.s kà. British sources also use ‘Dawe’ for Intha. Whether  
this was a local appellation or some kind of classificatory  
confusion remains to be investigated. British scholars tried to  
draw connections between the various dialect speakers. 
Such variation in names seem to index as much emerging 
categories as historical and political developments (the rise  
of nationalism, the political benefits of being an ethnic group), 
and emerging schemes of knowledge. These last include  
developing linguistic classifications, and government techno-
logies of governance, starting with British practices and 
evolving over time, through to the most recent government 
census of 2014. A final element is no doubt people’s own lived 
experiences, in which earlier pre-colonial practices, such as 
having multiple or shifting identities, was possible and normal. 
One way to understand the shift in the meaning of Mranmā-grī  
is to note that, in what is now Bangladesh, Rakhaings are a 
Buddhist community with close ties to the highly institutional-
ized and prestigious Burmese Buddhism. If Buddhist practices 
were less organized or institutionalized among the Barua, they 
would seek training and ordination in Rakhaing institutions, 
where they would become exposed to the language and thus  
in a sense ‘become’ a kind of Rakhaing. 
Positioning Burmese and its dialects hierarchically
In whatever way the speakers of these Burmese dialects  
evaluate themselves, they appear to be at or near the top 
of the local language hierarchy. Whatever the names for 
themselves and their languages, dialect speakers tend to  
have the same status as Burmans in the language ecology.  
My observation comes out of a body of scholarship on  
multi-lingualism and language contact. In situations where 
there is multilingualism – people regularly speaking many  
languages – the overall trend is that who speaks what 
language, or who does and does not learn a specific language, 
reflects where speech communities fall on a hierarchy.  
A corollary of ‘learning up’ is that speakers of lower-placed 
languages can replicate both matter (usually thought of  
as ‘borrowings’) and patterns (or ‘syntax’) by reanalyzing 
native words or forms and using them in the same way  
as the model language. 
Said another way, people tend to learn the languages  
higher up on the hierarchy and not the other way. Inside 
Burma, the general trend is that the more languages one 
speaks, the lower one is on the hierarchy. Slightly confusingly, 
higher status languages live in lower altitudes – the lowlands 
and in mountain valleys – and lower status language speakers 
live in higher altitudes – the uplands, highlands, and mountains. 
An example from the Kachin world would be a Maru or  
Lhaovo speaker, who will also know Jinghpaw and Burmese, 
and possibly Shan or Chinese. Jinghpaw and Shan speakers 
would not learn Lhaovo unless they had family connections. 
Burmese rarely learn minority languages, learning instead 
English and such economically useful languages as Korean or 
Japanese. Parallels outside of Burma are many, such as eastern 
Europeans who learn many western European languages  
for work and education opportunities, but not vice-versa. 
This trend of speaking and replicating up is a general pattern, 
and there are important exceptions. The kind of multilingualism 
meant here is long-term and stable, and a not rapid language 
shift. Certain populations will learn languages lower on the 
hierarchy, such as Chinese and other traders who learn many 
languages to facilitate business. Absolute numbers can make  
a crucial difference: in some parts of lower Burma, where the 
Mons are the local majority, some Burmese do in fact learn  
Mon. Based purely on linguistic observation, in Bangladesh,  
a Muslim-majority country, the Bengali language stands above 
Marma and Rakhaing, yet within local Buddhist communities, 
Rakhaing and Marma are at the apex. The situation in Bangladesh 
highlights the importance of Burmese Buddhism, with its great 
prestige and institutional complexity. The Burmese government 
in fact indirectly supports Buddhism in Bangladesh, by facilitating 
monks from there coming to Burma to study. 
Absolute numbers may also help explain the phonological  
situation in some of the Burmese dialects. Historically, appar-
ently Shans learned Intha but not the other way around, and 
speakers of Karen languages around Tavoyan learn Tavoyan  
but not the other way around. When large numbers of speakers 
speak a higher-status language, they may take with them 
certain speech habits. If the higher-status language is spoken 
by a fairly small number of people, the surrounding speech 
habits may work their way into the speech of monolinguals. 
Following this observation, Intha lacks the sound /θ/, having 
instead /s/, which represents the influence of Shan. 
If we look at Tavoyan ‘on the page’, at how each word in a 
Tavoyan sentence corresponds with Standard Burmese, the two 
are quite close once we understand how older sounds in each 
variety have shifted down to the present. But when we listen to 
Tavoyan, it is at first strikingly, incomprehensibly different for 
most speakers of Standard Burmese. The prosody or intonation 
is quite different, lacking the drawn-out sounds that Burmese 
uses for emphasis. There is the presence of the /l/ as in /kl` ŋ/ 
[school], and the nasal vowels of Standard Burmese are often  
not nasalized. Finally, the sounds /b/ and /d/ often sound  
‘imploded’ as /b´/ /d´/ as in Khmer or Vietnamese (see Jenny’s 
essay in this Focus). These exact points of difference may have 
parallels in the Karen languages. In linguistically assimilating to 
Tavoyan, they may have carried these features over into Tavoyan 
speech. I caution, however, that much more work would have to 
be done to thoroughly describe all aspects of the sound systems 
of the dialects and of the language(s) they have come into 
contact with before we can make such assumptions certain. 
In conclusion, a sense of difference, social distance, ideas of 
allegiance and patronage may no doubt be quite old, but how 
language feeds into the creation and maintenance of difference 
is equivocal. Linguistic scholarship alone cannot make or break 
an ethnic identification, but it can provide useful insights into 
how speech communities relate to each other. Studying sound 
changes is a big part of what the study of historical linguistics 
is. The question of how the sound system of Old Burmese devel-
oped into what we now hear in Burmese and the dialects may 
seem to be the arcane concern of latter-day philologists being 
paid cushy money from European universities. But sound change 
can offer direct insights into historical and social processes. 
Linguistic data thus is a form of historical evidence. 
Patrick McCormick, Researcher, Department of  
Comparative Linguistics, University of Zürich, and  
École française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO), Yangon  
(mccormick.efeo@gmail.com)
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Visit Newbooks.asia to discover recent publications in Asian Studies, to find purchasing information 
and to read the latest reviews. If you too would like to contribute to our growing collection of reviews, 
register as a user on the site, and request a review copy of the title that interests you. The titles below 
are just a few of the new publications that have recently become available for review on the website.
Brian C. Bernards. 2016
Writing the South Seas: Imagining 
the Nanyang in Chinese & Southeast 
Asian Postcolonial Literature
University of Washington Press
ISBN 9789814722346
Michael Luke Sullivan. 2016.
Cambodia Votes: Democracy, 
Authority & International  
Support for Elections 1993-2013
NIAS Press
ISBN 9788776941871
Mark Elmore. 2016.
Becoming Religious in  
a Secular Age
University of California Press
ISBN 9780520290549
Ya-Feng Mon. 2016.
Film Production & Consumption  
in Contemporary Taiwan:  
Cinema as a Sensory Circuit
Amsterdam University Press
ISBN 9789089648884
Rotem Kowner  
& Walter Demel. 2016. 
Race & Racism in Modern East  
Asia: Interactions, Nationalism, 
Gender & Lineage
Brill. ISBN 9789004326606
Zhuang Wubin. 2016.
Photography in Southeast  
Asia: A Survey
NUS Press
ISBN 9789814722124
Rosemary Marangoly  
George. 2016.
Indian English & the Fiction  
of National Literature
Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9781316623077
Rohan D’Souza. 2016.
Drowned & Dammed:  
Colonial Capitalism & Flood 
Control in Eastern India
Oxford University Press
ISBN 9780199469130
Aya Hirata Kimura. 2016. 
Radiation Brain Moms & Citizen 
Scientists: The Gender Politics 
of Food Contamination After 
Fukushima
Duke University Press
ISBN 9780822361992
Priscilla Roberts  
& John M. Carroll. 2016. 
Hong Kong in the Cold War
Hong Kong University Press
ISBN 9789888208005
Ingo Venzke  
& Li-ann Thio. 2016.
The Internal Effects of  
ASEAN External Relations
Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9781316606551
Wendy Su. 2016.
China’s Encounter with Global 
Hollywood: Cultural Policy  
& the Film Industry, 1994-2013
University Press of Kentucky
ISBN 9780813167060
Zachary Abuza. 2016.
Forging Peace in Southeast  
Asia: Insurgencies, Peace 
Processes, & Reconciliation
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
ISBN 9781442257566
Vladimir Nalivkin & Maria 
Nalivkina, edited by Marianne 
Kamp. 2016. Muslim Women of 
the Fergana Valley: A 19th-Century 
Ethnography from Central Asia 
Indiana University Press
ISBN 9780253021380
Arnika Fuhrmann. 2016.
Ghostly Desires: Queer  
Sexuality & Vernacular Buddhism  
in Contemporary Thai Cinema
Duke University Press
ISBN 9780822361190
Hae Yeon Choo. 2016. 
Decentering Citizenship:  
Gender, Labor, & Migrant  
Rights in South Korea
Stanford University Press
ISBN 9780804791274
Ayako Kano. 2016.
Japanese Feminist Debates:  
A Century of Contention  
on Sex, Love, & Labor
University of Hawai’i Press
ISBN 9780824855802
Justin M. Jacobs. 2016.
Xinjiang & the Modern  
Chinese State
University of Washington Press
ISBN 9780295995656
Ajay Patnaik. 2016.
Central Asia: Geopolitics,  
Security & Stability
Routledge
ISBN 9781138640023
Sophorntavy Vorng. 2016. 
A Meeting of Masks: Status,  
Power & Hierarchy in Bangkok
NIAS Press
ISBN 9788776941970
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New titles available for review on newbooks.asia
New reviews now available to read online:
Seeing Beauty, Sensing Race
Reviewer: Wisnu Adihartono
L. Ayu Saraswati. 2013. 
Seeing Beauty, Sensing Race  
in Transnational Indonesia 
Honolulu: University  
of Hawai’i Press 
ISBN 9780824837365
http://newbooks.asia/review/
seeing-beauty
Religion & Hybridity:  
Hinduism & Catholicism in Goa
Reviewer: Caleb Simmons
Alexander Henn. 2014. 
Hindu-Catholic Encounters in Goa: 
Religion, Colonialism, & Modernity 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press ISBN 9780253012944
http://newbooks.asia/review/
religion-hybridity
Flying High
Reviewer: Niels Mulder
Ranilo Balaguer Hermida. 2014. 
Imagining Modern Democracy:  
A Habermasian Assessment  
of the Philippine Experiment  
Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press ISBN 9781438453873
http://newbooks.asia/review/
flying-high
Diaspora & Identity
Reviewer: Kaarthiyainy 
Supramaniam
Ajaya Kumar Sahoo & Gabriel Sheffer 
(eds). 2014. Diaspora & Identity: 
Perspectives on South Asian Diaspora
London & New York:  
Routledge ISBN 9781138850712
http://newbooks.asia/review/
diaspora-and-identity
The Uyghur Discourse
Reviewer: Henryk Szadziewski
Ondřej Klimeš. 2015. 
Struggle by the Pen: The Uyghur 
Discourse of Nation & National  
Interest, c. 1900-1949 
Leiden: Brill 
ISBN 9789004288089
http://newbooks.asia/review/
uyghur-discourse
The Chinese Urban Juggernaut
Reviewer: Aviram Sharma
Wade Shepard. 2015. 
Ghost Cities of China: The Story  
of Cities without People in the World’s 
Most Populated Country 
London: Zed Books
ISBN 9781783602209
http://newbooks.asia/review/
chinese-urban-juggernaut
Masculine Identities & Male Sex  
Work Between East Java & Bali
Reviewer: Wisnu Adihartono
Matteo Carlo Alcano. 2016. Masculine 
Identities & Male Sex Work Between East 
Java & Bali: An Ethnography of Youth, 
Bodies, & Violence. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan ISBN 9781137541451
http://newbooks.asia/review/
masculine-identities
Alternative Livelihoods
Reviewer: Stéphane Gros
Sarah Turner, Christine Bonnin,  
& Jean Michaud. 2015. 
Frontier Livelihoods: Hmong in  
the Sino-Vietnamese Borderlands 
Seattle: University of Washington 
Press ISBN 9780295994666
http://newbooks.asia/review/
alternative-livelihoods
New Hong Kong Cinema  
by Ruby Cheung
Reviewer: Sander Holsgens
Ruby Cheung. 2016. 
New Hong Kong Cinema: Transitions  
to Becoming Chinese in 21st-century  
East Asia. Oxford: Berghahn Books
ISBN 9781782387039
http://newbooks.asia/review/
new-hk-cinema
Mongolian Film Music
Reviewer: Sunmin Yoon
Lucy Rees. 2015. 
Mongolian Film Music:  
Tradition, Revolution  
& Propaganda
Farnham: Ashgate
ISBN 9781472446237
http://newbooks.asia/review/
mongolian-film-music
Environment, Trade & Society  
in Southeast Asia
Reviewer: William B. Noseworthy
David Henley & Henk Schulte  
Nordholt (eds.) 2015. Environment, 
Trade & Society in Southeast Asia:  
A Longue Durée Perspective.  
Leiden: Brill ISBN 9789004288041
http://newbooks.asia/review/
environ-trade-society 
Malaysia Singapore Fifty Years  
of Contention 1965-2015
Reviewer: Phua Chao Rong, Charles
Kadir Mohamad. 2015.
Malaysia Singapore Fifty  
Years of Contention 1965-2015 
Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press
ISBN 9789839541892
http://newbooks.asia/review/
fifty-years-contention
Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges
Reviewer: Priyanka Singh
C. Christine Fair &  
Sarah J. Watson (eds). 2015.
Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges
Philadelphia: University  
of Pennsylvania Press
ISBN: 9780812246902
http://newbooks.asia/review/
enduring-challenges
Early Modern China  
& Northeast Asia
Reviewer: Hang Lin
Evelyn S. Rawski. 2015. 
Early Modern China & Northeast Asia: 
Cross-Border Perspectives 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press ISBN: 9781107471528
http://newbooks.asia/review/
early-modern-china
Sovereign cultural analysis
Reviewer: Niels Mulder
Nick Joaquin. 2004, 2013. 
Culture & History 
Pasig City: Anvil Publications
ISBN 9712713008
http://newbooks.asia/review/
cultural-analysis
In Search of an Aesthetic  
of Non-Violence
Reviewer: Minoti Chakravarty-Kaul
Josef Helfenstein  
& Joseph N.Newland (eds). 2014.
Experiments with Truth :  
Gandhi & Images of Non-Violence
Houston, TX: The Menil Collection. 
ISBN 97800300208801
http://newbooks.asia/review/
aesthetic-nonviolence
The Salvific Worlds of Kailas
Reviewer: Soumen Mukherjee
Alex McKay. 2015.
Kailas Histories: Renunciate  
Traditions & the Construction  
of Himalayan Sacred Geography
Leiden & Boston: Brill
ISBN 9789004304581
http://newbooks.asia/review/
worlds-kailas
The Return of the Smallholder
Reviewer: Geoffrey Pakiam
Rob Cramb & John McCarthy  
(eds). 2016. 
The Oil Palm Complex:  
Smallholders, Agribusiness  
& the State in Indonesia & Malaysia 
Singapore: NUS Press 
ISBN: 9789814722063
http://newbooks.asia/review/
return-smallholder
The Limit of Political  
Compromise & Technocracy
Reviewer: Sirojuddin Arif
Ginandjar Kartasasmita  
& Joseph J. Stern. 2016. 
Reinventing Indonesia 
Hackensack, NJ: World  
Scientific Publishing 
ISBN 9789814596558
http://newbooks.asia/review/
compromise-and-technocracy
Sidewalks & other public  
spaces in Asia’s cities
Reviewer: Hans Schenk
Annette Miae Kim. 2015.
Sidewalk City, Remapping Public Space  
in Ho Chi Minh City. Chicago: Chicago  
University Press ISBN 9780226119229
William S. W. Lim. 2014. 
Public Space in Urban Asia 
Singapore: World Scientific  
Publishing. ISBN 978-9814578325
http://newbooks.asia/review/
public-spaces-asia
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New titles from Amsterdam University Press
AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY PRESS (AUP) publishes scholarly monographs in a diverse range of disciplines within Asian Studies. 
AUP stimulates the publication of original, cutting-edge work of high quality with an interdisciplinary approach. The press has 
an impressive list of series on several thematic areas. One special focus is on cross-border research. 
Publishing with Amsterdam University Press is a choice for scholarly excellence and global presence. As one of the premier 
university presses in continental Europe, AUP supports scholarship by working closely with authors to produce outstanding 
academic publications, in print as well as digitally.
Amsterdam  
University Press Series:  
In the Spotlight
New Mobilities in Asia
In the 21st century, human mobility will increasingly have  
an Asian face. Migration from, to, and within Asia is not new, 
but it is undergoing profound transformations. Unskilled labour 
migration from the Philippines, China, India, Burma, Indonesia, 
and Central Asia to the West, the Gulf, Russia, Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Thailand continues apace. Yet industrialization in 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, and India, the opening of Burma, and 
urbanization in China is creating massive new flows of internal 
migration. China is fast becoming a magnet for international 
migration from Asia and beyond. Meanwhile, Asian students 
top study-abroad charts; Chinese and Indian managers and 
technicians are becoming a new mobile global elite as foreign 
investment from those countries grows; and Asian tourists are 
fast becoming the biggest travellers and the biggest spenders, 
both in their own countries and abroad.
These new mobilities reflect profound transformations of 
Asian societies and their relationship to the world, impacting 
national identities and creating new migration policy regimes, 
modes of transnational politics, consumption practices, and 
ideas of modernity. The series will, for the first time, bring to-
gether studies by historians, anthropologists, geographers, and 
political scientists that systematically explore these changes.
Proposals Welcome
The series welcomes scholarly monographs and edited 
volumes in English by both established and early-career 
researchers.
Series Editor
Pál Nyíri, VU University, Amsterdam
China’s Environment  
and Welfare
China’s environmental challenges are an issue of global  
concern. This, however, has meant that in much writing 
on the topic ‘the environment’ has become equated with 
‘pollution’. In similar ways, the study of welfare has become 
synonymous to the study of illness. This book series 
champions a broad analytical rethinking of these terms, and 
encourages explorations of their complex interconnections. 
Practices under scrutiny may range from fengshui and 
hygiene to farming, forest governance, mining and industry. 
Topics may be equally wide-ranging, spanning from climate 
change, waste incineration and cancer villages to everyday 
environmentalism and cultural and ritual engagements with 
environment and welfare. Geographically, the series covers 
rural and urban areas as well as their growing hybrid meet-
ing point. Interdisciplinary in scope, the series will feature 
disciplines from across the social sciences and humanities.  
As a whole, the series promotes a conception of welfare  
which positions human welfare as part of broader ecological 
welfare and probes human-ecological interactions.
Proposals Welcome
The series welcomes scholarly monographs and edited 
volumes in English by both established and early-career 
researchers.
Series Editor
Anna Lora-Wainwright, China Centre and School of  
Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford
Series: Asian Borderlands
The series explores the social, cultural, geographic, economic and historical dimensions of border-making by states,  
local communities and flows of goods, people and ideas.
Duncan McDuie-Ra. 2016. 
Borderland City in New India
ISBN: 9789089647580
Farish A. Noor 
The Discursive Construction  
of Southeast Asia in 19th  
Century Colonial-Capitalist  
Discourse 
ISBN: 9789089648846
Mona Chettri. 2017.
Ethnicity and Democracy in  
the Eastern Himalayan Borderland
ISBN: 9789089648860
Lili Lai
Hygiene, Sociality, and Culture in 
Contemporary Rural China 
ISBN: 9789089648464
Martin Saxer and  
Juan Zhang (eds.). 2016
The Art of Neighbouring
ISBN: 9789462982581
Wulan Dirgantoro
Feminisms and Contemporary 
Art in Indonesia 
ISBN:9789089648457
Series: Asian 
History
The series focuses on  
cultural and historical studies 
of politics and intellectual  
ideas and crosscuts the 
disciplines of history,  
political science, sociology  
and cultural studies.  
Series: China's 
Environment  
and Welfare 
This book series champions 
a broad analytical rethinking 
of terms such as environ-
ment, pollution, welfare and 
illness, and encourages 
explorations of their complex 
interconnections.
Series: Asian 
Visual Cultures
This series seeks to explore 
how the texts and contexts 
of Asian visual cultures shape, 
express and negotiate new 
forms of creativity, subjectivity 
and cultural politics.
For questions, or to submit a proposal, contact:
Saskia Gieling 
Senior Commissioning Editor Asian Studies, 
s.gieling@aup.nl
Shannon Cunningham
Commissioning Editor Asian Studies (exclusively US & Canada)
s.cunningham@aup.nl
Visit our website 
http://en.aup.nl
Publishing your book with AUP
•  AUP offers in-house copyediting by experienced  
native speakers
•  The process from the delivery of the final manuscript  
to the publication date is extremely efficient, thorough  
and rapid, including the peer review.
•  Our books are available in the US and Canada through  
the University of Chicago Press, and in Europe and the  
rest of the world through NBN International. 
•  Our representatives in Asia are China Publications  
Services (China), MAYA Publishers PVT Ltd (India)  
and Tim Burland (Japan).
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LEIDEN UNIVERSITY, home to IIAS, will be dedicating 2017  
to Asia. Throughout the ‘Leiden Asia Year’, the university will  
be organising symposia, conferences, lectures and exhibitions,  
all on the theme of Asia, in close collaboration with the 
municipality of Leiden, its museums and other Leiden-based 
organisations. The Leiden Asia Year was announced by Rector 
Magnificus Professor Carel Stolker on 5 September 2015,  
on the occasion of the Opening of the Academic Year. 
The Leiden Asia Year has been prompted by the upcoming 
opening of ‘The Asian Library’ in 2017. As announced in an earlier 
issue of The Newsletter, this new facility is currently being built 
on top of the main building of the Leiden University Libraries, 
and will bring together under one roof some of the foremost 
collections in the world, from and about Asia. The Asian Library 
is one of IIAS’s most valued partners in Leiden, as it is the Official 
Sponsor of the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) 
Book Prize.
Bring
your friend! 
Second ticket free  
with this coupon
Chinese outsider art at the  
Outsider Art Museum
24 Nov 2016 - 5 June 2017
Outsider Art Museum (OAM)  
located in the Hermitage Amsterdam
2017 will be the Leiden Asia Year
All the 2017 Asia-related activities of the University will be brought together 
on www.leidenasiayear.nl. Additions will be made to the programme over the 
coming months. 
Above:  
Current construction  
of the Asia Library at  
the Leiden University  
Libraries (Oct 2016)
IIAS will be organising and participating in a number  
of activities taking place in Leiden during the Leiden Asia  
Year. The first that has already been scheduled is the  
symposium ‘Collecting Asia’, to take place on 17 March 2017.  
This symposium aims to describe the history of Asian-Leiden  
connections and to showcase the written (digitised) 
sources and the wealth of material culture present at Leiden 
University. It will also look at current heritage practices  
taking place on the Asian continent. Additional events for 
which dates have been set include the seminar 'Reflections on 
India and China' in April, to be convened by IIAS visiting pro-
fessor Pralay Kanungo, who currently holds the Indian Council 
for Cultural Relations Chair for the Study of Contemporary 
India at IIAS/LIAS (Leiden University Institute for Area Studies); 
and an afternoon meeting in Leiden, on 12 October, to intro-
duce the academic community to the biennial International 
Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS; co-organised by IIAS), 
whose 11th edition will potentially be organised in Leiden  
in the summer of 2019 (ICAS 10 will take place in Chiang Mai, 
Thailand, from 20-23 July 2016; www.icas.asia). Plans for other 
activities are still being developed, and will possibly include  
a Winter School for PhD students about food and food waste  
in Asia, to be organised together with Leiden University.
The full-day Grand Opening of The Asian Library is 
scheduled for 14 September 2017. Different events are being 
organised for the week of 11 to 17 September. These include  
a ‘Mapping Asia’ exhibition, an international symposium  
on the history of cartography featuring old Asian maps,  
a symposium and exhibition on Asian cuisine and culinary 
activities, smaller pop-up exhibitions and a range of lectures. 
The film hall of The Asian Library will be used for showing 
short films during the CinemAsia Film Festival.
The considerable efforts involved in the construction of  
the Asian Library demonstrate how a focus on Asia, going back 
to almost the beginning of the University in 1575, is as alive 
today as it ever was. Dutch trading endeavours in the East from 
the beginning of the 17th century, fortunately, went hand 
in hand with scientific explorations of Asia’s rich biodiversity 
driven by the Hortus botanicus Leiden, and later with the 
systematical study of Asian cultures and societies. Today, this  
is reflected by the many collections from Asia, including unique 
manuscripts, rare printed books, letters and other archival 
materials, as well as by a  strong focus on Asia in research and 
education, not only in the Humanities with its renowned Asian 
language and cultures programmes, but also in such areas 
as Law and the (Social) Sciences. Significantly, Leiden is, in 
addition to IIAS, home to a number of other institutes focusing 
on Asia, including the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast 
Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV), the National Museum  
of Ethnology, and the Siebold Japan Museum.
The mind envisioned through creativity: Chinese outsider art at the Outsider Art Museum
24 November 2016 - 5 June 2017
Outsider Art Museum (OAM), located in the  
Hermitage Amsterdam. OAM is run by The Dolhuys, 
Museum of the Mind, situated in Haarlem,  
a mere 15 minutes from downtown Amsterdam  
www.outsiderartmuseum.nl; www.hetdolhuys.nl
RECENTLY THE FIRST OUTSIDER ART MUSEUM (OAM) in the 
Netherlands opened its doors in the Hermitage Amsterdam. 
This museum shows leading art works by outsider artists  
from all over the world. Finally there is a permanent  podium 
for ‘invisible’ artists who are not represented in the art world 
and who create works by following their inner voice. 
Creativity is at the core of the Outsider Art Museum. 
When entering the Outsider Art Museum in the Hermitage 
Amsterdam one is welcomed by art that looks different than 
anything  you encounter in other galleries or museums. Bright 
colors, edge-to-edge filled drawings and three-dimensional 
fantasy figures. Passionate and unique expressions give way  
to the artists’ inner world; their dreams, fears, fascinations  
and preferences are on display. Looking at the paintings we  
can see a glimpse of the soul of the artist. Although this is  
the case for many artists, the fact that these creators do not 
follow the conformist art rules, gives them free rein.   
Notable are the similar themes that emerge in outsider  
art, regardless of geography and cultural backgrounds. 
Dreams, fears, nightmares, religion as hope, overwhelming 
forces and systems with which the artists try to make sense  
of the world around them, can be detected. Are they in  
contact with each other? Do they know each other’s work?  
Not at all. They follow their inner voice, and remarkably  
use a similar expressive language. 
Chinese outsider art
This fall the OAM is participating in the first Sino-Dutch 
exchange exhibition of outsider art. This extraordinary  
exhibition features multiple artworks by Chinese outsider 
artists, as well as new pieces from the Dutch outsider art 
collection. The audience will have the unique opportunity 
to compare and admire outsider art from these two very 
different countries. 
This international exchange is a joint project of The 
Dolhuys and the Chinese Federation for Disabled People,  
with Guo Haiping as curator for the Chinese artwork.  
Guo Haiping strives to raise awareness and interest for the 
outsider art genre in China. This awareness is giving a voice  
to a group of people struggling to find their place in society. 
The artwork being displayed in the Outsider Art Museum  
is of great significance for both artists and their families,  
as well as a sign of recognition of their work in the inter-
national art world. 
Hans Looijen, director of The Dolhuys,  
Museum of the Mind & Outsider Art Museum
IIAS lecture in the museum
Prof. Jeroen de Kloet, Director of the Amsterdam Centre  
for Globalisation Studies, University of Amsterdam
(http://jeroendekloet.nl) will host a lecture at the Outsider 
Art Museum in the context of this exhibition, in January  
2017. The exact date will be made available soon.  
Please contact Heleen van der Minne at 
h.m.van.der.minne@iias.nl for more information,  
or if you would like to attend this lecture 
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Thanks to four years of EU-funded research exchanges in combination 
with a series of supporting activities, the Urban Knowledge Network Asia 
(UKNA) has developed into one of the most significant and dynamic urban 
research networks in the world to focus on Asian cities. Growing from 
its core membership in China, India, Western Europe and the USA, UKNA 
now includes additional partners in Southeast Asia and ‘Greater China’. 
Hopefully, a number of other universities in Northeast Asia and Southeast 
Asia will be able to join the UKNA network in the near future as well.
Gien San Tan, IIAS/UKNA
Human flourishing in Asian cities
Consisting of over 100 researchers with affiliations at  
17 institutes in Europe, China, India and the United States,  
the Urban Knowledge Network Asia (UKNA) represents  
the largest global academic network on Asian cities. UKNA’s 
objective is to nurture contextualised and policy relevant 
knowledge on Asian cities, seeking to influence policy by 
contributing insights that put people at the centre of urban 
governance and development strategies.
UKNA’s common vision provides the overarching 
framework for the network’s activities and planned research 
outputs. It represents the common ground for all partners 
in the diverse network, encompassing scholars in the social 
scientists, humanities, the natural sciences and the arts, 
across 3 continents. The key message of the common vision 
is that UKNA focuses on ‘human flourishing and the creative 
production of urban space’ in Asian cities. The justification  
for this focus is the realization that most other urban  
research projects are preoccupied with macro-level topics 
such as urban infrastructure, architecture and/or the natural 
environment; human beings appear to be missing in these 
schemes. The UKNA partners saw an urgent need to bring  
the well-being (‘flourishing’) of human beings (whether  
urban residents, migrants, and/or citizens) back into the urban 
research and policy focus. The vision emphasizes ‘immediate 
problem solving as well as the identification of long-term, 
transformative processes that increase the scope for the 
active engagement of people in the creative production and 
shaping of the City’.
Four years of staff exchanges
On 31 March 2016, our Marie Curie Actions/IRSES funding 
(2012-2016) from the European Union came to an end. We can 
look back on a very successful first four years. Thanks to EU 
research mobility support, 146 UKNA scholars and practi-
tioners were able to carry out 206 research exchanges at 12 
different UKNA partner institutes. These research exchanges 
have succeeded in bringing the network partners closer 
together, around collaborative research initiatives, roundtable 
and seminar activities on a variety of urban topics in East and 
South Asia, with comparative cases from European cities. 
Publications 
Editors from across the UKNA network are currently busy 
submitting for peer review three edited volumes for publica-
tion in the ‘Asian Cities’ book series of Amsterdam University 
DO YOU LIVE IN AN ASIAN CITY? If yes, then how would  
you describe it? Is it a Mega City? Smart City? Eco City?  
Is it Resilient? Flourishing? Progressive? Is it a Metropolis  
or a Globopolis? Do all the adjectives above sound similar  
to you? Rest assured they are not! Important criteria separate 
the definitions – and lived realities – of one from the other. 
Curious about those criteria? Then the person you must meet 
is Prof. Mike Douglass - who has been engaged with both  
the theory and practice of urban planning in Asia for more 
than four decades.  
Mike Douglass is Professor and Leader of the Asian 
Urbanisms Cluster at the Asia Research Institute (one of  
UKNA’s partner institutes), and Professor at the Lee Kuan  
Yew School of Public Policy (National University of Singapore).  
He was recently in Leiden to give a lecture at the International 
Institute for Asian Studies. 
In his insightful lecture, Douglass emphasized that it  
is no longer enough, or even advisable, for Asian cities of 
the 21st century to be ‘mega’ – what they need instead is 
‘resilience’ to tackle the onslaughts of climate change, and 
the understanding to put ‘human flourishing’ at the heart  
of the urbanization enterprise. 
One of the biggest challenges facing Asian cities today  
is natural disasters like flooding and earthquakes – and  
their management. It is even more challenging when it is 
a ‘compound disaster’; an example would be Japan in 2011 
where an earthquake led to a tsunami, which in turn led  
to a nuclear disaster with long-term devastations. What is 
most crucial to prevent such tragedies from happening is 
‘disaster preparedness’, but unfortunately most Asian cities 
(including Jakarta, Manila, Hong-Kong, Shanghai, Beijing, 
Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Dhaka and Karachi) are ‘critically 
unprepared’ in this respect.       
Whenever we talk of a 21st century city, the vision that  
is usually conjured up is that of Skyscrapers and New Towns, 
Malls and Superhighways, with some ‘Mega-project’ or other 
always under construction. In effect, what they have led to 
is the corporatization of cities; and that, in turn, has resulted 
in increasing disparities in well-being among citizens and 
decreasing participatory governance. It has also led to the 
disappearance of the ‘city’ as we know it. As Saskia Sassen 
rightly pointed out in her 2015 Guardian article, ‘Who owns 
our cities’: “We are witnessing large scale corporate buying  
of whole pieces of cities. [...] They raise the density of the  
city, but they actually de-urbanise it – density is not enough  
to have a city. If the current large-scale buying continues,  
we will lose this type of city making that has given our cities 
their cosmopolitanism. One that alters the historic meaning 
of the city. Such a transformation has deep and significant 
implications for equity, democracy and rights.” 
There’s no gainsaying the fact that there has been a 
concerted effort in the last few decades in many Asian cities 
towards sustainable development. Hence the recent vogue  
of ‘Eco Cities’ and ‘Smart Cities’ – the former aiming to live  
in harmony with, and without damaging the environment; 
and the latter being basically ‘wired’ cities, seeking to  
address public issues via ICT-based solutions. The noble  
intentions notwithstanding, what is missing in the whole 
enterprise - according to Douglass - is conviviality. Smart 
Cities are smart and efficient (at least in theory), but they  
are also automated and anonymous. They lack a sense  
of community – which is a basic human need. “In human 
happiness”, as Lisa Peattie reminds us, “creative activity  
and a sense of community count for at least as much and 
maybe more than material standard of living.” What is thus 
required is the conception of cities as Convivial Spaces – 
surrounded by human scale architecture, with open public 
spaces, making use of local cultural practice and with scope 
for vernacular place-making, that is inclusive and allows  
for spontaneity. 
In short, Douglass thinks that the need of the hour is 
a different model: not merely ‘Sustainable’, but ‘Livable’, 
‘Progressive’ cities – whose hallmarks (apart from conviviality) 
are inclusion and justice; and which have ‘Human Flourishing’ 
(rather than ‘Economic Growth’) as their core objective.  
In order to achieve this, Douglass is emphatic that Asian  
cities should NOT follow the UN 
‘Sustainable Development’ model,  
where Economy, Environment and 
Society are separate entities that 
intersect at only one point; instead,  
what should be nurtured is a more  
holistic approach, where the Economy  
is seen as embedded in Society, and 
human Society is seen as an organic  
part of Nature. 
UKNA and the bridging of theory  
and practice
Many of the problems of urbanization 
in Asia actually stem from the fact that 
there is a huge gap between theory  
and practice when it comes to urban 
planning. And it is precisely in this  
respect that Prof. Douglass considers  
the work of UKNA to be very important  
– as it is an inclusive network that  
brings together both scholars and 
practitioners in collaborative research on cities in Asia.
In his words: “There are not many places like it. Inter-
disciplinary, for one thing. It takes on contemporary issues,  
not just historical and others. Then there are many, like  
Paul himself [Paul Rabe, Co-ordinator of UKNA], who like  
‘practice’. So, it’s unique. And it’s providing a realm that  
no other institution is filling. If I look, for example… most  
Area Studies, if it is in India, it’s about India; if it’s in China,  
it’s about China. So, they are all very regionally restricted.  
They are often just pure Humanities, or Social Sciences,  
and don’t get into any kind of real role actually. And they  
are not trying to build institutions in other parts of the world. 
Like UKNA, with double Masters Degrees. So, I think it really 
needs support. And it’s unfortunate that all of the indicators 
have to be quantitative. Because its imprint is much more  
vast. It is a good idea.” 
Press/IIAS. The three volumes – entitled “Ideas of the City in 
Asia”, “Cities by and for the People” and “Future Challenges 
of Cities in Asia” – contain the work of many researchers who 
have taken part in the UKNA research staff exchange scheme 
during the past four years, as well as that of selected external 
scholars.
Upcoming events
UKNA’s annual roundtable will take place this year in Delhi, 
from 16-20 December. UKNA partners Ambedkar University 
Delhi (AUD), the Jawaharlal Nehru University Institute of 
Advanced Study and the International Institute for Asian 
Studies (IIAS) will jointly organize two exciting events in  
Delhi on the theme of “heritage and infrastructure in the 
city”. The theme focuses on unpacking the city of Delhi 
through layers of lived history and heritage, urban infra-
structure, ecological landscapes and architectural histories. 
The first activity is a roundtable on “Urban heritage  
and a decentralized city museum” (16-17 December).  
The second activity is a seminar on “Basic urban services in  
Delhi: citizens, state/policy and politics” (19-20 December).  
In between the two activities, there will be a guided excursion 
to the Delhi neighbourhood of Mehrauli, including a visit to 
its archaeological park and to a new pop-up museum. The 
multi-disciplinary nature of the Delhi event and the inter-
active discussion format of both activities characterizes the 
approach of UKNA and IIAS towards the study of Asian cities. 
Moving forward
Even now that the IRSES research exchange funding has 
ended, the UKNA network will continue. The number of 
institutional partners in the network continues to grow,  
as does the number of institutions (both academic and non-
academic) and scholars who seek to collaborate with UKNA. 
Our ambition remains to be an inclusive network that brings 
together concerned scholars and practitioners engaged in 
collaborative research on cities in Asia. Our network continues 
to influence policy by contributing insights that put people at 
the centre of urban governance and development strategies, 
with “human flourishing in Asian cities” as our vision.
We will keep you informed about further developments 
and activities through the Newsletter and via updates  
on the UKNA website (www.ukna.asia).
Mike Douglass and UKNA: Envisioning human flourishing in resilient Asian cities
Rituparna Roy
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Membership:
Association for Asian Studies
Community
 Fellowship and intellectual exchange with your peers
 Stay current on the latest research and methodology
Privileges
 Eligibility for grant programs and book subventions     
 Special rates on all AAS publications, i.e. Education About Asia
 Reduced Annual Conference registration fee
 Complimentary annual subscriptions to the print and online 
 Journal of Asian Studies and the online Asian Studies E-Newsletter
networking
 Connect with 7,000 scholars across all disciplines
exClusive online Benefits
 Search and contact current members in the AAS    
  Member Directory
 View articles in the Journal of Asian Studies  
  since 1941
 Access job listings
Attend the 2017 AAS Annual Conference!
March 16-19, 2017
Toronto, Canada
For details, visit 
www.asian-studies.org/Conferences/AAS
JOIN TODAY!
www.asian-studies.org
Located in the U.S., the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) is a scholarly, non-political, non-profit professional association 
is open to all persons interested in Asia and the study of Asia. The AAS has approximately 7,000 members worldwide, 
representing all the regions and countries of Asia and all academic disciplines. The AAS provides its members with a unique 
and invaluable professional network through its publications, online resources, regional conferences, and annual conference.
KEY ISSUES IN ASIAN STUDIES books provide an introduction to major cultural and historical 
themes. They are perfect for classroom use or for anyone with an interest in Asia. The Association for 
Asian Studies (AAS), Inc. publishes 2–3 books each year. For a full list and description of titles, please 
visit the AAS website at www.asian-studies.org/publications.
EDUCATION ABOUT ASIA is a unique and innovative magazine published in 
June, October and December. It serves as a practical teaching resource for educators 
and an invaluable source of information for anyone interested in the study of Asia.  
ThemaTic issues on Topics of parTicular inTeresT include:  Marriage and Family in Asia, 
Islam in Asia, Youth Culture, Religion in Asia,, Economics and Business in Asia, Visual 
and Performing Arts, Asia in World History (special series)
Subscribe to the print edition today! www.asian-studies.org/EAA
Online open public access to all EAA issues since 1996.
Publications: 
Annual Conference:
Journal of Current Southeast 
Asian Affairs 
 Key research and professional analyses on current political, economic, and social affairs in Southeast 
Asia 
 International editorial board, double-blind peer-reviewed and high-quality articles, and listings in major 
indexes 
 Three issues annually  
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2016) includes 
Special Section “30 Years Đổi Mới” / Research Articles  
      Adam Fforde 
Vietnam: Economic Strategy and Economic Reality 
      Hai Hong Nguyen 
Resilience of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Authoritarian Regime since Đổi Mới 
      Jörg Wischermann, Bui The Cuong, and Dang Thi Viet Phuong 
Vietnamese Civic Organisations: Supporters of or Obstacles to Further Democratisation? Results 
from an Empirical Survey 
      Thiem Hai Bui 
The Influence of Social Media in Vietnam’s Elite Politics 
 
      Pinn Siraprapasiri and Chanintira na Thalang 
Towards the ASEAN Community: Assessing the Knowledge, Attitudes, and Aspirations of Thai 
University Students 
 
Please visit <www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org>.  
The Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs is open access; all articles are immediately available online, 
full-text and free of charge. The journal also exists in classic print format and can be subscribed to. It is 
part of the GIGA Journal Family. For more information see: <www.giga-journal-family.org>.  
 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies 
Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien 
Institute of Asian Studies 
 
Rothenbaumchaussee 32    20148 Hamburg    
Germany 
Phone: +49 40 428874-0    Fax: +49 40 4107945 
E-mail:<ias@giga-hamburg.de> 
Homepage: <www.giga-hamburg.de/ias> 
Ask for your personal sample copy.            
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IIAS Announcements
Dynamic borderlands: livelihoods, communities & flows
5th Conference of the Asian Borderlands Research Network
12-14 December 2016; Kathmandu, Nepal 
THE 5TH ASIAN BORDERLANDS CONFERENCE in Kathmandu, Nepal, from 12-14 December 2016, is organised by Social Science Baha,  
the Asian Borderlands Research Network (ABRN) and the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS).
Placing special emphasis on borders and cross-border flows of people and objects that have not been highlighted in previous conferences,  
conference panels will address questions such as: What new borderland flows, corridors and paths are (or have been) taking shape, and what  
impacts do they have on livelihoods and communities; How can we use these Asian cases to rethink social theories of various kinds?
Anyone interested in the theme is welcome to attend. Registration is required. 
Information and registration:  
www.asianborderlands.net
Call for applications 
‘Weaving Knowledge’: 
Summer School on  
Lanna weaving & dyeing 
6-23 July 2017; Chiang Mai, Thailand
Sponsored by the Center for Science & Society,  
Columbia University (USA), Chiang Mai University, IIAS,  
and the Dorothy Borg Foundation.
Co-convenors: Nussara Tiengkate,  
Pamela H. Smith, Annapurna Mamidipudi
THIS TWO-WEEK WORKSHOP aims to engage both the theory 
and practice of craft knowledge by requiring participants to 
learn the Lanna techniques of weaving alongside expert weavers, 
while engaging with the scholarly challenge of making embod-
ied craft knowledge explicit. As the students are trained in crafts 
by practitioners in a weaving workshop near Chiang Mai, they 
will discuss concepts such as tacit expertise and technological  
literacy, pedagogy in sensory and material knowledge, inno-
vation and sustainability in traditional technological cultures, 
with the practitioners, as well as invited scholars and activists 
in history, anthropology, and sociology from around the world. 
Set in the rural environment around Chiang Mai, this workshop 
will bring together three conveners: one historian of science 
and technology, one weaving/craft expert, and one scholar of 
development practice in craft, to guide the group of doctoral 
candidates in reflexive practice – both of weaving and writing.
For more information,  
see http://iias.asia/summerschool2017
Vietnam & Korea as 
‘longue durée’ subject 
of comparison: from 
the pre-modern to the 
early modern periods
Conference, 3-4 March 2017; Hanoi, Vietnam
THIS CONFERENCE is the first of a two-part conference  
“In comparison: Korea and Vietnam in history”, an initiative 
directed by IIAS, and jointly organized by Seoul National 
University, Asia Centre (Seoul), Vietnam National University 
(Hanoi), International Institute for Asian Studies (Leiden), 
Leiden University (Leiden) and École des Hautes Études en 
Sciences Sociales (Paris). The second part, focusing on the 
contemporary Korean and Vietnamese conditions from  
1945 onward, will be held in Korea in the following year. 
“Vietnam and Korea as ‘longue durée’” will focus on these 
two major regional nations and societies in Asia; as great 
kingdoms in the pre-modern period they developed, some- 
times within and sometimes outside of the Sinitic ‘tributary’ 
system, strong political organizations and original civilizations. 
The vicissitudes of the modern and contemporary periods,  
first with the experience of colonial subjugation, then inter-
national warfare and civil conflicts resulting in division of the  
two countries set much connections and parallels in the two 
countries’ trajectories. Today, Vietnam and Korea continue  
to stand at the edge of the two great ideological systems that 
shaped the twentieth century, socialism and capitalism, yet  
in a divergent ways – Vietnam being reunified and having 
entered post-communist-pro-capitalist State authoritarianism 
while Korea remains divided between two models of state- 
hood and governance.
This conference is conceived as an exploratory exercise  
to identify points of connections in which scholars of  
Vietnam and Korea could confront their work and engage 
their paradigms. As an ongoing project historically grounded 
in contemporary perspective situated within the larger  
Asia-global spectrum, as well as for practical sake, the  
conference will focus on two conventionally agreed historio-
graphies of the countries: their ‘pre-modern’ and ‘colonial’ 
periods. An underlying question the conference aims to  
address is how the Korean and Vietnamese states and their 
civil societies, concepts that shaped during the tributary 
system, became formulated during the modernisation period.
Info and registration: www.iias.asia/vietnamkorea
Proposals are no longer being accepted for the conference.
International MA Double 
Degree ‘Critical Heritage 
Studies of Asia & Europe’
IN MARCH AND APRIL THIS YEAR, the final official documents 
were signed for the establishment of an international Double 
Degree MA programme in ‘Critical Heritage Studies of Asia and 
Europe’. Initiated by IIAS and built upon a series of workshops 
and conferences organised since 2010, this Double Degree  
programme involves the Leiden University Institute for Area 
Studies, the Department of Anthropology of the College of 
Liberal Arts (National Taiwan University), the Graduate Institute 
of Building and Planning, College of Engineering (National  
Taiwan University), and the Graduate School of International 
Studies (Yonsei University, South Korea).
Concretely, the Double Degree programme consists of an 
independent one-year MA course at Leiden University, which, 
upon completion, is recognised as part of an independent 
two-year MA programme at one of the Asian partner universities. 
In this way, students from National Taiwan University and Yonsei 
University can spend the second year of their two to three year 
MA studies at Leiden University. Vice versa, graduates of the 
Leiden University MA programme can choose to do a conse-
cutive second year of heritage studies at one of the three  
partner institutions in Asia. Upon successful completion of the 
Double Degree programme, students will have obtained two 
separate MA degrees, one from their home university and one 
from the partner institution, and a certificate for the Double 
Degree in Critical Heritage Studies of Asia and Europe, issued  
by the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS).
The institutions involved in the Double Degree programme 
consider Asia as a fertile source of both theoretical and meth-
odological insights in the highly contested area of heritage. 
Since colonial times, European-based concepts and technical 
approaches to conservation have dominated the understanding 
of heritage in Asia, in most cases through the top-down 
imposition of ideas and processes. It is this hegemonic discourse, 
usually promoted by developmentalist states in Asia and 
elsewhere, as well as various processes of indigenous response, 
that the Double Degree programme intends to highlight. The 
programme focuses in particular on the politics of heritage and 
the questions of its legitimacy. Who controls heritage? What 
is the role of heritage in the constructed narratives of national-
ism? How is heritage being used as a cultural practice to shape 
the discourses on nation-building and nation-branding?
The courses will prepare students to work in academic 
research, spatial planning, museum management, tourism 
industries, and heritage conservation across Europe and  
Asia. Students will study heritage as a means of rethinking 
relations between Asia and Europe in terms of mutual  
respect and exchange.
The Double Degree is an initiative of the International 
Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) at Leiden University, which  
for some years has been promoting the field of critical heritage 
studies through courses, workshops, conferences, and publi-
cations. It also forms part of the wider ambition of IIAS to  
spread the production of knowledge about Asia by establishing  
a platform for continuing dialogues between universities  
located in Asia and beyond.
For further information, please contact: 
Dr Elena Paskaleva, IIAS, Leiden (e.g.paskaleva@hum.leiden.nl).
Dr Jin-Fu Liu, Department of Anthropology of the College of 
Liberal Arts, National Taiwan University (anthro@ntu.edu.tw).
Prof. Liling Huang, Graduate Institute of Building and 
Planning, College of Engineering, National Taiwan University 
(liling@ntu.edu.tw).
Dr Kim Souk Woo, Graduate School of International Studies, 
Yonsei University, South Korea (sassy@yonsei.ac.kr).
IIAS Annual Lecture 2016
with Peter Frankopan
After the Silk Roads: Asia, Europe, and the Discovery of the Americas
Thursday, 8 December 2016, 4pm
Leiden University Academy Building, Leiden, the Netherlands
HISTORIAN DR PETER FRANKOPAN is Senior Research Fellow at Worcester  
College (University of Oxford) and Director of the Oxford Centre for Byzantine 
Research. He works on the history of the Mediterranean, Russia, the Middle East, 
Persia, Central Asia and beyond, and on relations between Christianity and Islam.  
He also specializes in medieval Greek literature, and translated The Alexiad for 
Penguin Classics (2009). Following his much acclaimed book The First Crusade:  
The Call from the East (2012), he published The Silk Roads: A New History of the  
World in 2015, which was The Daily Telegraph’s History Book of the Year 2015,  
and in July 2016, the paperback topped the Sunday Times Non-Fiction charts.  
The British historian William Dalrymple described the book as a “historical epic  
of dazzling range, ambition and achievement” (Observer). 
For the 2016 IIAS Annual Lecture, Peter Frankopan will discuss the  
fascinating history of the relations between Europe and Asia after the  
demise of the Silk Roads and following the European discovery of the Americas.  
The discovery of the maritime routes between Western Europe and Asia have  
often been described as the main contributing factor to the end of the Silk Roads 
and the cause of a drastically changed relationship between Asia and Europe. 
However, at the time that the first Portuguese and Spanish sailors set foot in  
South and Southeast Asia, they also discovered the enormous mineral wealth  
of the Americas. This development not only had a disastrous influence on local 
societies and cultures in the Americas, but also enriched the colonial Spanish  
and Portuguese empires and enabled them to expand their influence and  
maritime trade across large swaths of Asia. It provided the wealth to buy  
local products much in demand in Europe, thereby also affecting the local  
economies of South, Southeast and East Asia.  
Registration is required.  
Please register by webform at www.iias.nl/frankopan. 
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IIAS Research and Projects
IIAS research and other initiatives are carried out within a number of thematic clusters in phase with contemporary  
Asian currents – all built around the notion of social agency. The aim of this approach is to cultivate synergies and  
coherence between people and projects. IIAS also welcomes research for the open cluster, so as not to exclude  
potentially significant and interesting topics. Visit www.iias.nl for more information.
Asian Cities Asian HeritagesGlobal Asia
WITH A SPECIAL EYE on contemporary developments,  
the Asian Cities cluster aims to explore the longstanding  
Asian urban “tradition”, by exploring the origins of  
urbanism and urban culture in different parts of Asia  
and linking the various elements of city cultures and 
societies, from ancient to modern (colonial and  
post-colonial) times. Through an international  
knowledge-network of experts, cities and research  
institutes it seeks to encourage social scientists and  
scholars in the humanities to interact with contemporary 
actors including artists, activists, planners and architects, 
educators, and policy makers. By bringing together  
science and practice, IIAS aims to create a platform for 
scholars and urban practitioners focusing on Asian cities  
‘in context’ and beyond traditional western norms  
of knowledge.
Urban Knowledge Network Asia (UKNA)
Consisting of over 100 researchers with affiliations at  
17 institutes in Europe, China, India and the United States,  
the Urban Knowledge Network Asia (UKNA) represents  
the largest global academic network on Asian cities.  
UKNA’s objective is to nurture contextualised and policy-
relevant knowledge on Asian cities, seeking to influence 
policy by contributing insights that put people at the  
centre of urban governance and development strategies.  
Between April 2012 and April 2016, the staff exchanges  
within the UKNA network were funded by a grant awarded  
by the EU. The success of the UKNA synergy has encouraged 
the network’s partners to carry on with their joint effort  
and plans are underway to expand the network and  
broaden its research agenda. See page 48 of this issue  
of The Newsletter for more information.
Coordinator: Paul Rabé (p.e.rabe@iias.nl) 
Website: www.ukna.asia
THE ASIAN HERITAGES CLUSTER focuses on the uses of  
culture and cultural heritage practices in Asia. It addresses  
the variety of definitions associated with heritage and  
their implications for social agency. In particular, it explores 
the notion of heritage as it evolved from an originally 
European concept primarily associated with architecture  
and monumental archaeology to incorporate a broader  
diversity of cultural forms and values. This includes the 
contested assertions of ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ heritages, 
and the importance of cultural heritage in defining one’s  
own identity or identities vis-à-vis those of others. It aims  
to engage with the concepts of ‘authenticity’, ‘national 
heritage’ and ‘shared heritage’ and issues pertaining to  
the political economy of heritage. Attention is also given  
to the dangers of commodification of perceived endangered 
local cultures/heritages, languages, religious practices,  
crafts and art forms, as well as material vernacular heritage.
International Graduate Double Degree Programme  
in Critical Heritage Studies
Over the last few years, IIAS has been intensively engaged 
with the Leiden University Institute for Area Studies (LIAS) and 
targeted Asian partners, in the development of an international 
Double Degree programme for graduate students in the field of 
‘Critical Heritage Studies of Asia and Europe’. To date, the Asian 
partners involved have been two departments of National 
Taiwan University and one department of Yonsei University 
in South Korea; contacts with other possible Asian partner 
institutes are being explored. The programme offers selected 
students the opportunity to follow a full year study at one of 
the partner institutes with full credits and a double degree. The 
curriculum at Leiden University is supported by the IIAS Asian 
Heritages research cluster and benefits from the contributions  
of Prof Michael Herzfeld (Harvard) as a guest teacher and the 
Senior Advisor to the Critical Heritage Studies Initiative of IIAS.  
Contact: Elena Paskaleva (e.g.paskaleva@hum.leidenuniv.nl) 
or Willem Vogelsang  (w.j.vogelsang@iias.nl)
Website: www.iias.nl/critical-heritage-studies
Indian Medical Heritage Research Network
The Indian Medical Heritage Research Network wants to 
stimulate social-cultural and social-historical research on 
Indian medical traditions such as Ayurveda, Unanitibb, Siddha, 
Yoga and Sowa Rigpa. Of special interest is the integration of 
Indian medicine in Indian public health and its role as second 
resort for middle class Indians and Europeans. The network 
offers a virtual space on Facebook (www.facebook.com/
IndianMedicalHeritage) for collating research findings and 
other information about India’s medical heritage covering 
diverse perspectives, interests and backgrounds. 
Website: www.iias.nl/indianmedicine 
Coordinator: Maarten Bode (m.bode@uva.nl) 
THE GLOBAL ASIA CLUSTER addresses contemporary issues related to  
trans-national interactions within the Asian region as well as Asia’s projection  
into the world, through the movement of goods, people, ideas, knowledge, 
ideologies and so forth. Past and present trends are addressed. The cluster aims 
to expand the understanding of the processes of globalisation by considering  
the various ways Asian and other world regions are interconnected within  
a long-term historical framework. Acknowledging the central role of Asia  
as an agent of global transformations, it challenges western perspectives that 
underlie much of the current literature on the subject and explores new forms  
of non-hegemonic intellectual interactions in the form of ‘south-south-north’  
and ‘east-west’ dialogue models. In principle, any research dealing with  
Asian global interactions is of interest. 
Asian Borderlands Research Network (www.asianborderlands.net)
The Asian Borderlands Research Network focuses particularly on the border  
regions between South Asia, Central/East and Southeast Asia. The concerns  
of the ABRN are varied, ranging from migratory movements, transformations 
in cultural, linguistic and religious practices, to ethnic mobilization and conflict, 
marginalisation, and environmental concerns. The ABRN organises a conference  
in one of these border regions every two years in co-operation with a local  
partner. Next conference: Dynamic Borderlands: Livelihoods, Communities  
and Flows; Kathmandu, Nepal, 12-14 December 2016.
Coordinator: Eric de Maaker (maaker@fsw.leidenuniv.nl)
Energy Programme Asia (EPA)
The EPA-research programme is designed to study the effects of global  
geopolitics of energy security on the one hand, and policy to increase energy 
efficiency and estimating the prospects for the exploitation of renewable  
energy resources on the other. EPA’s current and second joint comparative  
research programme with the Institute of West Asian and African Studies  
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is entitled The Transnationalization  
of China’s Oil Industry: company strategies, embedded projects, and relations  
with institutions and stakeholders in resource-rich countries (2013-2017).  
Involving various Chinese and Dutch research institutes, this programme  
will analyse China’s increasing involvement with governments, local institutions 
and local stakeholders in the energy sectors of a number of resource-rich countries 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America, notably Sudan, Ghana, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, 
Venezuela, and Brazil. It seeks to determine patterns of interaction between 
national institutions and Chinese companies, their relationships to foreign  
investment projects, and the extent to which they are embedded in the local  
economies. This programme is sponsored by the Royal Netherlands Academy  
of Arts and Social Sciences (KNAW), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences  
(CASS) and IIAS. 
Coordinators: M. Amineh, Programme Director EPA-IIAS  
(m.p.amineh@uva.nl or m.p.amineh@iias.nl),  
Y. Guang, Progamme Director EPA-IWAAS/CASS 
Website: www.iias.nl/research/energy-programme-asia-epa
IIAS Centre for Regulation and Governance 
The IIAS Centre for Regulation and Governance in Asia, is engaged in innovative  
and comparative research on theories and practices – focusing on emerging 
markets of Asia. Its multi-disciplinary research undertakings combine approaches 
from political economy, law, public administration, criminology, and sociology  
in the comparative analysis of regulatory issues in Asia and in developing theories  
of governance pertinent to Asian realities.
Coordinator: Tak-Wing Ngo
Asian Studies in Africa 
Since 2010, IIAS and other partners from Africa, Asia and the USA have been  
working on an initiative to promote the study of and teaching on Asia at African  
universities and, equally, to promote African Studies in Asia. The initiative  
constitutes a first attempt to sustain a humanities-informed South-South  
knowledge platform with connections between other academic centers  
in Europe and North America, but also Latin-America and Oceania.
In 2012, a roundtable in Chisamba, Zambia, led to the establishment  
of the pan-African ‘Association of Asian Studies in Africa’ (A-ASIA). A-ASIA’s  
development is headed by a steering committee of scholars, mainly from Africa  
and Asia. In September 2015, A-ASIA held its three-day inaugural conference,  
in Accra, Ghana, called ‘AFRICA-ASIA: A New Axis of Knowledge’. It was the  
first conference held in Africa to bring together a multidisciplinary ensemble  
of scholars and institutions from the continent and the rest of the world with  
a shared focus on Asia and Asia-Africa intellectual interactions.
Website: www.africas.asia
Humanities across Borders: Asia and Africa in the World 
A four year programme supported by The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) at Leiden University has recently been awarded a four-year grant by  
The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, New York, to facilitate a collaborative platform of over twenty Asian, African, European and 
North American universities and their local social and cultural partners, for the co-creation of a new humanistic pedagogical model. 
This follows the successful completion in 2016 of a three-year project (Rethinking Asian Studies in a Global Context), supported by  
the same foundation, to rethink the scholarly practice of area (Asia) studies in today’s global postcolonial context. IIAS is grateful  
to the Mellon Foundation and Leiden University for their continuing support. 
The new programme titled ‘Humanities across Borders: Asia and Africa in the World’ calls for expanding the scope of the  
humanities by mobilizing knowledge-practices that have largely remained unrepresented in contemporary academia. It will  
connect a global network of individuals and institutions capable of garnering such knowledge in Asia and Africa in order to develop 
alternative pedagogies for teaching, research, and dissemination across disciplinary, national, and institutional borders. The aim  
is to contribute to the realignment of the social role and mission of institutions of higher learning with regard to the humanistic 
values that inspired their establishment in the first place. 
The objectives of this four-year initiative are: (1) The establishment of a trans-regional consortium of scholars, educators, and 
institutions committed to innovations in research and education; (2) methodological interventions through a focus on key sites 
of knowledge-practices in four regions – Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Asia, and West Africa – to benefit from their compara-
tive potential; (3) the encouragement of university-society linkages and, when possible, their institutionalization in the form of 
trans-disciplinary centres for testing curricula and pedagogies in partner institutions; (4) the development of a curricular matrix 
responsive to forms of humanistic knowledge-practices across borders. 
Dr Philippe Peycam will direct the overall coordination of this programme, Dr Aarti Kawlra will function as its Academic Director 
and Titia van der Maas will serve as the Programme Coordinator. 
We wish to thank all our partners for agreeing to work together with IIAS under this exciting new initiative and look forward to 
keeping you informed on the progress of this programme through the IIAS Newsletter and website. 
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Along with the research fellows who are attached to one of the IIAS research programmes, the Institute yearly  
hosts a large number of visiting researchers (affiliated fellows) who come to Leiden to work on their own individual 
research project. In addition, IIAS also facilitates the teaching and research by various professorial fellows as part  
of agreements with Dutch universities, foreign ministries and funding organisations.
Mehdi Amineh
Coordinator  
‘Energy Programme Asia (EPA)’
Domestic and geopolitical challenges  
to energy security for China and the  
European Union
1 Sept 2007 – 31 Mar 2017
Alessandro Battistini
The “Nepalese Anonymous”:  
an original(?) commentary to 
Ānandavardhana’s Devīśataka  
(edition and translation)
15 Oct 2016 – 15 Apr 2017
Somdev Vasudeva 
Śobhākara’s Logic of Aesthetics
1 Oct 2016 – 31 Mar 2017
Debjani Bhattacharyya
Hydrologics: Property, law and  
the urbane environment in the  
Bengal Delta
5 Oct 2016 – 31 Mar 2017
Lung-hsing Chu 
Meeting in Nagasaki: Rethinking  
Western Influence on Japanese  
Material Culture in the later Edo Peri
1 Oct 2016 – 31 July 2017
Jatin Dua 
A Sea of Protection: Piracy, Trade,  
and Regulation in the Indian Ocean
1 Oct 2016 – 31 July 2017
Gregory Goulding
The Cold War poetics of Muktibodh:  
a study of Hindi internationalism,  
1943-1964
1 Sept 2016 – 31 July 2017
CURRENT FELLOWS IN THE SPOTLIGHT
Pralay Kanungo
Visiting Professor,  
India Studies Chair (ICCR)
Indian politics
1 Sept 2013 - 30 June 2017
Neena Talwar Kanungo
The arrival of digital democracy in  
India: Social media and political parties
1 July 2016 – 30 June 2017
Adam Knee
Kingdom of the imagination:  
Thailand in world cinema
1 Sept 2016 – 30 June 2017
Mahmood Kooria
Malabar in Zanzibar: Asian-African 
Intersections in the circulation of  
legal texts across the Indian Ocean
1 Sept 2016 – 28 Feb 2017
Radu Leca
Myriad Countries: The Outside  
World on Historical Maps of Japan
1 Oct 2016 – 31 July 2017
Carola Erika Lorea
Folklore, religion and diaspora:  
the migration of oral traditions across  
and beyond the East Bengal border
1 Sept 2016 – 30 June 2017
Giacomo Mantovan
Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora
1 Sept 2016 – 30 June 2017
Sayana Namsaraeva
Nested Subjects on the  
China-Russia-Mongolia border
1 June 2016 – 30 Nov 2016
Steffen Rimner 
Macro-region gone  
missing: the Pacific Rim
WHAT ATTRACTED ME to Leiden University and to IIAS  
were, above all, two major qualities. First, Leiden has shown 
great interest in scholarship on multiple registers of Asia’s 
relations with the wider world. The work of my colleagues 
here explores the local, national, regional and global aspects 
of historical change. Second, Leiden’s commitment to inter- 
disciplinarity is as conspicuous as it is gratifying. The energetic 
pursuit of international history and international relations  
in conjunction is especially close to my heart. 
In Leiden, many understand that one country’s  
perspective just won’t do. The burgeoning international-
ization reflected by IIAS extends beyond its walls. I see it  
also at the Institute of History and the new spate of teachers 
and scholars in International Studies at the campus in  
Den Haag. Little wonder, then, that the Times Higher 
Education ranked Leiden’s Arts and Humanities faculty at  
the top of European continental universities in 2015-16!
Before my arrival from Japan this summer, I was fortunate 
to have received an international education. I took my B.A.  
at the University of Konstanz, continued at Yale University,  
did language studies in China, Taiwan and Japan and received 
my Ph.D. in international history at Harvard University in 
2014. Since then, I have held fellowships at Yale and Oxford 
and taught at Columbia in an appointment at the university’s 
only global teaching program.
At IIAS, I am finishing my first book for Harvard University 
Press. Based on multi-lingual, archival research in eleven 
countries, the book recasts the origins of global drug control 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It ranges 
from the Opium Wars to the League of Nations to explore 
how social, ideological, economic and political forces created 
a global regime of oversight that cut straight into the financial 
interests of all great empires. The results were deep and  
wide-ranging, from transnational movements to multi-
imperial cooperation, the non-governmental foundations  
of global governance, state compliance in international law 
and defining features of international public health crises. 
In my past research and teaching, I have been fascinated 
by the Pacific Rim (or “trans-Pacific” relations) as a largely 
neglected macro-region. Classic world maps bring the  
Atlantic Ocean center stage, whereas the Pacific finds itself 
awkwardly cut in two. Yet, Pearl Harbor is in Hawaii, North 
Korea projects its nuclear power across the Pacific and the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) means what it says. Beyond 
these examples, the Pacific Rim has historically played a critical 
role in international society and global politics throughout  
the nineteenth and twentieth century. Migration, trade,  
ideas, culture and political tensions have “flowed” across 
these waters despite the vast distances involved. Shouldn’t 
we try to understand why?
Along similar lines, my publications include “Beyond  
the Call of Duty: Cosmopolitan Education and the Origins 
of Asian-American Women’s Medicine,” in Asia Pacific in the 
Age of Globalization, a contribution to the Palgrave Macmillan 
Transnational History Series, and an article on the Chinese-
American-Cuban-Peruvian connection in the “coolie trade”,  
to appear in the November issue of the Journal of Global 
History. During my stay at IIAS, I will give talks in Leiden,  
the UK and possibly Japan. 
Leiden’s intellectual vitality, collegiality and open- 
mindedness have made my stay a great pleasure. Beyond  
my stay at IIAS, I do hope to find a job somewhere in the 
world, preferably resonating with the themes outlined above. 
ASC-IIAS Fellowship Programme 
A joint fellowship offered by the African Studies Centre 
and the International Institute for Asian Studies
THIS FELLOWSHIP is intended for researchers specialising in Asian-African interactions. It aims to  
attract researchers whose work is informed by current theoretical debates, in the social sciences 
and humanities, on global connectivities and who are able to critically engage with shifting 
paradigms in ‘area studies’ beyond the ways in which these have traditionally been conceived in 
the West. We are particularly interested in receiving fellowship proposals that go beyond a mere 
analysis of current issues associated with African-Asian comparative economic developments or 
Chinese investments in Africa – although none of these themes, if appraised critically and for their 
societal consequences, will of course be excluded. Our definition of Asia and Africa is broad and 
inclusive, Asia ranging from the Middle-East to the Pacific Coast, and Africa from North-Africa  
to the southern tip of the continent.
Application deadline: 15 March and 15 September each year. 
For more information and application form, go to: www.iias.nl/page/asc-iias-fellowship-programme
Gonda Fellowships for Indologists 
FOR PROMISING YOUNG INDOLOGISTS at the post-doctorate level, it is possible to apply for funding with  
the J. Gonda Foundation, to spend three to six months doing research at IIAS. Please send your application  
to the J. Gonda Foundation by the appropriate deadline below. The J. Gonda Foundation of the Royal  
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) supports the scholarly study of Sanskrit, other Indian  
languages and literature, and Indian cultural history. In addition to enabling Indologists to spend time  
at IIAS, the foundation offers funding for projects or publications in Indology of both researchers  
and scientific publishers, as well as PhD grants. 
Application form: www.knaw.nl/en/awards/subsidies/gonda-fund   
Application deadline: 1 April and 1 October every year
Steffen Rimner
The Asian origins of global drug control
1 July 2016 – 31 May 2017
Bal Gopal Shrestha
Religiosity among the Nepalese Diaspora
1 Jan 2015 – 31 Dec 2017
Sebastian Schwecke
Informal monetary markets
1 Oct 2016 – 31 Jan 2018
Ady van den Stock
‘Wisdom’ as a category of knowledge  
and a marker of cultural identity:  
reinterpretations of Wang Yangming  
in modern China
26 Sep 2016 – 26 July 2017
Emilia Roza Sulek
The ‘caterpillar fungus boom’ and its socio-
economic consequences for Tibetan pastoral 
society in Golok, Qinghai Province, China
1 Aug 2016 – 31 Dec 2016
Mayuke Tanabe
The socio-cultural impact of Japanese- 
Moroccan cooperation in the fishing industry 
1 Jan 2016 – 31 Dec 2016
Yu QIU
Complicit Intimacy: a study of Nigerian- 
Chinese intimate/business partnerships  
in South China
1 July 2016 – 31 Dec 2016
Shu-li WANG
The Politics of China’s cultural heritage  
on display: Yin Xu Archaeological Park  
in the making
1 Sept 2015 – 31 Aug 2017
IIAS Fellowship Programme
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The International Institute for Asian  
Studies (IIAS) in Leiden, the Netherlands, 
invites outstanding researchers to apply 
for a fellowship to work on a relevant  
piece of research in the social sciences  
and humanities.
WE ARE PARTICULARLY interested
in researchers focusing on one of  
the Institute’s three thematic clusters. 
However, some positions will be 
reserved for outstanding projects  
in any area outside of those listed. 
 
Asian Cities  
The Asian Cities cluster explores 
modes of urban development, and 
deals with cities and urban cultures 
with related issues of flows and fluxes, 
ideas and goods, cosmopolitism and 
connectivity at their core, framing  
the existence of vibrant ‘civil societies’ 
and political micro-cultures. Through 
an international knowledge network, 
IIAS aims to create a platform for 
scholars and urban practitioners 
focusing on Asian cities ‘in context’ 
and beyond traditional western norms 
of knowledge. 
Asian Heritages
This cluster focuses on the politics  
of culture and cultural heritages  
in Asia. It addresses a variety of  
definitions associated with cultural 
heritage and their implications  
for social agency. In general, the 
cluster engages with a broad range  
of concepts and issues related to 
culture and cultural heritage, and 
their importance in defining one’s 
identity vis-à-vis those of others.
Global Asia  
The Global Asia cluster examines 
examples of and issues related  
to multiple, transnational  
intra-Asian interactions as well  
as Asia’s projection in the world. 
Historical experiences as well  
as more contemporary trends  
are addressed.
Research projects that can contribute to new,  
historically contextualised, multidisciplinary  
knowledge, with the capacity of translating  
this into social and policy relevant initiatives,  
will be privileged.
For information on the research  
clusters and application form  
visit our website:  
www.iias.nl
Emilia Roza Sulek
Caterpillar fungus boom in Tibet
ARE THERE TIBETAN pastoralists who  
thrive in China’s new economy, and do the 
stories about the ‘ecological resettlement’ 
(see pages 4-5 in this issue) tell the whole 
truth about Tibet’s pastoral society? I wrote 
my dissertation about such economically 
successful pastoralists and came to the IIAS 
to transform it into a book manuscript. 
In my book, I analyse a regional 
economic boom based upon the trade in 
caterpillar fungus, an expensive medicinal 
resource endemic to the Tibetan plateau. 
This trade witnessed a gradual rise in 
popularity after the economic reforms of 
the 1980s, and in the early 2000s it grew 
to such a size that it became compared 
to a ‘gold rush’. Wild harvesting and sale 
of caterpillar fungus became the main 
source of income for the pastoralists in 
regions such as Golok where I conducted 
my research. This research revealed that 
the pastoralists not only earn their income 
from caterpillar fungus, but also use profits 
to transform their lives and environments 
in novel ways. In my book, I analyze the 
complex character of this transformation, 
ranging from changes in pastoral pro-
duction to infrastructural investments. 
The pastoralists, as pictured in this study, 
appear as active agents of change who use 
their new-found prosperity to accomplish 
their own goals. They demonstrate human 
agency and skills often neglected in studies 
devoted to Tibetan pastoral societies  
of China.
The IIAS is where I always wanted to 
go. I subscribed to the Newsletter during 
my undergraduate years in Warsaw and 
imagined the Institute with its multi-
disciplinary approach as the place where 
I could fully develop my interests. In fact, 
the first report from my fieldwork, a crime 
story entitled “Tseren’s last gold rush”, 
I published nowhere other than in The 
Newsletter (issue #46)! Since my childhood 
I have also always wanted to go to the 
Netherlands. My uncle worked at the 
flower fair in Aalsmeer and I remember all 
his stories and postcards from that time. 
Leiden is a good match to my imagination. 
It has fertile soil for working on my book 
and offers inspiration on other levels. I like 
the canals with their still water at night, 
numberless bridges (I have to think about 
van Gogh and Hiroshige) and seagulls 
waiting to steal your broodje. I enjoy the 
North Sea air and the Hollandse Nieuwe 
at the market. I engulf myself in Leiden’s 
history, discovering its hidden gems: the 
clock (from before the pendulum era!) 
in the Hooglandsche Kerk, the oasis-like 
alms-houses and the Café De Bonte Koe, 
which was meant to be a butcher’s shop. 
It’s a pity they don’t serve Jenever in Leidse 
flessen! My anthropology of daily life would 
not be complete without the Netherlands’ 
best kept secret: its food, which, as many 
other things, is lekker. I
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The exhibition The Power and Pleasure of Possessions in Korean Painted Screens explores the genre of Korean still-life  
painting known as chaekgeori 冊巨里 (loosely translated as ‘books and things’). Chaekgeori [Check-oh-ree, 책거리)  
was one of the most prolific art forms of Korea’s Joseon dynasty (1392–1910), and it continues to be used today. It often 
depicts books and other material commodities as symbolic embodiments of knowledge, power, and social reform.  
For the first time in the United States, more than twenty screen paintings dating from the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries of the Joseon dynasty are on view at the Charles B. Wang Center at Stony Brook University in New York. 
Jinyoung Jin
Fig. 1: Chaekgeori,  
the Scholar’s  
Accoutrements. 
Late eighteenth to 
early nineteenth-
century Korea. 
Six-panel screen, ink 
and color on paper. 
60″(H) x 157″(W). 
The Leeum, Samsung 
Museum of Art.
Fig. 2: Chaekgeori,  
the Scholar’s  
Accoutrements.  
Late nineteenth- 
century Korea.  
Seven-panel screen,  
ink & color on paper.  
42″(H) x 162″(W). 
The Chosun Minhwa 
Museum.
Fig. 3: Airan Kang,  
Digital Book Project: 
The Luminous Poem, 
2011. Custom electro-
nics, LEDs, and resin. 
Dimension varies.
Fig. 4: Kyoungtack 
Hong, Library 3, 
1995-2001. Oil on 
canvas. 71¼″ x 89″.
The Power and Pleasure of Possessions  
in Korean Painted Screens
Showing at the Charles B. Wang Center,  
Stony Brook University (until 23 December 2016)
Spencer Museum of Art at the University of Kansas  
(8 April–12 June 2017)
Cleveland Museum of Art (5 August–5 November 2017)
CURATED BY A GROUP of Korean art experts that include 
Byungmo Chung (professor, Gyeongju University), Sunglim 
Kim (professor, Dartmouth College), Jinyoung Jin (Director 
of Cultural Programs, Charles B. Wang Center), Sooa Im 
McCormick (Assistant Curator of Asian Art, Cleveland 
Museum of Art), and Kris Imants Ercums (Curator of Global 
Contemporary and Asian Art, Spencer Museum of Art),  
this collection showcases marvelous and rare examples of  
chaekgeori screens alongside the works of a diverse body of  
contemporary artists who continue this genre into the twenty-
first century. Seven contemporary artists featured in the ex- 
hibition are Stephanie S. Lee, Seongmin Ahn, Kyoungtack Hong, 
Patrick Hughes, Sungpa, Young-Shik Kim, and Airan Kang. 
Initially intended as a means to maintain and promote the 
disciplined Confucian lifestyle of Joseon Korea against an influx 
of ideas and technology from abroad, King Jeongjo (1752-1800, 
r. 1776-1800) encouraged court painters to emphasize books as 
the main subjects of royal screen paintings and to embrace the 
power of books and the ideas contained within them. Realizing 
that books were vehicles of change in his society, King Jeongjo 
worked hard to popularize the idea of books as symbols able 
to transcend the tangible originals among Korea’s artisans and 
other elites. In the process, the value of physical books actually 
increased and became highly sought-after. This desire for books 
and other commodities in Korea set in motion a significant social 
and cultural shift toward materialism that has continued into the 
twenty-first century. One can say that chaekgeori paintings not 
only have the ability to teach and inspire, but they also possess 
the power to shape the values of a society.
One masterpiece in the exhibit serves as a great example of 
this. The piece in question is a six-panel screen that has a distinct 
rhythmical balance in its composition, depicting a full stack of 
books and luxurious objects (fig. 1). Chinese curiosities from 
the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) flooded the homes of the upper 
classes of Korea during this period, and this is reflected in this 
screen. Books mingle with scholarly objects (such as imported 
Chinese ceramics, brushes, paper, eyeglasses, and the like), all 
competing for prominence of place and the attention of the 
viewer. Each section elegantly displays scholarly accoutrements 
and prized collectibles, often in the shape of or featuring images 
of auspicious symbols. These images together signify the hope 
for academic achievement, social advancement, longevity, 
the birth of many sons, and happiness. The screen also utilizes 
European linear perspective, trompe l’oeil, and shading effects  
to create the illusion of three-dimensional space. 
The flexible yet timeless themes chaekgeori emphasizes and 
the numerous possibilities and techniques it can utilize have 
ensured the genre’s ongoing popularity, now stretching for 
more than two centuries. No other genre or medium in Korean 
art, in both literati and folk painting, has so engaged and 
documented the image of books and collectable commodities, 
and the changes in how we view and value them over time.  
And when the genre transitioned into folk-style painting, new 
and unexpected visual elements emerged. Folk-style chaekgeori 
expanded the range of subjects beyond books to express 
surrealistic dreams and more. For example, an unusual feature 
of this particular late nineteenth-century screen (fig. 2) is its 
depiction of clouds and a dragon. The dragon symbolizes the 
desire for many sons, the wish to educate them, and the hope 
to have them improve their social status through education. 
The surrealistic depictions of such earthly desires is a testament 
to the incredible imagination inherent in folk-style chaekgeori. 
The exhibition also showcases how this artistic genre has 
been utilized by today’s artists. For example, in Airan Kang’s 
Digital Book Project installation, books glow, catching the 
viewer’s eye, yet they simultaneously invite and forbid access  
as embodiments of ideals (fig. 3). This aspect of her work can be 
directly compared to the representation of books in chaekgoeri 
paintings, where books are symbols of ideas, inaccessible 
objects that ultimately surpass their original, physical meaning 
and being. In our increasingly paperless and digitized society, 
Kang depicts books as still holding an inner light, an artistic 
decision which seems to be an argument against the practice  
of valuing books solely as material commodities. 
In his Library series, Kyoungtack Hong paints still-lifes filled 
to the brim with books, birds, and plants. The results are often 
surrealistic with materialistic overtones. Whereas in traditional 
chaekgeori paintings objects take on a privileged aura, in Hong’s 
paintings the materials of old – Chinese ceramics, fabrics, 
lacquered boxes – yield to plastics, mass-produced disposables, 
and impersonal objects. In his Library 3 (fig. 4), thousands 
of books serve as space defining objects, backgrounds, and 
pedestals for hundreds of mass-produced toys. These toys, due 
to sheer quantity and our preconceived notion of their value, 
are ultimately of little importance. On the left side of the  
painting, three skulls enter the pictorial space. Symbolizing 
death, they are a stark contrast to the durable plasticity of the 
toys, as if to forecast an impending doomsday. On the right 
side, the Virgin Mary acts as a quintessential (yet also ironic) 
representation of Western religion, ethics, and humanity. 
Through these juxtapositions, Hong reminds his viewers 
that there is more to life than the ownership of uncountable 
objects, especially when said objects are so empty of any 
transcendental value or meaning. Books are in the background 
of our lives, much like in Hong’s painting, serving as props for 
materialism. Using chaekgeori, Hong is able to astutely critique 
this state of affairs. The other modern artists featured in the 
exhibition make similar (yet also differing) commentaries on 
these themes, using a genre created and promoted expressly 
to combat against materialism.
The significance of any work of art consists largely in the 
work’s ability to carry and communicate embodied meaning. 
And when it comes to documenting, engaging, and comment-
ing on the culture of consumption, no other genre or medium 
in Korean art can compare to chaekgeori. By drawing on a long 
artistic lineage and making comparisons to the traditional 
form and objectives of chaekgeori with contemporary examples, 
The Power and Pleasure of Possessions in Korean Painted Screens 
facilitates a better understanding of the intellectual curiosity 
and the desire to own commodities that animated Korean 
society then and that continue to animate us now – and how 
these powerful urges continue to be portrayed in art.
Jinyoung Jin (Director of Cultural Programs,  
The Charles B. Wang Center).
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